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, filc-stamped May 4 
to &fendan$' Motlo 
ng Attorneys Fees to 
uments from case CV 0801763 
filc-%ramped Apnl 21. 2009; and 
7 Memorandum In Suppon of Dcfendants' Monon for Recons~dcrahon R 
Attorneys' Fees Awarded, file-stamped Apnl 21. 2009 
cc. Counsel of Record 
Disinct Coun Clerk 
In the Supreme Court o f  the State o f  Idaho 
REED J. TAYLOR. an ~ndivrdual, 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
,i ORDER GRANTING MOTION 
1 TO AUGMENT THE RECORI) 
'I I 
1 Supreme Court Docket No. 
1 36130/36131 
MICHAEL E MC NICHOLS, an individual; ) Nez Perce County District Court 
CLEMENTS. BROWN & MC NICHOLS, P.A., ) NO. 2008- 1 76312008- 1765 
an Idaho professional corporation; JANE DOES j 
I -V. unknown individuals, 
,i 
1 Ref. No. 09-342 
Defendants-Respondents ) 
RESPONDENTS' SECOND JOINT MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD with 
attachment was filed by counsel for Respondents July 27, 2009. Therefore, good cause 
appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that RESPONDENTS' SECOND JOINT MOTION TO 
AUGMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the appeal record shall include the 
document listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied the Motion: 
I .  Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify, file-stamped December 8, 
2008. 
- - c 
DATED this 37 day of August 2009. 
For the Supreme Court 
cc: Cou~lsel of Record 
8flh k w  
Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk V 
mIGZ.&L DISTMCT OP TW 
STATE OF O m  OF NEZ PUCE 
EEED I. TAYLOR, a single person, 1 
) CASE NO. CV07-00208 
Plajntiff, 1 
) OPMON AhZ, ORDER ON 
) P W F ' S  MOT10X TO 
) DISQUiUIEY 
AL4 SmVICES COmOUTIOM; an Idaho 5 
corporation; AIA W S W C E ,  Gc., a0 j 
Idabo solpombn; R. JOHN TAYL,OR and ) 
CONNIE TAYLOR, h&dividuaIIy and the ) 
co@serf thmeoq 1 
BRIAN -MAN, a single person; md ) 
IOLEE DUCLOS, a single person; CROP ) 
USA INSURANCE AGENCY, INC., sn ) 
Idaho cmporatim; and JAMES BECK and ) 
CO- BECK, individually and in tbe 
w m w  priperty comprised thereof; 
Defendants. 
1 
1 
E s  mtter is bcfoie the Court on PlsintiE s Motion to Disqualifj the Attorneys and Law 
Firms o f  Hawley Troxell Emis & Hawley LLP, Clmnts  Brown & McNicholr, PA, and 
Qwles % Brady LLP. A hearing on the motion was held October 20,2008. Plaintiff Reed 
TayIor was represented by attorneys Michael L. BisA and Roderick C. Bond. Defendants AIA 
S e ~ a s  Corporation aod IUA Insurance, Ine. were represeated by attorney Crsig Mdadows xi& 
Taylor v. A&. er al. 1 
Dpim'on & Mi- on Motiotz ro D&quaigj im Fim 
the law fim of hwiey  TmxeU Eonis & Ha%?iey. Crop USA u9s rqret;ented by 
aMmey Charles Harper with the law firm of Quaries a n d  Brady. Defmdant R John Taylor was 
repre~ented by Womey WckT E. McNiehols with thc Isw &m of Clmcnts, Bmwn and 
McNichols. The C o w  hdviDg read the motion, amended motion, briefs, md fideviu 
mbmined by the panics, having heard o n l  s r p e n t s  of c o w l  and Wig My advised i~ the 
mamx, hczreby &es its &ision. 
FACrZiU BACXCGROUM) 
on J m w  29,2007. Retd Tayior filed suit AIA Senices Corporation, AIA 
Insmaace, Ine., John Taylm, Come Taylor, Bryan Freeman and J o b  Ducios. A& Insurance, 
Inc. is a businxts entity unda the umbmlla of AIA S&w Corporation. At the time of the 
filling of thc lawsuit, John Taylor was the director of  the carporations and a board 
member dong with Bryn Fre- and JoLee hclos .  Comie Taylor, the f m e r  wife of John 
Taylor, held a eommunip properly interest in the corparations. Follorring the filing of the 
la-t, atorney Michael McNicbols was retxind to r e p m i  AIA Semiccs, M A  hwce and 
John Taylor; sitomey David Gittem was retained to repnsmt Bryan Ffeeman and JoLce Duclor; 
atromcy Jm %illy was retained to represent Connie Taylor. P W L a t e r  menM his 
C o m p h t  fo include CropUSA, kc. and others approxlmatcly sewn m o n k  alter the original 
Cornplaint was filed. 
W i ~  &ys of the fitkg of zhe lawsuit, the Defendants, as weU as the Plaintrff; filed 
motions for temporary restraining orders aod pre- injrurctiom. On F e b v  27,2007, the 
Court e d  a temporary restraining order against Reed Taylor after he ~aempted to cxesise 
management autZIority o v a  tfie corporate Defendaats. A hearing clate 'ufw schedded and, on 
Toylor v. AM. et d 2 
Oplnion & Order on Mdion ro DBPu(II@ Larv Firm 
-48%. 
-&i& 
< - ax< 
." zx$- 
. CEC 8. 9 6 6 8  1.30%4 V@ICT COJRT 
March 8,2007, f d  
iqjmc&on prohibi~g h e d  Taylor from acting or m p h g  to act as m q e r  d o r  a board 
member of AL4 Insurance Inc andor &om hararsing and/or inwering with the managemem of 
AIA Toswmm, Inc. a d  AM Sw5ce;: ~ o ~ r a t i o n '  The Corn's Order h effect. 
On Mach 28,2007, attorney McNichk filed a motion to vvitMraw as oamei for AL4 
ScNices and ALA Ins . Reed Taylor did not obje~t and, at a heahg oa Apnl f 2,2007, the 
Court wted tfie motion to withdraw. On May 7,2007, a notice of appearance on behalf of 
At4 Senices and ALA lnsumne was Bed by crttomys C k y  Babbitt and 3oh Ahby of the law 
&ID Hawley, Troxell Ennxs gt HawIey, LLP. The fixm makues to represent the c q d o n s .  
After Dt3fendant CropUSA was b u & t  into tbe action as a Defmhg the: Chicago law firm of 
Quarles & Brady Bed a notice of appeataact: on behalf of the w~oration, having assoc.iated 
with the Idaho law firm of Rawley Truxell Ennis & Hawley. 
After nearly ninewen months of litigation, nmwous motions a d  h m g s ,  extehsive 
discovery, aaid uuswssfut  ef%orts to resolve tbe matter ur mediation, on S q b b e r  8,2008 
F l u R e e d  Taylor 6Ied a motion to disqtdi@ the various attorneys aad law f h s  
rep~z~enw Defmbt John Taylor, the AIA corpor&ons, and CropUSA. An Amended motion 
was filed on Septmber 24,200g. In respame, the Ddendants, as wiI ss the Plaintiff, filed 
leagthy briefs atld expert affidavits in support of their xespectivt positions. On October 7 and 10, 
2008, Defetldants John TayIor and fhe: AI.4 coq~ra t io~ l~  Bed motions to submit documents to 
the Court under seal for in camera review The COW heard oxd arments  on PImtiFs nrot~on 
on October 20,2008 and thex&r grated the mottons to submit documents -mdcr s d  for in 
camera review by the Court. 
-- -- 
' hkch 8,2008 Opiioa and Order on Defendanl;' Metion fbr Preliminary Injaaction at page 6 
Taylor u ALd, el aL 3 
Opinion & Or& on Mtxion ro Disqua/f& Law Fiinr 
on to gut or TD d a y  a m&an 
pp.3991). On appeal 
percdved the issue as one of &wetion; 
the b o d & e s  of its discMon and cons*ady with the icgat standards 
appliable to tlx spec& choices available to it; and (3) whether the tiid court 
re&d its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. at 697,819 P.2d at I 15. 
The m o w  paty has the bmden of eftabfishing grounds for the diwifirntion. 
Id. The pal  of the court should be to shape a remedy which will asstire fairness 
to the partits and the integrity of the judicial process. In'. Whenever pos&le, 
courts &odd endeavor to mla a sduiun &at is Icmt butdemome to the climt. 
Id. M~hent the motion to coma not fbm a cliexlt m formex client of 
the attorney, but fiom aa opposing party, the motion should be: rwicwtxl with 
caution. Id. Tbe court must also condder that a motion to disqwdify opposing 
cornsel should bc filed at fhe onset of the ~tigdon, ox "with promptness and 
r m & l e  ditigmm" once the fix% upon which the mbhoa is based have 
become known. Id. & 698,8 19 P.2d at 11 6, A &hire to act ptomfly may 
wmm d d a l  of the motion. Id. 
Crown v. Nwkm Go., LTD, 128 Xdabo 1 14,122,910 P.2d 786 (Ct.App. 1996). 
A N U Y  SIS 
In the inamt mottter, PhWco&nds the Def&& should be ascxtbg claims a g d t  
each other sac£, not only are counsel for fhe D e f m h ~  not assetting tbose claims, they me in 
fact worbg together to mmr& udawzl  acts io order to dqrivc the Plaintiff of assets 
belonghg ta hua, by means of a joint defme w m e n t .  Plaintiff W e x  zstlerts the attorneys 
anr3 law fkms repteserllting Ioh  Taylor, tfic AXA corporations, and CropUSA axe representing 
their q e c t i v e  clients in violation of professional ethics d e s  which prohibit feprewntation of 
clients wirh codlicting interests. 
P M F s  motion quickly beoame a matter of dueling experts as each party to tbe motion 
Med numerous and mmsive expat &davits in support of their respective positioni;. The 
T&or r. A& ct al 4 
Ctpim;Pn d M r  an Motion to  D & M @  Low Firm 
b m h  of tstablisbg grounds for diqdlifrcanon ruts w i t h  Phm ar the moving paty. 
Rbm the mation wmt?S from an omsing p?y ,  as it does here, the Court must re'iiew the 
motion snd aceompaying filings with caubon and witb ao eye toward f h s s  to the paniff and 
to the inmety of the judicial 
After reGew of the in mmea dowmb, tlre Court is by, md ih wemeat 
%4& the opiaim of at? D experts. The m y s  and their Iaw firms 
rm&d tbe peal diets of inter& and the posibility of c b s  &tween Ddeadmb. 
In wmpEance 16th the Idaho Rules of hofesional Conduct, thc respective att:ome~ls and law 
f w  first M y  informed their potential clxents on the issues of codicts and future claims, 
o b h e d  written vrtaivers from their clients md required their ckents to execute apemmb &a2 
pmserue my and alX claims that now exist or may arise as ~s result of this litigation. There i s  no 
absoiUte prohibition in Idaho's & b i d  rules m the reprmt?tion of client's with potatid 
conflicts of intmzst. Rather, tbr?- nrles rcq.ctire an attorney to takt: c e W  steps before atering 
into such a ~ M i o s ~ p .  In the insfmt mttm, the Coat is firmly pcmwded that tbc! law fim of 
Clemmts Bmm and McNichols, H&wley Troxell Emis and Hawley, and Quar1es and Brady, 
dong wth the ind3'vldd &torneys, kave met their ethical obligatioas to thtir respective clients 
and to each of the o k  parties in the matter. 
Finally, tho Court notes that Plaintiff's motion to di@@ counsel came ody BAer &e 
attorneys have been actsng as ~surtsef ur thek respective clients for well aver a year, dumg 
which multiple motions have been filed, nmerow hearings bave been held, and extensive: 
discovery has been completed To dis- the attorneys aad law fm at W jmcture would 
not only serve an iqjustice to the Dcfendant clients of tbe anomeys, but would serve an injustice 
to the Plaintiff. The principles of himess add justice require the insran.t matter to move fomwd 
n of tht? issues aid to do so witb those who are now well versed in the 
issws Ed un&l*g matte;=. 
within the discretioq 
ion m a g  of the Cbur~ and ticting wim t%re of tht W e t i o n  and consimt 
sufficient pmds to 
disqvalify thc law h and individuai mmeys from reprmting their respective clients io the 
aba\?e-entided mm. The Comt Einds no violatim of the ethical rules, the attorneys and law 
f m  having mted mthin those rules by frtliy i a f m g  their chats regarding possible confltcts 
of interest, hmg obtained written waiven of those mdicQ a id  hvhg pmervcd any and all 
c W  that may exist between the various Dehdmts 
OmEy 
PlainWs Motion to the rrttmys and law firms of Hawley TroxeIl Enais (8; 
hwIcy, LLP, Clements Brow & McNichols, P.A., and Quarles & Brady, LLP is haeby 
D r n E D .  
Tbylwv dall 6 
Opinion Ilt Order ~ r s  Mon'on to D8qtfalift taw Firms 
@@$$ -, Gxd 
* *-, 
- 1- NO. $488 K i: i 
I haeby cc.lrtsi@ that a me copy of the forezokg 0WER was: 
J b d  &liver& via corn baskeg or .~d;jtcR 
P 
V 
mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersimtd at Leuiston, Idaho, this B a y  of 
Demmbm, 2008, to: 
Rcxierick G, Bond 
Smith and C m o n  
508 Ei&& St 
L&ston, ID 83501 
David R Itisley 
bdkLI,  Blake gt Cox 
FO Bax 446 
W b q  Tt) 83501 
hrlichael S. Bissstl Jmm -oh 
7 S Howard St Charles E. Harper 
S p o h ~ ,  WA 99201 Quarles and Brady LLP 
500 W Madison St., Ste 3700 
Michael E McNtchols Chicago IL 6066 1-25 1 1 
CImeaB, Brown & McNichofs 
PO Box 1510 
h~ston, XL, 83501 
David A. Gi* 
PO BOX 191 
C1-n, WA 99403 
Charles Brown 
PO Box 1225 
Lewristo~ ID 83501 
Gary D. Babbitt 
r) John Ashby 
If~wley, Troxell Emis & Hawley LLP 
POBox 1617 
Boise, TT) 8 3 m  17 A 
Taylor v. AIA, et 111. 
Opinioa & Order on Motion a, Disquali* Law Finns 7 
In the Supreme Court of the State o f  Idaho 
REED .I. TAYLOR, a11 individual, 1 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, i 
) ORDER GMNTIKG MOTION TO 
1. ) AUGMENT THE RECORD 
1 
MICHAEL E. MC NICHOLS, an individual: ) Supreme Court Docket Nos. 36130-2009 
CLEMENTS, BROWN & MC NICHOLS, ) (36131-2009) 
P.A., a11 Idaho professional corporation; JANE ) Nez Perce County District Court 50s. 
DOES I -V. unknown indikiduals, ) 2008- 1763 (2008- 1765) 
I t /  Defendants-Respondents. 1 
$1 I// 1 
REED J.  TAYLOR, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 1 
1 
GARY D. BABBITT, and individual; D. 1 
JOHN ASHBY, and individual; PATRICK V. ) 
COLLIKS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY, TROXELL, ) 
EhWIS & HAWLEY, LLP, an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals, 
1 
1 
Defendants-Respondents. 
1 
1 
A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND STATEMENT IN SUPPORT 
THEREOF was filed by counsel for Appellant on June 15, 2009. A CONDITIONAL NON- 
OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGLMENT RECORD BY MICHAEL E. 
MCNICHOLS AND CLEMENTS, BROWN & MCNICHOLS, P.A. and a CONDITIONAL NON- 
OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD BY HAWLEY 
TROXELL were filed on June 24, 2009. Thereafter, APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
) i f  
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD was filed on June 25, 2009. Therefore, good cause 
IT l3EKEBY IS ORDERED that Appellanr's -MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be, I 
/ I 1  
i t  
Il 
I I and hereby is, GRANTED and the augnlentation record shall Include the documents llsted below. . , 
1 '  111 
1: j i  file stamped coples of whlch accompanted thls Motton: 
I 
I f 1  
I l f  
11 Documents from case number C?' 08-01765 1: 
1: 
1 .  Defendants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, file-stamped January 6,2009: 
2. Brief in Support of Defendants' Costs and Attorneys' Fees, file-stamped January 6, 
2009: 
3. Affidavit in Support: of Defendants' Costs and Attorneys' Fees, file-stamped January 6, 
2009; 
4. Plalntlff Reed J.  Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorneys' Fees 
and Costs, file-stamped January 20. 2009: 
5 .  Memorandum in Response to Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request 
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs, file-stamped February 3, 2009; 
6. Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Amend Defendants' Memorandum of Costs 
and Attorneys' Fees, file-stamped February 3, 2009; 
7. Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Motion for Leave to Amend Memorarldum of 
Costs and Fees, file-stamped February 19, 2009; 
8. Reply to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs, file- 
stamped February 23, 2009; 
9. Defendants' Reply Brief in Support of Motion for Leave to Anlend Meinorandurn of 
Costs and Attorneys' Fees, file-stamped February 24, 2009; 
10. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs, 
file-stamped April 3, 2009; 
1 1. Judgment, file-stamped April 24, 2009; 
12. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion, Order and 
Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants, file-stamped May 4, 2009; 
13. Plalntiff Reed J. Taylor's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Opinion and Order Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants, 
file-stamped May 7, 2009; 
13. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, file-stamped 
May 1 1,2009; 
15. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration and Plaintiffs Motion 
for Reconsideration, file-stamped June 1, 2009; 
16. Second Amended Notice of Appeal, file-stamped June 4,2009: 
17. Amended Notice of Appeal, file-stamped May 15, 2009; 
f t  Documents from case CV 08-01763 111 
kli / / I  
I I 
*I 
111  
18. Defendants' Verlfied Menlolandurn of Attorney's Fees and Costs, file-stamped iii 
I l  
!;I  January 6,2009; I $  t 
I l l  
I /  
.'I 19. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Award of Fees/Costs, file-stamped 
January 6, 2009; I l l  i ; 
'I 
ti! 
jll 
I / 14 
ii"j 
i b i  
ii j i /  
20. Plaintrff Reed J. Taylor's Motion to Disallow Defendants' Request for Attorneys' 
Fees and Costs, file-stamped January 20, 2009; 
2 1 .  Memorandum in Support: of Motion to Amend Request for Award of Attorney's Fees, 
file-stamped February 3,2009; 
22. Defendants' Joinder in Brief Filed by Hau ley Troxell Defendants In Response to Reed 
Taylor's Motion to Disallow Request for Attonley's Fees and Costs, file-stamped 
February 6,2009; 
23. Plair~t~ff  s Response to Defendants Motion for Leave to Amend Memorandum of Costs 
and Fees, file-stamped February 19, 2009; 
24. Repll to Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow Fees and Costs, file- 
stamped Februasy 23, 2009; 
25. Jornder in Reply Brief Filed by Defendant Hawley Troxell on h4otion for Leave to 
Amend Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, file-stamped February 24,2009; 
26. Opinlon and Order on Defendants' Motion for Avvard of Attorney Fees and Costs, 
file-stamped April 3. 2009; 
27. Judgment. file-stamped April 24, 2009: 
28. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Motion for Reconsideration of the Opinion, Order and 
Judgment Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants, file-stamped May 4. 2009; 
29. Plaintiff Reed J. Taylor's Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Opinion and Order Awarding Attorneys Fees to Defendants, 
file-stamped May 7, 2009; 
30. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Plainti fT's Motion for Reconsideration, 
file-stamped May 1 1. 2009; 
3 1. Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney Fees and Costs. 
file-stamped June 1 ,  2009: 
32. Second Amended Notice of Appeal, file-stamped June 4, 2009. and 
33. Amended Notice of Appeal, file-stamped May 15, 2009. 
ti f 
;1 IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall submit to this Court, within 
I 
I (13) fourteen days of the date of this order, the docun~ents listed below which shall upon receipt be I 
I 
11 added to the augmentation record, documents whic1-t were NOT submitted with this Motion, and not 
' f l  
.I1 I 
i 
It 
contained in this record on appeal: I 11: I /  
,it Documents from case CI7 08-01765 '11 
I / /  
111 I .  Motion for Leave to Amend Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees, ;i 
I i i  1'1 
11 file-stamped February 3, 2009; $1  
2. Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. file-stamped Aprll 2 1 ,  2009; and I l l  Ijl tll /!I 
1 , 3. Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Reconsideratlon, file-stamped 111 
11 April 2 1, 2009; iil 
/I I t  
Documents from case CV 08-01763 11 11 
l j l  
I l l  4. Defendants' Motlon for Award of Attorney's Fees, file-stamped January 6, 2009; l l j  
/ I i  111 5.  Motlon to Amend Request for Award of Attorney's Fees, file-stamped February 3, /I 2009; 
i j I I 6. Defendants' Motlon for Reconslderation Re: Amount of Attorneys' Fees Awarded, 11; 111 'I 
j l l  $1; 
'!i j l  
Ill li' 
cc: Coul~sel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
s 
1: file-stamped Aprrl 2 1 ,  2009, and 
11; 7 Memoralidurn In Support of Defendants' hlotlon for Recons~deratioll Re: Amount of 
I 
I Attorneys' Fees Awarded, file-starnpcd Aprtl 2 1. 2009. 
i 
'11 
7 
i l  
;t 
I 
6 
'I 
I 
1 
I 
t 
I 
i 
I 
i t /  
I 
I 
I 
i 
t I 
$ 1  
1 
1 8  
.I /I 
1 
1 :  
I 1  
I 
111 1; 
I 
I 
I" 
[i 
I I 
I /  
I!/ 
I 
I f  
8 1 
11 
it 
/ j j 
=*He** - * ------ - 
Jam- D Mue 13B #I 780 
L ~ r m  C.  Xpwn 1SB Zit1 767 
25 X E. Front Streee, Suite 300 
1tO. Box 1539 
Dose, I& 83701 
Telephom. (2081) 343-5454 
Fac&dle, (208) 38-1-5814 
E & B File No ~ O S Z - D C ~ ~  ? 
AEomeys for Defmdiznts 
THE DISmIGT COURT OF THE S'ECOhD KlI3IChL DIST)11@): OF W E  
STATE OF IBAEIO, M AND FOR THE COUNTY OF TiP! PFXCF 
Plaintiff; Case No. CV 08-01 765 
t 
GARY D. R A R R I n ,  nn individuai; D. JOW 
ASHBY, an individuril; PATRTGK V 
WLLWS, an indivldud; KICMARD A 
RILEY, an indjvidud: m W E Y  TEQXELL 
E3TK?S & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho l h t e d  
liability p&er&p; JAN% DOES I-X 
unfLnoun inhviduals; 
DEFENDANTS' mMORGVi3CM OF 
COSTS ANI) ATTO-S' FEES 
Defendmb Gary D. BabbiR D. John Ashby, Patrick V. CoUias, Richard A. %Riley and 
Hawley Troxell Emis & Hawley lLP, by and throu& their attorneys of record, E l m  M Bmkc, 
PA. ,  bereby submit the t b l l o m  M a r m d u m  of Coc;ts and Attorney Fees pursuant tn Rdes 
54(d)(l), 54(d)f5), Sdfe)(Y), and 54(e)(5) of the Iddho Rules of Civil Procedw and Idaho Code 
D@EhDmf S' MEMOMWUM OF C'OSTS AhrD A'PTORNEYS' FEES 1 
0 t'arT1013 Pimk~urcoties b )OT)FJD%I. b'f~cI&&sm n DrA*Bm@1 F a  U d C b ~ ~ J k k b B ?  ht-dlts 0 iC3~1  b~. 9s Ol vpl 
$ #  12- 12 1 , 30- 1 -746(2) and (3), and 48-hOii(5) Defendants are the prevailing parties in this 
action by virtue of the Opinion and Ordrr nn 1Iefkndant.c' Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend Complaint entered herein on December 23, 2008. 
Part A - Gosts as a Matter of' Right Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)fC1 
Item Description of Cost 
-
No. 
-
I .  Filing f'ee paid to Nez Perce Ctlur~ty Distnct Court for 
filing Answer 
TOTAL COSTS AS A MA7VPER OF RIGHT SOIIGHT 
Cost Amount 
Amount Per Item 
Part B - Attorney Fees Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) and 54leM5) 
Description of Fees Amount 
No. 
P Per Item 
I .  Fees incurred from 08/20/2005, through 12/04/2008. For a detailed $43,912.50 
itemization of fees, see Exhib~t A t o  the Affidakit of Loren C. Ipsen in 
Support of Defendants' Costs and Attorney Fees. 
Part -
A 
£3 
'TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES SOI;GlIT 
Part C - Recaa of'Total Gosts and Fees Soueht 
T p e  of Costs or Fees 
Costs as a Matter of Right 
Attorney Fees 
Amount 
$58.00 
$43,912.50 
TOTAL COSTS AND FEES SOUGI4T $43,970.50 
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T E D  11s day of January, 2009. 
ELAN! ei, BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
STATE OF IDAJ IO ) 
1 
County of A63 1 
LOREN C-'. IPSEN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
That I-ie IS one of the attorneys for Defendants in this action and, as such, has knowledge 
of'the ficts relatlve to the above costs; that the items in the above memorandum are correct and 
have been neccssar~ly incurred in said cause; and that the same are allowable under Rule 54(d) of 
the Idaho liules o f  Civil Procedure. 
/ 
'h: SLTHSCKlHED and SWORN to before me this b d 2009. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day ofjanuary, 2009'1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instmment to be served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Michael S Bissell A u.3. hlail 
CAMPBELL BIISS~:I-I, & KIRBY, PLLG Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street. Ste. 41 6 Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 1 1 
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Jams D. LaRue ISB #I 780 
Loren C Ipwa XSB #I767 
ELAM &L BURKE, P A .  
251 E. Front Street. Suite JW 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 33701 
Telephone. (208) 343-5454 
Facs~mile. (208 j 384-584 
E & B File No. 7082-001 3 
Attorneys for Defmhts 
IN THE D1Sj"KICT COUKT UF THE SECQ AL DJSTRICTT OF 'TXE 
STATE OF IDAHO, AND FOR THE C O W Y  OF NEZ PERCE 
;REED J TAYLOR, an indiGdidual; 
Plaintiff, 
GARY D. RABBITTI an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an m&vidual: PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, aa individud, RICKAaD A. 
RILEY, an mdrvidual; W W E Y  TROXELL 
EfiPSIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Id& h i r e d  
liability par~m&p;  JAME DOES X-X, 
unknown indiw'duals: 
Case No. CV 08-01 553 
BRIEF lypj SljPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
COSTS A h 9  ATTOhKEVS' FEES 
Defeadants, a.6 the prwaitislp parties in ttle above-capbnned case, have applied ta tbe C:ottr! 
for an award of attorney's fm iiad costs For the following reasons fees and cost should be 
awarded. 
BRIEF lj\J SWPORT OF DEFEhrDAN15' COS I'S .AND A'ITORNEYS' FEES 1 
~7052~iBI3iPlcadir~slUution to Dumw\Ap~lh&)a fur Anomqs' Fm and W&ncfin Support nf Cc3b &. *ti 01 YPJ 
Idaho Code $ 12- 1 2 1 provides: 
In any clvll action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties, provided that the section shall not alter, repeal or amend 
any stature wh~ch  othenvise provides for the award of attorney's fees. The term 
"party" or “parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, corporation, 
association, prtvatc organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof." 
The statutclrypower granted by Idaho Code $12-12 1 is discretionary; attorney's fees will not 
be awarded as a ~natter of'right. hfinich 11. Gent State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 9 1 I ,  59 1 P.2d 1 078 
(1 979). Rather, an award ofattorney's fees under Cj 12-121 is appropriate where an action is brought 
hvolously, unreasonablq, or without foundation. Gatchel v. Butler, 104 Idaho 876,664 P.2d 1 163 
(Gt.App. 1983). I t  is appropriate to award fees pursuant to $ 12-121 where the court is not asked to 
establish any new legal standards, nor to modifL or clarify any existing legal standards, but the focus 
of the action is the application of settled law to the facts. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho 876, 664 P.2d 
1 163 (Ct.App. 1983). 
The present case, while unusual, is not a case of first impression. In 7'a.yIor v. Maile, 142 
ldaho 253,259,127 P.3cl i 56,162 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing 
to sue an attorney for breach of fiduciary duty where they had no attorney-client relationship and the 
attorney had not assumed 3 fiduciary relationship with the plaintiffs. Reed Taylor is or reasonably 
should be aware of the controlling principles of law enunciated in that case, since he was one of the 
plaintiffs. Nevertheless. he asserted similar claims against attorneys with whom he had no attorney- 
client relationship in the present case. Where a party wilfully asserts claims which are contrary to 
established law, imposition of fees under 5 12- 12 1 is appropriate. 
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Where a parly's arement  hinges upon a question of law, attomey's fees will be awarded 
under 5 12-1 2 I ifthe question of law is clearly settled. H~lichinson v. Stare, I34 Idaho 18,904 P.2d 
303 (Ct.App, 1999). And where an appeal turns on questions of law, attomey's fees are recoverable 
under 4 12- 12 1 if the law is well-settled and the appellant has made nt! substantial showing that the 
trial court misapplied the law. Andvewjs v Idnho f"iire.rt Industries, Inc , 1 17 Idaho 195, 786 P. 2d 
586 (Ct.App. 1990). The same principle is applicable at the District Court level. Where, as here, 
the plaintiff asserts untenable claims contraq to settled law, an award of attorney's fees 1s 
appropriate. Attorney's fees should be awarded under Ij 12-1 21 where the position advocated by the 
nonprevailing party is plainly fallacious and not fairly debatable. Associates N. W. 11. Beets, 1 12 
Idaho 603,733 P.2d 824 (Ct.App. 1987). 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor lacked standrng to bring any of the claims alleged in his Complaint or 
the proposed Amended Complaint. It was not asserted by him that he was at any time represented 
by the dekndants or that he was a shareholder at the time of the events upon which his purported 
shareholder derivative action was based. These are plain facts which are not fairly debatable. 
Plaintiff could not possibly have been under any misapprehension regarding the facts. Nor should 
the applicable law been difficult to discern. Established case law in this state holds that privity is 
required in order to bring a professional malpractice action against a lawyer, except in the narrow 
ctrcumstance of an attorney preparing t e s t m e n t q  instruments. HarrigJeld v. Hancock, 140 Idaho 
134,90 P.3d 884 (2004); Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522,546 P.3d 623 (2004). The only possible 
conclusion is that plaintiff deliberately chose to disregard the facts and settled law when he filed hls 
Complaint. 
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Plaintiff further disregarded settled law by basing his Complaint primarily on actions taken 
by defendants in open court or othewise in pursuance of their duty to represent their ci~enrs. Ir is 
a shocking proposition that one can bring an action against opposing counsel for simply discharging 
their duty to represent their clients' interest in accordance with their ethical obligatior?~. As noted 
by the Court at page 13 of its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motjon to Dismiss and Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend Complaint, "Plaintiff is unable to direct the Court to any conduct or action on the 
part of Defendants that falls outside of the scope of Defendants' representation of their clients." 
The pattern of disregard of the facts and established law continued when plaintiff moved to 
amend his Complaint. The only new substantive causes of action related to plaintiff's shareholder 
derivative action theories, but plaintiffwas well-aware that he lacked the necessary standing to bring 
suit because he was not a shareholder at the relevant time. In summary, one is left with the abiding 
impression that plaintiff filed and pursued this case frivolously, unreasonably and without 
foundation. 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWAFtD OF REASONABLE 
ATTORNEYS' FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 630-1-746(2) A N U  
Idaho Code 5 30-1-746(2) and (3) provide that, upon tmjnationn-of a shareholder's 
---------- -- 
derivative action, the court may: 
(2) Order the plaintiff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, includ~ng 
reasonable counsel fees, incurred in defending the proceeding if it finds that the 
proceeding was commenced or maintained without reasonable cause or for an 
improper purpose; or 
(3) Order a party to pay an opposing party's reasonable expenses, including 
reasonable counsel fees, incurred because of the filing of a pleading, motion or other 
paper, if it finds that the pleading, motion or other paper was not well grounded In 
fact, after reasonable inquiry, or warranted by existing law or a good faith argument 
for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law and was interposed for tin 
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itnproper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless increase 
in the cost of litigation. 
The Official Comment to 4 30-1 -746 states that among the purposes ofthe statute are to deter 
stnke suits and prevent proceedings w h l ~ h  ]nay be bmught to harass the corporation or its officers. 
Although only Reed Taylor can explain his 5ubj~ctlve jntent in filing the present action, the 
reasonableness of the allegations asserted by htm when he sought to bring a shareholder derivative 
action against the defendants can be assessed by objective standards. 
Foremost among the relevant considerat~ons is the fact that Mr. Taylor was not a shareholder 
at the time of the alleged acts and omissions complained of The Idaho statutes clearly require that 
only a shareholder has standing to bring a sharctlolder denvatlve action. Moreover, the nature of the 
allegations contained in the Complaint and the proposed Amended Complaint should be considered. 
It is clear that Mr. Taylor did not seek to protect or benefit the corporation. Rather, he sought to use 
the proposed derivative action to benefit only h~ixself; and actually to recover corporate assets to the 
detriment of other shareholders and corporate cred~tors. In effect, the founder and former CEO of 
AlA Services, who leA the company when it began tct run into financial difficulties, sought to 
aggrandize to himself all remaining assets of the company in preference to any other claimants. A 
shareholder derivative suit is surely an improper vehicle for seeking to prefer oneself over others 
having legitimate stakes in the corporation. 
Idaho Code $30-1-746(2) and (3) penalize a party who uses a shareholder derivative action 
or a pleading, motion or other paper reiatlng to a derivat~\e action for an improper purpose. Reed 
P---"-------~-/ 
Taylor's motion to amend his Complaint to add shareholder derivative action is such a pleading, 
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G 17082 001 3\Pleadlngs\Mot1on to D~s~n~ss \App l~ca t~or i  for Attc~r-rieqk rca dlid Costs Bnef In Support of Costs erc ver-01 wpd 
motrctrl or: other paper, Application of the statute mandates that the defendants' reasonable costs, 
~ficIudrng reasonable attorney's fees, be assessed against him 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN A l V A m  OF mGSONABLE 
Among the causes of action asserted by the plaintiff in this action was a claim for breach of 
the Idaho Consurner Protection Act (the "ICPA") Title 48, Chapter 6, Idaho Code. Specifically, 
p la~nr l l t  alleged that defendants violated ldaho Code 9 48-608 by supposedly comm~ttlng acts In 
vrolat~on of the ICPA against a person, Reed Taylor, an elderly person (defined as one over 62 years 
of age) which resulted in the loss of more than 25% of the elderly person's retirement funds 
The plaintiffs attempt to invoke the ICPA was misplaced, however, because the plaintiff 
failed to allege that the plaintiff had purchased or leased goods or services from any of the 
defendants, which is a threshold requirement of ldaho Code 9 48-608. In order to prevent such 
abuses by over-aggessive plaintiffs, ldaho Code 4 48-608 provides in part that, "The court in its 
discretlnn may award attorney's fees if it finds the plaintiffs action is spurious or brought for 
-
harassment purposes only." 
--.- 
- -." 
- ----- 
line term "spurious" is an apt description of plaintiffs effort to make a claim against 
defendants under the ICPA. There simply is no basis for such a claim. Before filing such a claim, 
plair~ti ff and his counsel were required to determine in the exercise of reasonable judgment that the 
claim was well-grounded in fact and law. A moment's reflection would have sufficed to realize that 
no goods or services were purchased by plaintiff from defendants and, therefore, no predicate existed 
for bringing suit under the ICPA. Reasonable attorney's fees should be awarded to the defendants 
to compensate them for having to defend against an unwarranted and unjustified ICPA claim. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' COSTS AND A'ITORNEYS' FEES - 6 
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DATED this h4day oflanuary, 2009. 
ELAhil& BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
- 
By: - 
L 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
\Jk I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _l?_ day of January, 2009,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael S. Bissell t/ U.S. Mail 
CMPBELL BISSELI- & KIRBY, PLLC - Wand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 4 t 6 Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 
- Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-7 1 1 1 
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AU(J lil-( 00011 
a:, i. 1,.'1:3 ; 4 9 P b v '  
2' 
Jmas D L&ur fSB if1 780 
Loren C lpsen ISB &I767 
E L M  & B , P A. 
252 E. Front Street, Swte 34H 
P.O. ttfox 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
I;acsim!le: (208) 384-5W 
E & B File No. 7082-WX3 
Affomqs for Defmdanb / 
ICN THE DISmICY' COURT OF THE SECOh2, JUDICL4L DISTRICT OF 1'BE 
STAT33 OF IDAHO, IN A M 1  FOR THE COLrW1"L' OF hl? PERCE 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individM. D. JOMtl' 
ASHBY, an indiwdual; PATRKCK V. 
GOLl,INS, m individual; R J ( 1 3 W  k 
RII,EY, an indit$$\laI; IiAWI-EY TROXELL 
Em7S & mWEY LLP, m Idaho Ilmlrtxi 
liability pmership, JANE DOES I-X, 
h o w n  individuals; 
Case No. GV 08-01 765 
STATE OF fDnHU ) 
) ss. 
Coutlty of Ada ) 
LORm C. PSEN,  bang first duly mom upon on&, dqxsserj md say3 
f m A V n  Bl SUPYUILT UF DEFEhDmlTS' COSTS ANTI AnCIRNEYS' FEFi - 1 
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1. f am a shareholder w ~ t h  the law firm of Elam & Burke, P.A., attomeys of record 
for Defendants Gary 1). Babbltt, O. John Ashby, Patnck V. Collins, Richard A. Riley, and 
Hawley Troxell Ennls and Hawley I LP 
2. 1 a n  fa~ilrlrai .ii~tl? the files gclrerated In this action and have bowledge of ebr: 
contents thereof and make t h ~ s  a f f i d a ~ ~ t  based upon my personal knowledge. 
3. In their Memctrmdutn of Costs and Attorney Fees, Defendants seek 
reimbursement for costs allowed as a matter of nght and attorney fees incurred on behalf of 
Defendants totaling $43.91 2.50. 
Costs as a htlatter of R i ~ h t  
4. I have rewewed the costs as a matter of right listed ~n Part A of Defendants' 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees, which consist of the mandatory fee for filing 
Defendants' Answer. 'Thts cost was reasor-tably and necessarily incurred and is allowable as a 
matter of right under 1.R.C P 54(d)(1 ) (C)  
5 .  Attached as Exhibit A hereto is an itemization of the professional services 
rendered by Elam & Burke. P.A., on behatf of Dekndants in connection with the defense of the 
above-referenced action. I have revrewed thls ltem~zation and believe that it accurately reflects 
the fees billed by Elam & Burke, P.A . In conrlectlon with this matter. Further, I believe in good 
faith and, therefore. state that the amount of attorneys' fees claimed in Defendants' 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. ~iern~zed in Exhibit A hereto, is reasonable 
considering the factors set forth in Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, namely: 
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A. Time and labor required: See Exhibit A attached hereto, 
B. The novelty and difficulty of This case required research and legal analysts regarding 
the question. numerous theories asserted by Plaintiff in his Complaint 
and Amended Complaint, including professional 
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, intentional 
intederence wiih cojiiriraci, carversion a-rssd alleged 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. 
Additionally, issues of privity, lack of standing and 
litigation privilege were raised by the pleadings, as well 
as the issue of whether Plaintiffs was entitled to file a 
shareholder derivative action against Defendants. 
C. The skill requisite to perform James D. LaRue and I have each been practicing law for 
the legal sewice properly and the over 30 years. Mr. LaRue's practice concentrates on 
experience and ability of the defense of first and third party insurance defense and 
attorney in the particular field of professional negligence actions, while my practice 
law. emphasizes business transactions and commercial 
litigation. 
D. The prevailing charges for like Since my admission to the Idaho State Bar in 1975, I 
work. have performed similar services to those required by this 
case. Based on my experience and review of attorney's 
fees charged by other attorneys in commercial and 
professional negligence litigation, I believe that an 
appropriate and prevailing attorney fee f i r  this type of 
work to be between $ 1  35.00 and $250.00 per hour for 
attorneys and $95.00 per hour for paralegals. On this 
case, the hourly rates of Elarn & Burke, P.A., were 
$150.00 for shareholders, $125.00 for associates, and 
$85.00 for paralegals. 
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E. Whether the fee is fixed or The fee arrangement in this matter is based on an hourly 
conttngent. rate rather than a contrngent agreement. 
F. The time limitations imposed It was necessary to address numerous legal issues raised 
by the client or the circumstances by PlaintifFs Complaint and his motion to amend the 
of the case. Complaint upon relattvely short notice. 
G. The amount involved and Plaintiff claimed damages against Defendants in the 
results obtained. mount  of $10,500,000.00. 
H. Undesirability of the case. This case involved the alleged breach of duties to th~rd 
parties by Defendant attorneys in the course of their 
representation of corporate clients. 
I. The nature and length of the Elarn & Burke has not had an attorney-client relat~orlsh~p 
professional relationship with the with the Defendants which substantially precedd the 
client. threats made by Plaintifps lawyers to sue the counsel for 
AIA Services and AIA Insurance. It was therefore 
necessary to gain familiarity with the circumstances relating 
to the litigation within a relatively short period of ttrne. 
J .  Awards in similar cases. Based on my experience, I believe the hourly rates a11tl 
total fees charged by Elam & Burke in this case are 
consistent with awards granted in other cases of cornpiex 
commercial or professional malpractice litigation. 
K. The use of automated legal E l m  & Burke utilized Westlaw electronic legal research 
research. when feasible in order to conserve attorney time anti fees 
chargeable to their clients. 
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SUBSCRIBED and SWORN before &e this &day o f  January, 2009. 
Residing at 
Commission explres: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of January, 2009, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
~ndlcated below: 
Michael S Bissell U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 1 1  
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2 5 1  E a s t  Fron:  S t r e e t ,  Si itte j oo  
Post Office BOX 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone 208 343-5454 
Fax 208 384-5844 
ELAM & B U R K E  
A T T O R N E Y S  A T  L A W  
IRS NO. 82-045 1 327 
FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES RENDERED 
Through December 29, 2008 
RE: HTEH (I) Reed Taylor ( C )  CI,IENT/MATTER 07082-00013 
Claim: B086124 
DATE HOURS 
8/20/08 JDL 5.00 Review emails from Bissell with attached complaint - 
forward copy to client and ALPS (.4). Telephone 
conferences with client re new lawsuit, 
McNichols complaint and appointed counsel, and 
related issues (1.1). Review numerous ernail 
comunications ( ' 8 ) .  Review Complaint against 
HTEH (1.5). Letter to consultant ( . I ) .  Call 
co-counsel re: ~cNichols Complaint (.I). Brief 
review of McNichols Complaint ( . 3 ) .  Work on 
issues to develop and understand ( .7) . 
8/20/08 JNP 1.10 Review and analyze email correspondence re filing 
of complaint against HTEH (.I). Analyze issues 
re complaint against HTEH and individual 
attorneys ( . 3 ) .  Review and analyze complaint 
filed against HTEH and individual attorneys (.7). 
8/20/08 1,CI 1.30 Receive and review complaint by Reed Taylor 
against Hawley Troxell and individual members of 
that firm. 
8/20/08 1,CI .20 Review case law and analyze its applicability to this 
action. 
8/20/08 LC1 1.80 Receive and review complaints against Hawley 
Troxell and Mike McNichols; analyze defenses to 
complaint against Hawley Troxell. 
8/21/08 JDL 4.70 Begin outline for motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim by identification of legal 
theories in complaint, possible responses and 
research needed and identification of documents 
to support (2.3). Communications with 
client/carrier (1.1). Telephone conversation 
with attorney (.I). Develop analysis and 
strategy of sequencing underlying and attorney 
Page 1 
8/21/08 JMP 
8/21/08 LC1 
8/21/08 L C 1  
8/21/08 LC1 
8/22/08 JDL 
8/24/08 LC1 
8/24/08 LC1 
8/25/08 JDL 
8/25/08 JNP 
lawsuits, motions, stays, a r d  c > t h ~ r  
cons~derations ( ' 9 )  Comn~t~nlcatlons with 
attorney Bissell re: acceptance of service(.3). 
2.10 Research and anaiyze idano case law re elements of 
cause of action (1.4) Researrfi and analyze Idaho 
case law re elements of clazms (.7). 
1.00 Prepare memorandum analyzl~g complaint of Reed 
Tyler vs. Hawley TroxelL and defenses to causes 
of actlon. 
50 Revlew consol~dated flnanc~al itaterwnts of corporations. 
70 Research case law re plalnt,ff s causes of action 
for alleged clvzl conspzrdcy ar ci aldlng and 
abetting client In comisslon cf tcrtlous acts. 
.50 Analyze defenses to complaint, Pale 13 (b) (6) 
motlon, and posslble rnotrloi~ for ckanqe of venue. 
50 Commence preparatlon of Rule I? (n) ( 6 )  motlon to 
dismlss and supporting brief 
2 00 Research and continued preparatlor of brlef in 
support of 12(b) (6) motlon to d i s ~ i s c  
.70 Call to cllent ( .2) Revlew crrall ccnmunlcations ( 3) . 
Discuss structure of motion to Dt? flled In response 
to complalnt and cons~derat-ion cf R , ? e  11 sanctions 
In motlon ( 2). 
5.60 Revlew and analyze Idaho Code pro371slons and 
Idaho case law re the Idaho Cors tne r  Protection 
Act, elements of lndividuai c i a L ~ s  arid defenses 
( 3 . 1  Draft merorandum sxrrdriz-rg ~esearch and 
analysis re claims for convtrslon v~olatlons of 
the Idaho Consumer Protect~oq Act, and defenses 
( 2 . 5 )  
1.50 Work on brlef In support of rnotlon to dlsmlss. 
.50 Research case law and lmpact cn picLntiff's cause 
of actlon for alleged aldlng and acettlng. 
7.50 Research privlty rule In Jdaho ~n legal 
malpractice actlon; continue preparatlon of 
motlon to dismlss 
7.00 Contlnue brlef~ng lssbe of sjketrer prlvlty 1s 
requlred In legal malpract~ce act-cq 
1.00 Research Issue of alleged aldlrg u ~ d  abett~ng 
llablllty. 
5.60 Revlew numerous emalls betdeen cl~ents, 
McNlchols, Blssell and c o u ~ s ~ l  ( 91  Review flle 
documents and complalnt ( . 6 ) .  (dor~ eq memorandum 
in support of motlon to dis~iss 12 5) Calls to 
attorney re: issues common to recent-y flled 
complaints. (.8). Call cl~ent re various lssues ( . 4 ) .  
Revlew email from Blssell r e .  acceptance of 
servlce of complalnt and dlscoxeuy ( 2). 
Consider method of accepting service of discovery 
- discuss with client ( .2) . 
3.90 Research and analyze case law, treatises and law 
review articles re conversion and claims for 
conversion against attorneys by non clients 
(2.6). Draft section of memoranuvm in support of 
motion to dismiss re plaintiff's ciaims for 
conversion and alleged violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act (1.3) .
3.50 Research issues of liability of attorneys under 
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theoilps of clvll consplracy and aidinq and 
abet t . ~ l g  
4.60 Research dnd Grlef Issues of conversion, alleged 
breach nf  consumer ptotectlon act, civil 
consplracy, aiding and abetting, litigation 
imunlty, and Section 876 of the Restatement (Second) 
of 'I'ort s 
1 . 1 0  Develcp analysls for purposes of motion to dlsmlss 
and conference wlth cllents (1.2). Communicatlon 
wrth urtorney ( . 3 1 .  Telepnone call to carrxer's 
representatrve ( . 6 ) .  Call Brad Geary - Lewiston 
Trlhune - on behalf of HTEN ( . I ) .  Communication wlth 
cllent re: various Issues (.I). Review 
of ermll from cl~ent ( . 8 ) .  
5.50 Contlnue to research and analyze case law, 
L r e a l  l$rs dnd law review artlcles re converslon 
and cldlms for converslon and/or violation of 
consurrer protection acts against attorneys by non 
clients. 
20 Recelve and review correspondence from cllents. 
50 Analys s of speclfic allegations of complaint and 
def enscs to same. 
2 40 Research and brlef issue of litigation prlvllege 
or Inmurilty; brief application of Taylor v. Maile 
declslcn 
2.30 Work on brlet re plaintiff s cause of action for 
alding and abettlng and civll conspiracy. 
4 20 Review documents prior to contact with 
cllent ( 3). Telephone conference wlth cllent 
re: upccrning motions and other lssues ( . 7 ) .  
Communlcatlon wlth attorney Bissell with 
acceptdnce of service (.2). Review additional 
emall communications ( . 9 ) .  Communications with 
client re issues (.2). Review email communlcatlons 
from c i l e n t  ( . 9 )  . Review and forward Bissell 
ernall t o  client (.I). Develop issue list for 
meet l r ig ts~lth cllents ( .4) . Review GV of 
potent-ai consultant (.2). Telephone conference 
wlth attorney re: common considerations/issues 
( . 3 ) .  
4 60 ContrnAe to research and analyze case law, 
treatises and law revlew articles re converslon 
and ciaivs for conversion and/or violation of 
consuner protection acts against attorneys by non 
cllents (3.0). Further develop legal arguments 
re plalntlff's claims for conversion and 
v1olat:cns of the Idaho Consumer Protection kct 
(1.6) 
50 Fevlew relevant documents pertaining to complalnt. 
20 Asslst lalth preparation of section of brlef In 
support of motion to dismiss whlch deals wlth 
alleged conversion of personal property. 
30 Recelve and revlew client's comments regarding 
factual allegations of complalnt. 
1 30 Provlue :nput lnto memorandum to be filed agalnst 
complalnt ( . 3 ) .  Complete list of meeting topics 
for dlrcusslon (.3). Communicatlon wlth cllent 
re: ltems for discussion ( . 3 )  . Review prlor 
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trial court decision in preparation for meeting 
with client ( . 4 )  . 
Further develop factual and legal arguments in 
support of dismissal of plaintiff's claims fax 
conversion and the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
(3.11. Research and analy~e case law from Idaho 
and surrounding jurisdictions re elements of 
converslon and conversion of money (2.4). 
Further develop memorandum in support of motion 
to dismiss to include additional legal and 
factual arguments addressing plaintiff's 
converslon and Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
claims (3.9). Review local rules for the second 
judiclal dlstrict to verify whether there is a 
page llmltation for briefs in support of motions 
( . . 2 j .  
Continue pxeparation of brief in support of Rule 
10 (b) ( 6 )  motion to dismiss. 
Numerous telephone calls and email communications 
to/fsom client and carrier re: recent filings and 
retain~ng consultant (1.3). Revlew draft memorandum 
in support of motion to dismiss - recommendations for 
change/additlons (1.5). Telephone calls to 
prospective consultants ( '3) . lnitiai review of 
motions flied in underlying matter (2.9). Provide 
draft memorandum in support of motion to dismiss 
to clients (.I). Review and forward copy of 
written discovery from plaintiff to client 
representative and carrier. ( . 3 ) .  
Further develop memorandum in support of motion 
to dismiss re plaintiff's claims for conversion 
and alleged violations of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act (1.6). Telephone conferences with 
Nez Perce County Clerk's Office re page 
limitations for filings (.2). 
Revise, edit and proof first draft of brief. 
Make changes to brief. 
Receive and review plaintiff's initial discovery 
requests. 
Receive and review plaintiff's first set of 
interrogatories and request for production 
propounded to defendant Hawley Troxell Ennis & 
Hawley, LLP. 
Analysis of documents relevant to complaint. 
Research issue under Idaho re: application of 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
Research issue re: remedies. 
Research issue re: alleged breach of fiduciary duty. 
Review general allegations of complaint against 
Hawley Troxell and prepare schedule of factual 
allegations to discuss with defendant attorneys. 
Research whether corporation's attorneys are 
subject to claim of conversion for receipt of 
attorney's fees from collateral subject to 
security interest of creditor of corporation. 
Review complaint and prepare memorandum of issues 
to discuss with Hawley Troxell attorneys. 
Analyze potential Tmplication of article 9 of the 
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UCC re plaintiff's conversion claim ( ? I  
Telephone conference with Judge Brudic's l a w  
clerk re local rules for page limitations (.I). 
.4C claim for conversion in iawsu~t Egainst 
Hawley Troxeil attorneys. 
3.00 Meeting with clients to discuss defense of 
lawsuit. 
1.30 Revise brief to incorporate c11 entl s corn'iier~ts .
.20 Analyze and formulate arguments in support of 
d~smissrng alding and abettlng cause of 8ct;on 
1.10 Research issue of whether creditor of corpcratlon 
has direct cause of action for breach of 
fiduciary duty against directors and attorqeys 
for alleged breach of flduclary duty 
.10 Correspondence to clrents re: issues 
. 3 0  Review draft motlon, memorandum and afflddvit In support 
of protective order against discovery from ITEM pendlng 
ruling on 12(b) (6) motion - forward copy to cllenti.31. 
4.20 Review and analyze plaintiff's first set ~f 
discovery requests in preparation for draftlng 
motion for protective order to stay d~sco-ery 
3 Research and analyze Idaho case law and 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure re bases fur 
staying discovery pending the outcoTe of n 
dispositive motion (1.4) . Formulate algcyents ~n 
support of staying discovery pendlng the cutcome 
of defendants' motion to dismiss (.4). D ~ a f t  
motion for protectlve order (.I). Draft 
~emorandum in support of motion for protect-ve 
order (1.5). Draft affidavit in support ei 
motion for protectlve order (.5). 
.50 Work on revision of brief in suppor: of F ~ I , ~  
12 (b) ( 6 )  motion to dlsmiss. 
2.00 Research issue of whether creditor of corForat;on 
has direct cause of action against corporate 
officers, directors, and others. 
2.00 Revise brief in support of motion to dlsrnlss to 
incorporate suggestions of Hawiey Troxell 
attorneys, 
8.80 Complete brief in support of motion to dismiss 
and circulate for comment. 
3.90 Work on memorandum in support of motion to 
dismiss (2.4). Telephone conference with client re: 
modifications to memorandum in support of : 2 ( h )  (6) motion 
and motions scheduled for hearing (.2). Emaii to 
client with copy of memorandum in support cf 
12 (b) ( 6 )  motion to dismiss ( .2) . Review c:ientls 
suggestions re: 12(b)(6) memo (.4). Cail 
from counsel for Mr. McNichols (.5). Final mction for protective 
order re: discovery sought in HTEH lawsuit i . 2 ) .  
.60 Research and analyze Idaho case 
law and Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure re timing 
of reply briefs and affidavits after a 12ib) (6) 
motion is converted to a summary judgment r~tlon 
(.6). 
1.00 Receive and review comments on brief and rc-'.rlse 
same to accommodate comments. 
3.50 Receive and review emails from Hawley Troxell 
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attorneys ri 2 ( D '  (6) hrlef and Incorporate 
comments lnto hripf 
2.50 F'lnal rrernorcirLi?dm A q  support of motlon to dismlss, 
mot LOZ, ~ O L  xic tit c c  t l  order, credte proposed 
order gra:it;r7a r n c t  lon for protectlve order - 
rorresp~r~derc P ti, Clerk/Court wlth motions and 
supportlng d r c l m e r t s  (1 7). Revlew various email 
comrni,n*catlo~s fro% c l l e n t  ( 4) Identify issues 
for telephore r1JYfe5rence wlth attorney Blssell 
( 1 ) TPJ r j ) \ ~ , n ~  c orlference wlth attorney 
elssel l re tlnndllTi~ of pendsng motlons ( . 3 )  . 
.20 Letter to B ~ s ~ e l :  zc tlmlng of hearlng on pending 
rnotlon to dlsnlss and agreement re. pendlng discovery (.2). 
3 80 Work on stlplllaLlcn ard order re: protectlve 
order s t ay l r i o  a l s c u T f e r y  ( . 3 ) .  Call cllents re: 
cornrnLnicatinrG d ~ t  I- attorney Bissell 
and answer 1 - 1  qdiprattlce case ( 2). Review and 
respond to PTI~II frcm attorney Elssell re: change 
of hcarlng o7 m o i - ~ r ~  to dismiss ( .I) . Begin 
draft of a n s ~ J e r  (2 9 )  Call from attorney 
( 21 Forbarc, c c p y  o f  arnentled notlce of hearlng 
and proposed st~yuiation/order re: discovery to 
attorney B i s c c : ~  i 1 )  
3.90 Comunlcatlc~~ hltr cllent re: attached draft 
answer 1 i Lrai ysls and development of 
addlt~onal 6: f lr~iatrve nefenses for answer ( .3) . 
Telephone i-oir~~~nlcatlori wlth cllent re: 
lnqulvy from Cuarles and Brady re: expert (.2). 
Work on letter rc cla?ms agalnst HTEH ( 2 . 3 ) .  
50 Suggest re:J, - ~n?s c; and addltlons to answer to 
complalnt 
.20 Revlew c l v l  t onsp~racy research. 
1.90 Work on answer tc ccrnp~slnt (1.2). Call client 
re: telephone conference to address lssues for 
answer ( - 3 1  C r e a r e  cewest edltlon of answer 
( 4) 
.10 RevLew Hawley rrcxei 1 sLggest1on.s re answer. 
2.80 Review m~inos ( 7 ,  Flrial and forward draft 
answer to c!lent ( 31 Telephone conference with 
attorney re comon lssues on motion to 
dlsq~~allfy, r"ctlo- to dlsmlss, and other related 
lssues I 3 Review co~munlcations from clients 
re: answer, I ,jtt-orat e recommended 
~harges/addl"~ons aqd create another edltlon of 
answer for cAsent r evAcw and comment. ( .8) .
Comm~nicatior dit? cllert re: lssues common wlth 
McIdichols an2 ilpaated i;rslon of answer ( . 4  ) . 
Telephone < a _ ,  tuclre ellent (.I). 
.50 Revlew pro~nced ar-swer to complalnt and suggest 
reviclons :G szfie 
.50 ReceLve ara I P J : ~ ~  aadltlonal comments and 
proposed Char yes to answer from cllents ( .2) . 
Prepare changes to answer (.3). 
.20 Revlew ano analylo Peb Idaho Supreme Court case 
( J - U - R  v iopez! regarding requirements for legal 
malpract-ce c-a-~t mder Idaho law. 
2.20 Revlew anc o ~ t i ~ n e  prcposed response to plaintiff 
Reed Taylor c bricf In opposltlon to Rule 
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12 ( h )  (6) motion to dismiss. 
1.30 Prepare memorandum regarding arguments advanced 
by plaintiff in opposition to motion to dismiss 
and proposed response to same. 
2.10 Review response to 12(bj ( 6 )  - outline issues in 
response to 12(b) (6) motion to facilitate reply 
brief (2.1). 
.70 Analyze plaintiff's brief in opposition to motion 
to dismiss and how to respond to same. 
2.00 Research and prepare reply brlef in support of 
motion to dismiss. 
2.50 Continued preparation of reply brief. 
9.50 Continued preparation of reply brief. 
1.10 Work on reply brief. 
6.60 Continued preparation of reply brief. 
2.90 Work on reply brlef (1.9). Feview memorandum in 
opposition to motion to disqualify to insure 
consistency with 12(b) ( 6 )  motion and for 
background information that may he helpful in 
arguing 12(b)(6) motion (.7). Call from attorney 
re: substance of 12 (b) ( 6 )  motion, opposition and 
reply; thoughts re: standinylstatus to argue motion 
to disqualify on behalf of cllents; and related issues ( . 3 )  
3.90 Receive comments regarding reply brief and revise 
same. 
.50  Draft additional revisions to reply brief. 
5.00 Work on hearing notes for motion to dismiss (3.9) . -  
Call from attorney re: reply issues (.2). 
Email communication with client (.3). Call to/from 
attorney ( . 3 / .  Calls to/from carrier ( . 3 ) .  
3.80 Receive and review comments re brief from Wawley 
Troxell and revise brief to incorporate comments. 
4.10 Work on hearing notes for motion to dismiss (3.8). 
Communication with attorney re: reply to 
response to motion to dismiss ( ' 2 ) .  Final and 
file/serve reply brief (.I). 
1.70 Telephone conference with client regarding 
comments concerning 12 (b) (6) reply brief (0.2) ;
revise brief to accommodate such comments (0.5); 
receive additional comments from client (0.3) ;
check quotation from treatise on corporate 
dividends and redemptions (0.2); revise brief per 
client's comments and suggestions (0.4); 
correspondence to Wawley Troxell attorneys re new 
revisions (0.1 ) 
5.50 Communications with client ( .2) . Work on 
hearing issues (5.2). Call from attorney 
re: reply and issues for hearlng (.I). 
Assist in preparation of oral argument on motion 
to dismiss. 
2.80 Work on hearlng outline re: motion to dismiss (2.8). 
5.90 Work on hearing issues for 12(b) ( 6 )  motion (1.7). 
Email from and response to Bissell's office re: 
availability for hearing on motion to amend 
complaint (.I) Travel to Lewiston (3.3). Review 
new filings from attorney Bond (.4). Meeting with 
client ( . 4 )  . 
7.20 Prepare for hearing (1.9) Meeting with client 
10/20i08 J N P  
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' 7  Court appearance for hearing (1.2). Review 
proposed dmended complaint in malpractice case ( . R ) .  
Travel to Bozse (2.6). 
2 . 5 0  Review email from acLorney (.I). Emaii to 
client and ALPS with copy of proposed amended 
complaint and observations from initial review 
3 .  Email to attorney with copy of proposed 
amended complaint ( . I ) .  Begin detailed review of 
proposed amended complaint (1.51. Analysis of 
tzmlnq, procedural and substantive reasons to 
oppose the motion to amend complaint and seek 
derivative relief ( . 5 )  . 
1.10 Receive and review plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion 
to amend complaint and memorandum of law, 
together with proposed amended complaint. 
.50 Analysis of proposed amended complaint and 
defenses to motion to amend. 
:.40 Communications with client and carrier(.2). 
Analysis of issues under derivative 
claim statute, and other defenses applicable to 
derivdtive claims stated in proposed amended 
complaznt (1.2). 
1.00 Analyze plaintiff's arguments in support of 
motzon to amend complaint; formulate arguments in 
opposition to motion to amend complaint re 
standing, violation of stay in underlying action, 
and noncompliance with Idaho Code provisions re 
derivative actions ( . 5 ) .  Research and analyze 
Idaho case law re elements of judlcial estoppel 
( . 3 1 .  Draft memorandum outlining elements for 
application of doctrine of judicial estoppel 
1.2). 
.90 Review communication from client (.I). Review 
memo re: judicial estoppel and/or judicial 
admissions as defenses to amended complaint ( . 3 ) .  
Telephone conference with client ( . 5 ) .  
1.10 Telephone conference with attorney for Mr. McNichols 
re: issues with proposed amended complaint ( . 3 ) .  
Review derivative action statutes (.8). 
1.30 Analysis of issues which should be raised in 
opposition to motion to amend complaint and 
consideration of timing of same ( .  8) . 
Communication with client representative re: 
opposing motion to amend (.2). Review newly 
filed motion and supporting documents in 
underlying case (.3) 
.90 Review and analyze plaintiff Reed Taylor's motion 
and memorandum of law to amend complaint. 
1.60 Research regarding conditions precedent for 
filing shareholder derivative action. 
1.30 Outline issues for opposition to motion to amend 
complaint. 
.50 Analysis of facts and contentions in opposition 
to plaintiff's motion for leave to amend 
complaint. 
2.20 Research issue of requirement that plaintiff in 
shareholder derivative action must plead and 
prove irreparable injury to corporation, as 
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opposed to puzely personal l?iimaqes allegedly 
sustarned by plainrrff share'i1i.14cr or creditor of 
corporation. 
5.70 Research and prepare br;ef 1n cpposillon to 
plaintiff 's motion ro amend c crrpldint . 
.80 Work on opposition to motlbr, v, file zmended complaint 
4 Revlew draft oppiisit~cr. 9 3 motlon to file 
amended romplaint rn the ;dciJl t ?lei s marter ( . 4 )  . 
6 50 Research and prepare brlcf - v l  ,;,pas; t ~ c ~ r l  to
rnotlon to amend complaint 
2.40 Work on draft brief opposlrg rsctlon to amend 
cornplalnt - forward draft tc ellent for comments 
and recommendations. 
3.40 Prepare section of brref A e d 1 . q ~  wlth shareholder 
derzvative action. 
.50 Review draft of brief and rca-li i r -  same. 
3.00 Work on memorandum in oppositLon to mctron to 
amend. ( . 9 ) .  Communication w l i h  ciLe?t re: 
posslble changes to memorc7n;iiirr i 2) Peview 
modiflcatlons recornmended by ., iect ( 5) Call 
cllent re: memo f.1). R e t u x ,  i d L l  to 
attorney ( .2 1 . Final, f A :e a n u  ser%,e 
opposltlon memorandim (1 : )  
.30 Research case law re standlnq 3 C  nlnorlty 
shareholders to bring a d ~ r t c t  or derivatlve 
clalm agalnst corporate pourisel for rnalpractsce, 
fraud, and breach of fldnclary a ~ t y  
.70 Work on hearing notes for mu; ; ~ > n  ta ~ r n e n d  
complaint. 
.30 Conslder focus of hearing or rrotlon to amend 
cornplalnt. 
1.50 Review reply to oppositlcr tc T - ~ ( c l c n  to amend and 
attached cases. 
6.10 Work on oral argument responses to arguments and 
authorit-ies raised In reply kirAc! (5 8 )  Review 
emarls from client represeotar ~ . ~ c s  addressing 
issues ralsed in reply ( 3) 
.70 Recelve and review plalntlff s yeply to 
defendants' memorandum In oppcs~tlon to motion to 
amend complaint. 
1.40 Review cases and authorltles i l t e d  by plalntlff 
in support of motion to amend 
.90 Research Idaho statutes, r ~ l e s  c: codrt and cases 
re shareholder derivatlve aciir , i .s .  
1.20 Asslst in preparation for hea1:rq on ~otion to 
amend complaint. 
1.80 Research and prepare memouuncir, re lssue of 
whether plaintiff Reed Taylor ,s fairly qualified 
to represent interests of sl-arei~ciders In 
derlvatlve action. 
1 90 Final preparation for h e a r ~ r g  cr. nlotlon to amend 
complaint (1.0) Meetlng ~ ~ t h  rllent pre-hearing - 
discussion of arguments aval:,~le 
( . 9 )  Participate In hearlng cn .~tlon ( 8) . 
PROFESSIONAL FEES 43,912.50 
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PLAIN'rJdili HEED 3. TAl\'l,UH'S 
MOTION TO DISAL1,0\Y 
1IEFEiVI)AN'I;S' REQCES'I- FOR 
ATTQIUVEYS' FEES ANl> (.'()>$TS 
L'CjLl ]PIS. i::> ~ I I ( ~ - ~ I C ~ U : : ! ;  RJCI3AB.D PX 
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1. INTROIIUCl'IO"t[ 
When the ~ O I J T ?  chsmisscd Rccd 1 ;jylor's C'cltnpl:~lnl. I! c11d t~o t  have the I-?txury o f  
seeing all of the facts w h ~ c h  supportetf the Complarnt and the Proposed Arncr~dcti 
('ornpla~nt, Although Iieeci 'Iaylor ~ospccts the ( .ou~ t ' \  11g111 to makc its own 
~nctepcndcnt findings. he be1 ~ e % c s  the evltlence t q  over\% hcl~nrng support~ng the ~ l a l m s  
aga~nst hc llcfctidants, whicll pose man4 ~ssucr; of iirst Imprcsston, otller issues of clc;lr 
law supporting clarins to protect sccur~ty ~ntcrcsts. ant1 clalrr14 1<*h1c11 \&*arrant he reversal 
'T'here 1s no cv~tience that Iieed ' I  aylol has pursuctf any of h ~ k  clalm? fi~volou\ly 
or \\ ithout foundat~on Award~ng atton?ey I cc\ to the 13cfentfants would s ~ m p l y  rcxv:irct 
them tor t l ~ e ~ r  \trongful acts---~vrongful acts thc ( 'ou~t  \ % 1 1 I  have ~ n t ~ m a t c  I<nowledgc of at 
the ~ o n c l u i ~ o n  f the trial In lixblor I ,I1 1 St.? t 1cc.5 ( ' o~ l~o~-o t io~r ,  cr trl 
11. I,EGAI, ANA1,YSIS AN11 AR(;IJMER"I' 
"An} part) ma!: object to t l ~ c  c la~n~c( l  costs of a ~ ~ c t t h c ~  jtartj .. to disallo\nr pal t or 
r i l l  of such cost5 i \~ thin  fourteen ( 1  4) (lay\ ot S ~ I V I L C  of tho memorandnm of cost..  " 
1.II.C.P 54(d)(O). "Any objection to tllc allo\vancc of' attollicy fees. or to the amount 
thereof. shall he madc In the same manner as an oblcct~on to cost5 a5 prov~ctctf by Jtule 
44(6)(6)." I .R.CY.P 54(e)(6). 
In order to be entitled to an aw:lrct of' ;tttorney fee\ a party 11iust c ~ t c  a spcc~iic 
statute or cctmmon la\v rule upon u l i ~ c h  an a \ ? a ~ d  may bc hrrsccl Nel,soj~ I A~1d~v.50~1 
I,zin?bcr C'o , 140 Idaho 702, 99 1'.3(i 1003 (C't. Rpp. 2004) i -ehca~-~i~,q dcnicd (July 14. 
2004), review dented (Oct 28. 2004). 
A. ?'he Defendants Arc Not Entitled 'To ,An Award Of Attctrne! s' I'ccs Ant1 
itttornc>s' fees are not attar~leil as a matter of' right undcr I C '  3 12- I7 1 
"\IThc1x\cr the coui-t aw,tril\ ;ittctr-ncy kc4 pursuant t i t  sectton 12-12].  Irlaflo 
I'odo, 11  shall niake a nrrtten firtrl~ng. crther I D  the awartl or In a separate tlocnn~e~it. ,I< to 
thc !:ns~s a:ct rcasons ! i~r  an nrding siiih attornit? kes."  I .I?.C'.I'. 54(e)(2). 
The Dcfenclants request n\varil of fkcs puri;uitnt to I.C. $ 12-1 21 . J Ion CI CI . tlie 
~ c c o ~ d  I \  cicvotd of any ev~dcncc tl~at Reed raylor ;iscerteil nny of'hrs clarni\ I~l\oltfiiil) 
or w~thout fountfallon and. thercforc, thcy are not cnt~tlcd to at1 award of fees uniie~ t l ~ \  
sectron. 
I .  In Order ' 1 0  Award Sny Fees Under I.C. $ 12-121, ' l h c  ('onrt 
Rltlst Find '1 hat &I Of Iiecct 'I'a? lor'\ C'lairns Were FI i\ o l o u c .  
'" 1 l:e district court should evaluate whctlicr ' all clail-ns brought.. .:I] c f~ 11 olott\ 01 
without tctundation' bcforc crwaldirtg atto~ncy ice\ untlc~ 1.C'. g 12- 12 1 " / 3 1 0 ~ ~ / /  I 
lfcr\l<n, 134 Idaho 16 1. 170, 158 P.3d 917 (2007). yziottng, l l i l zg l t~~7~ I . I lo~~rii fz~ 
IZosnzrr cv A s,c icbs . 113 Idaho 420. 427 987 J3 2<1 1075 ( 1090). 
iZn a\\iird of attorney k c c  ant1 costs rcyucstetl against nonprcva~l~ng p:ir-t\ untlcl- 
1 C'. 5 13-1 2 1 " i \  p~ opcr & 14 hen an act~on was c~thcr  brought, pursiicti 01 cicf'c~itictl 
IXcctl 'l'aylor hiis asscrtctf numclous c la~~ni :  :~ga~nst  the Defendants. ,111 01' \v l i~cl~ 
have 1ne1-11 01 arc ~ssucs  of first ~n~prcss~ctn .  Ifowever. to thc extent that t13c ( oulr l n ; ~  
find anq of I<cctl I <lylor's clainls \\ere Iri\olouc or \xitliout foundation t\+I-i~ci-i 1i~~i-l 
k10 IlOb! I 0  IIISAI I OW 111 I I hI)A% I S- 
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'Jhylor i l ~ ~ c s i s  that tl~cre are no SLICII c1;litni). t 1 1 ~  ( ' t r l~ t~  n ~ ~ s l  deny the Ilefendants' recluest 
f o r  fee\ hccauqe other clarrns Mere not blought f r i \ o l o u \ l t ,  I c: , the Court I I I U S ~  make a 
firidtng that afi of Reed 'I'ay1or.s clairt~s \ ~ . l ' c ' i ~  t i ro~~gl~t  I I  .iolously in order to atvitrd Ikes 
tinder I (' 9 12-121. Pz~ckeri r *  k'cr-ckrl, I44 Itiaho i (tl . 170, 158 1) 3d 937 (2007) 
(emphasis tidded) 
2 ,  Attorrteys Fees Shonltl Not Be .1~%:trtJetl Because Reed Taylor's 
Complaint Alleged Ktnr! l.cgai C)t~cstir~~ts .4nd Qlrcslians Of First 
Impression. 
Where a case involves 3 no\ c1 legill I J U C \ ~ I O J I  or lcsues of  first 117npressi0n. 
attomcys 'iees should not he a\$ardcti undcr I (' ; 13- 13 1 C'~z??~hell v Ic'ildet4. 141 
Idaho 640, 1 15 P.3d 73 1 (2005). Rced 1 aylot- a~scrtcti \c\*cral novel legal questions 
and1cjr ~ssucs of first impression. Ilc \honl t i  not bc pcrl~rl~/ctI fbr tloing so. part~cularly 
.ivhcn hc 1s seeking to protect 111s property 113telcst\ ,inti !lie :iiscls of the covoratlons 
A court may award attorney fees un t lc~  I C '  i 2-123 I T  i t  finds that the partj's 
conduct was frivolous. I.C. ji 12-12?, f iclc. nc~tl-icr Ilccri '1:rylor nor his counsel have 
engaged i n  the required ''ffi-i\/olct~is co~~ifnct." :tnJ sucll ths 1)efendants' rccluest s11t)~ild 
bc den~ccl 
I .  Reed Taylor's C'ontfuc.t II.';\L~ $ 0 1  l;ri\ o lot~s  A I I ~  Fees SfiouId Not 
Be A ~ a r d e d ,  
'"l.ri.iolous conduct' nie:ins cond~lit cii' :I p ~ i i t ?  to ,: ~ ' 1 \ 1 1  action 01- of his counsel 
of I-ecol d that sat~sfies elther of the follo\~~rig 
(I)  I t  obv~ously selves melcly to 11,!1;i\i 01 rnal~c~ously Injure another party to the 
c t~11  actton; (ti) I t  1s not supj,ortcci 111 f:!ct O I  \\ t ~ ~ ~ ; ~ n t c d  u cter e x ~ s t ~ n g  law and 
7 \ 4 0  1 ION '1 0 DISAI T O\V l)l-I I3il),.ZK'l 5. 
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œ an not hc supportctf bq it gootl f'atth argument for an extcns~or?. n~odi  ficat~on, 01- 
1cvcls,11 ofc-tcist~ny I:tw " 
I <'  Q 12- 123(1)(b). In ortfer thl- a C'ourt to  ]make an award under I.(' 9 12- 123, the court 
r t i ~ i \ t  ~ C I  ,I I~oar~tig to clctem~rle rf the conduct was frrvolous. I.G. 4 12-  121(2)(h) 
Jiccti i aqlor nsscrtctf vanous c lams  pcrtalning to the assets plctlged to k1n1 atxt 
tltc itctloirs t,ll\cr~ by t11e Ilofct~das~ts, and there is no evidel-tct: that thc clir~~-tls were n x ~ d c  
nlcrcbls t o  h:ililq< rlr ~ l ? a ! ! ~ i f ~ ! f ~ ! ~  IPurc fhc nep:r,dants. Mctreovel-, thc cfi1;i-n.; i;.crc :inJ ilrc 
\iij.tporteti b.u eur\tlrtg law or, at the \cry  least. were based upon gooti filth arguments fix 
the cxtt>n\~ol~.  u~cttI~ticat~on or reversal of exlst~ng law. The fact that thc* ('ourt (Jtsagl-cccl 
itnil t l~ i r~~rs ic t l  111cclainis docs not render them "frivolous," espcciall~ uherc. as hcrc. the 
( ' \>III -~ illd not II ; I \ JC  the luxury of seeing the numcrous document\ anti exhaustlvc 
c \ , l n ~ p l c \  0 1  corporate n~alfeasancc ~h1c11 supported Iicccl 'I nylor's c l a~ms  in this action 
2. If l'he Court Makes A Finding That Reed Ta~lor ' s  Conduct Was 
Frivolous, l'ben We Requests That ?'he Court Exercise Its 
Discr-etion And Den! The Request For Fees. 
Art n~vnt t i  of attorney fees to a p r c \ a ~ l ~ n g  part), ol as a sanct~on for ir~volou\ case 
I \  c l~c~re t~ona l )  Atkcrnzun I* Botzrle\~il(e C'otlnty, 140 Idaho '307, 92 P 3~1 557 (2004) 
('ontl-a~-> to the asscrtlons ~ n a d e  by the Defendants, Rectj Taylor and 111s counsel 
hill c purvueti good fal'th argu~xcnts groundcd I I I  law ant1 fact. Recd Taylor or- 111, counscl 
sl~o~il i l  r~ot be pcn,il~/cd for tak~rtg action to protect what little secur~ty. assets ant1 c l a ~ m s  
~-cn-~, i~n to sat~sfy t l ~ c  over '5% 5 M ~ l l ~ o n  wed to h ~ m .  liccd 'l'aylo~.'~ allegations aJc 11ot 
b,r\ccl ul?on 111s tics~rc to ~-ernove the Defentlants as counsel for s t ~ a t c g ~ c  rciisons or other 
ltci.1\ Jicctf I , l \ ~ l o ~  IS 11-ylng to Iecover his money and assets that ha\~c  been 
~ n ; l p p o p r  1,1tcl\ u t ~ l ~ / c d  and101 ~ n ~ q q m q ~ ~ a t e d  by, or w t h  the help of, the I)clcndant\ 
pro\.rde the corpotnttctn cl~cnt lle hest po\slblc teprcscntatlun. I-lo\\, cctuld entcil~ig Into a 
tolling agrecrnent bc good -for AJA, ? t \  ?~~!nc!r~t; sl~areholders or 3ts cred:?ors whcr: thcre 1s 
substantiti1 cv~dence that 11111lrons of tlolltrrs have been wtonyfirllq transferrctl to 
C'r(>plJSA lnsuri~ncc Agency, Inc (<lnothcr cllcnt of lfawlcy T~oxcll and erlt~ty 
unlawfully part~allg owned by John 'I':tvlor. u l ~ e n  such ownershtp st~oul(l be uridcr the 
AIA umbrella)' I t  is clear that joint ~eptcscnlat~on thrt~ugli any ~ ~ ~ c a n r  I S  ats~sllng partlcs 
cornrn~t ~ r o r ~ g f i r l  acts. Moreover. all of t l i~s has happcnccl \+he11 the tlcfcndants 11iive 
known that no shareholder mcetlng has taken place at ,4112 Serv~ccs C'ctlpo~irt~on or AIR 
Insurance, 111~. for yca15 ant1 that 1-10 slxileholtler vote hiis app~ot.ctf W C I I  reprcsc11tiit1o11 
when all officers and ci~rects have confl~cts of' lntcrest wh~ch  arc 1101 pel lnlttcti under the 
Byl:iws. 
When a party (5ucIl as RectJ I ;itlor) hcts valid and perfected ~ c c u r ~ t y  ~ n t c ~ c s t  In 
assets, how can that party not file sult to l?~otccl ~ t s  assets. rcga~tllcss of \vho 1s t ak~ng  
thcm'.' Wliat has transplrcd 111 t h ~ s  c:lsc IS analogous to a bank Ila\*lng a jccur~ty 1ntele4t 
In a vch~cle. the omncr stop5 nlak~ng payments, the owner ~e tuscs  to turn o w l  the 
collateral, and ~nstcad u t ~ l ~ / c s  its attorneys to ass~st  ~t In selling off the Jcntlcrs, ~ n t c r ~ o r  
and other pal-ts of the vehrclc to l a ~ s c  funds for such puiposcs a\ pt-lylng the at to~ncys 
pul-portcdly I eprcscntlng the party A person ~vould belle\ e th:it thcsc types of wlongful 
acts would ncvc~ I~appcn. but tiley I-take Iiapl-te~~ctl under w1t1-1 the I<nowlctlgc antfior 
asslstlincc of the I)efentlant\ 'I 11c allegctl ob l~ga t~on  for a colporatlon to pay attolncqs 
fees has no appl~cnt~on I t h ~ s  Instance, the corpolatlon should be ~ c l u s ~ n g  to pay 
atton~eysffecs f o ~  thc rcspons~blc part~es, anti the attolncys 5houltJ not he :icccptlng 
payments of fees fi om aoiu cc\ subject to a part! '5 s c c l ~ ~  i t ?  Intel csts 
liov. tc the jo~nt cfelcn\c of John Taylor, CroptiSA Insurance 4genc1. lric . Jamci 
t3ccl; C'onnre '1"aylot-; Jol ee Iluclos. and others In the best ~ntcrest ol AlA Scl-ti~ccs 
c'ctrj30t;d~o~~ or AlA J~lsu~;it~ce. Inc '7 The present \ttuat~oii l i  analogc~ii to a Ix-ltlk 
cntcrlng rnto :I joint clcfcnsc agreement w t h  two of' ~ t s  officers \\ho stolc ilepo\itor\. 
rnoncq. when the cleposltor5 arc iulng iiII of the .fi)rcgo~ng partlei for the rdtrrrn 111~11 
iunili, S u ~ h  a jo~n t  defcnse uould nexcr happen ant1 ivould on11 talic pliicc \~llerz the 
gu~l t )  part~c\  a1 e 111 ctmtrol of the corporation and are p~c \*en t~ng  m ~ ~ i o r ~ t \  l~oldcrs and 
c~ e d ~  to1s fro111 t ah~ng  actlo11 
11(nv c a n  attorneys engage In a reprcscntat~on by lgnorlng a pal It\ 's \ o ~ c  ol 4l1a1 c4 
pletlgcci to h ~ ~ n  when the \/otc \ \as author~zed by contract docu~ncnts. the tlcfault 
ob-t~~ous (and subsccjuentl) clctcrn~~ned by the court), the ~ o t c  was back \topped by o n  
1r rc~~t~: t l7Ic  ptjwer of attctrncy couplect nlth :in ~ntcrest, ast(1 w1tJ1 fill1 hno\vlctlge that that 
party htts substant~ally pre-ta~lccl In 111c act~on and that the only biirr~er prc\*l*nt~ng a part\ 
lion1 t<ik~ng control of a corporat~ctn 15 an ~njunct~on that coulcl bc d~ssolvctl ,my day or  
later ruled to be \li*rongtully I S \ L I C ~ .  part~cularly n~llcn such shares a l t  pletlged a i  
cnlliitcr;ll for the payment 0 1  a pa\t clue debt that obv~ously w ~ l l  never bc pd~tt In p u t  
b c c ~ ~ u s e  n i ~ l l ~ o n s  of clollars hi1.t.e been transferred to other part~es the attornc: a1 e jo~nt  I \  
OI d~rectly rcjx-eient ~ n g ?  Aga~n.  n o  scope of represcntat~on of a pledged colnpany coultl 
~nclutic lo~ntly d ~ s e ~ t l y  01 ~nd~rcet ly  tlcfcnd~ng other part~es \%]lo have ~ l ~ ~ ' ~ : ~ p p ~ o p r ~ : t t ~ d  
r ~ l ~ l l ~ o l ~ \  0-1 tlollars In asset\ t ~ o n i  the colnpi~ny. No scolx of rcplcsentat~on \ioul(i ~nclutle 
tfeScnd111.g thc corporat~o~l \\/here the assets hii\~c been unlawfully t~;lnxri.r~ctl 711~c 
dc-fcnclanti niay halie a ~olnt tlciensc as to certa~n cla~ni\ .  b ~ ~ t  not \vlicn othcl Inole 
sub\tant~al and obv~ous  c la~ms iilc not b c ~ n g  pu~suctl because cortt~ol and  ~ c p ~ c s c n t a t ~ ( , n  
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15 gultled by t11c \\~roi~g(loc'~ \ 
J J I  conclns~on. Ihc ;~ho\ t .  ,trc onl> a lc\t c?dmples o f  the acts that were subject to 
Itecd 'I'nylor's C'or.nplalnt. fhcrc can l x  IIO tolling agreement or representation 
clocumcnts \tuhtcfi could Ic:ttl 1 0  the j)rr>rrer ~c~xf icn t : i t~ )n  of C'roplJSA Insurance Agency, 
Inc .  AIA Insurance, Irlc. A1:i 5c1vlces ('ctrpc~j~itron. or John Taylor. kdch of these 
pafiles shoul(t be pursurng their own clarm. and defenses, each o f  these parties 
(pnrtlcularly the C O T ~ O I ~ I I I O I I  p;1rt1~5) hn\*c , I  c\tctl lntcrelt In ~mmcti~atcly asserting 
clarn~s against responsible partic\ ( I  c . both S I / \  colporat~ons s u ~ n g  CroplJSA and John 
'I dylor), pa~t~cular ly  \\hen thc e\ ~ticr~cc .;11o\j s t21at t ~ m c  1s of the essence because assets 
:u e b a n g  tranifcrrcd ha\ c been t r  < i ~ ' i \ l e ~ ~  cil :incl thc collcctirb~l~ty of i lny judgments 
~ ; ~ r r i l n t i  exped~trously p1115urng the ci,illl?i I \ c'11 131\111g ]iced '1'a)lOr out of the CyUatlo11 
cctml?Ietclv. iuch 3 ~ ~ ~ I C ~ C I I ~ ; I ~ I ~ I ~  1'. nnl-i~til~ci-. I \  del-tnv~ng n-tlnol~ty hol(lers. preferred 
slirtreholtler~ anti otlle~ L I C ~ I ~ O I \  01 <lsiict5. cl:nn~i and r~ghtful votes ;lndior control over 
t hc corpornt~ons. 
In sum, not J srrlglc c l a r t~~  :is\c~tcct k~ Kccd 'Taylor was fr~volous. Reed 'l'aylor 
khould not be punishctI (or protcct~ng 1115 collntcral. protecting h ~ i  sccur~ty ~ntercsts, 
purs~ng c l a ~ n ~ s  as an  ~nsol\~cnt c~et i r to~.  pur \ulng ~la1n15 as the pIccigee and secured party 
In :ill out\tand~ng sha~es  of 4 1 Z  ln\u~,ince. Inc ,  and purslng c la~ms  d ~ ~ e c t l y  or
tic] ]\*at i \  cly bascd upoll 111c farcgo~ng :u-~ti all reasons asserted in Itecd l aylor's 
C'ompla~nt. J'loposcti An~endcti ( o111pl;nnt. 2nd I?cspon.;c In Clppos~t~on to R4ot1an to 
I>ISITIISS All ot the ~011(1uct ( i c \ c~~hcd  nboi c <inti a.isclted by Reed Taylor In t h ~ s  actlon 
j ~ o \ ~ c l c i  man? cxan~ples 01 11:c I)cSc'nd,~ll~i cxcced~ng an> permi5siblc scope of 
I el21 cscnt:it~on. 
I r~tlcctl, hi)\+ can any represent;-rtron agl-ecmcnt be~ng  ;ipproved by the 
i ' c , ~ * p ~ r i i ? t ~ t ~ ~  when the bc\ard is not propcrly seatecl, ;vhc:l tl;z mirtoi-rly sharzholdeis 11ii-v~ 
not heen advrsctl or af'fordec-1 the opportunrtq t o  Late when t l~e  cnnfl~cts of~nlerest  require 
, t  ~ l ~ ; ' ~ ~ c I ~ o l d ~ r  ~ o t c  i~rider the coi~posations' I-Zyl;t\vs. when Reed In?lor votetl t l~e  sh:~~-cs 
ant1 citulcf bc -f;)und to be wrongfirfly cnlo~ned at any time. and ivhe~l thcrc 1s no evrdcncc 
tii :~t John 'l'aylor or- thc other defenclants should he incmitted to opesatc the corporations 
l r i  I~ght ot' the \rrl.t\t:*ntral cvicfence of corporate ~nalkasance of +\111ch the I)efcndants 
h,n c fill1 1;noulcttge. ;iss~sted, and/or acyu~cscccl? 'T'llc fitregoing I S  not exhaust~vc and 
oi1~e1- C X ~ ~ I T ~ ~ ~ J C S  ;ire ;~sserted in documcnls In the ('ourt file. \?hrch a11 uncqu~\ocally 
iIcrnonst~;~tc that Kecd 'l'a>lor's claims \+)ere not pussucd fri\lolousl~ or \vithout 
f(~~intfat~on as asserted by the Defendants 
3. If 'The Court Were 'J'o A\\ ard Fees lincler I.C. L j  12-1 23, Thetl 'The 
Fees Awarded May Only Be l'hose Fees That Wete Reasonably 
Incurred. 
If the C'ourt tlecides to award ices, i t  should only aival-d the 1)cfkntlants those ikes 
rc:iionably ~ncurrcd hy them as a result of any fr~virlous conduct (wh~ch as set forth 
,il?o\c. 2111 of the claims must be frivolous). ,-'fhc :\rnou131 of an a\ha~d that is made 
1~11-su;int t o t h ~ s  ection [I.C. # 12-1231 shall not cxcectl thc attosncy's fee4 t l ~ i i t  were Ix)tli 
~c,i \ t ,~~ably ~ncurrctl by a party and necessitated by t11c fj-i\olous C ~ I I ~ L I C ~ . "  I.C. fi 12- 
1 .?7(2)(CI) 
'1'1115 act~on was drs~nisscd based upon the C'o~1l.t'~ dctcrn~ination t11at Reed 'l"ablo~- 
j,,~lcd 10 ~t l t fc  ;I clalm. 'l'hereforc, only rcr~sonahlc anti wal-ranted fees ~ncurrcti for that 
i ig~cga tc  thc11- tees and 1101 include such ~tcnlr  :is telephone calls to counsel In ot11c1- 
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cases, relcpliot~e calls with expert w ~ t ~ ~ c s s c s ,  travel ti~nc. I'ccs prcparlng an Answer, the 
~relns ;utc-trcx\ctl in the argument% assc! tci,! beloiv and nn j  ot!rcr unwarranted andlctr 
* .  
unnecessary fees Incurred in thrs iict~on I hus, the C'OUI-t s110uId tlralnatically rcdrlce any 
fee awrtr(l. to  the extent it elects to 214 art1 an}, fees at all 
C'. 'I'he Defendants Are Not Entitled To An Aw;trd Of ,?lttorncys' Fees And 
iIcfl.r?diifits seck fees znder both I.( ' .  $ 30-1 -?36(2) ,lilrt (3). i>ui t l~cy rzrc nor 
entltlcd to izcs under either scct~on. i4*111ch pl-o\*~cic a court m c z j  awar-c1 atto]-11ey fees under 
Jlcre. the Court found that Reed 'I'aylor was not a uhar-cholder tbr pu~poses  of a 
de r~va t~vc  act~on. cvcn though Rccd 'I'a>lor assel-tctl the f i ) l l o w ~ ~ ~ g .  ( 1 )  b e ~ n g  the sole 
plcctgee 01' all shares i n  AlA Insul-ancc. ( 2 )  b a n g  tlic 111ost s~gn~ficant  creti~tor of tlic 
insoltent AIA Serx~ccs C'orporat~on: (3) bung  a sccurcd crcd~tor holding all outstand~ng 
shares of AIA Insurance. Inc. as co1late1-:tl. (4) bcirlg the sole secured cred~tor with all 
c o ~ n r r ~ ~ s s ~ o n s  anti rclareii rccc~vables 1~c111g j~ledgeif aii collate~al from both AIA 
Insurance. Inc. and AIA Scrv~ccs ('01-pol-at~on: ( 5 )  andlor any of the other reasons 
Proposed An~endcd Complaint, pnl-t~cula~ly i~l icn  Iiecct I"aylor 1s the only parly willing to 
~~rosccu tc  he claims and has asscrteti that lie \v111 iicpos~t any funtls rcco\~crect w ~ ~ f h  t e 
court for :-r dc te rm~na t~o~l  f c-l15trrbut1o11 I lowctc~ .  Idaho ('ode lnakcs 110 ipcc~ t i c  
I liccd l'aylor rcspectfi~lly disagrees aitlr tlrc C 'O~I I 'S  tie~et.niinatioti that he itncs Iiol 1rax7e s~a~rcij~rg lo 1?1.11rg 
derivative cl;11111s and believes !!la! he d(1cs !ia\>c s~antii~rg as a berrefizirtl owner ;is contcnipla~ed by 1tt;ilro 
C'ode. Sctl c7.g. A13A Offici:~l C U I I I ~ I ~ C I I ~  In Sccr1c1n.i 10-1-740, wlriclr sl;ile sIi~!cs: " l i jn  tlrc cot i~zs!  v t  
sectioni: 30- 1-730 rhrough 30-1-747.  bcnefici:~l o\\,llcr ~rle:>~is a pcrsoll I l i f ~ i ~ ~ t j  ij (Jlrect econo~lric in te r~s t  111 
tlie shares." Kecti l.aylol- is tlrc (iiily par!! will1 ii tiirccl econonric inrercsl in !he slrnl-es of',4l/'l I ~ r s ~ ~ ~ . a ~ r c e .  
Inc. as !licy rive pledgoti as collatet-;rl lol- rlrc pclynlenl 01' his $8.5 hdillio~r Note. ,Si>i~ C'o~iipl:~int anki 
Pl.oposed Anrended Complaint. 
f;nct~i~gs tllal 3 stock pleclge (sccurccl by the \lock i l lx i  c o i ~ l m ~ \ s ~ o n s )  c t ~  c~ciiitiir o f  an 
1nsi3lvcrrt cory3orat1on may not pursue det-iva!~vc c l i ~ t r t ~ ~  5c.c ! (,' + 2 0  1 , j r  ::y 
Indeed. the facts allcgcd by Iieed 'J"qlor 11lust1;itc \z113, partrc\ dl-e j)err>>~tted to
hring ctert\iati\~e claims---when n o  one else ~ 1 1 1  pursue thc clams,  t\hen liC r i  lhc o~ l lv  
party truly entitled to the proceects of such ela~rns. ~ h c t ?  :lqsetc are 17c1ng \ i j ~ l ~ i ) ~ ~ ~ t i  off 
fi-OITI tllosc rn control. wl-ten tor-pitr:rt~ons irse b c ~ n g  opci-,rtctl rr~iptopc~ly I?\' I - C ' O ~ ~ I C  who 
b c ~ n g  translerrcci as requ~rcd, and wl~cn the as\cti\ of nn ~n\ol\lcnt corlxtrat~ori ,11r h c ~ n g  
d~\crtcil to another corporat~on. Intcrcct~nglq. many of  l l i c~c  MI-o~igl~fl  ,ict\ tool\ place 
under t l ~ c  1)cfcrtdants' i\::ltchttll c?/es and/or ass~stance 
1 .  J.C. 8 30-1-746(2) llas No Application ' f  o l'his < asc. , t nd ,  IS 'l'he 
Court Finds 7'he Sectioti Is Appfic;thle, Fee\ Si~ctttid \ot Be 
Awal-decl. 
l!ntlcr 1.C'. tj 30-1 -746. the court miiy 
(2) Order t l ~ e  plaintill' to pa? anj* cielcnii,ii?t'\ icaxon:iblc e=\pcnses. 
rnclud~ng counsel f'ecs rncur~etl 111 clefentl~ng the proceetiinp 11 i t  i ind\  the 
procccd~ng \.cab cornn-le~~ced or rna~nta~neti i\ ~tkctut reawmablr. c<tu.-e or tor 
an Imp] opes purpose: or 
I .  3 0  - 7 ( 2 ) .  Attorney l ies awarded under I.G. h 30- 1-746 are {ir\c~ ctlonal-y. 
1 ie1-c. a fee request IS not applopr1:lte under th14 scit lo~i l?cca~ric tllc ( O L I I  I Sound 
Reed Taylor could not b ~ ~ n g  1115 c l ams  a n d  lie was not :I \l~,licholtfct :I\ ~ccjiil~cri under 
I C' 4 '30- 1-740 i>t c c y  In other molds a t lcr~\lat~\  c actron 1% a \  nc\ c~ commcniecl 1tc~:lusc 
the C'ou1-1 dc~.t~ccl liecd I ;lylo~'s hlotioli to Amend and the ~ccluc\t s i~oir l~i  b ~ ,  ticj~~eti 
/;/I/ 
' I  1, / 
2 .  'I hc li)efcttcI;~t~ti, SIronl(1 Vot IZe Awarded Fees Pursuant '1'0 I.C. tj 
30- 1-730(3). 
kinder I.(' 3 ?O- 1-740. the cctu1-t rt7;ry: 
(3) Oriicr- .I j> .~1? to ~ X Q  !.\ti opposii~g party's reasonable expenses. 
inclutlrr~g col~rtscl fucs. r~~ct~n-ctl because of filing of'a plcacilng. motrorl or 
vtl~cr papci. r f  r t  i inii\  t11,it the pleacirng, rnotion or other paper was not 
well gr~ou~~ticti rn f ~ c t ,  nlotirlicattorl or reversal of existing law alld was 
~ntcrpcl\cti f r i l  ,111 ~inpropcr putpose, such as to harass or cause ~1nncccst;:tt-y 
dclaj 01 ~ ~ c ~ ~ l f r ~ ~  rncrcaw 111 thc c o ~ t  oi'litigation." 
thllows gcncr-,ill! tlic ~ ~ r o \ r s ~ c t r ~ s  rulc I 1  of the Federal Rulcs of C:ivil 
I'rocedurc Scctioil '4Oi;j \ i , r i l  not he rleccsc:~ry rn statcs which already have a 
counterpart to I ~ r lc  I 1 
Idaho Ilas such a I-ulc 1 I 5 g . f I ' I I 1 ( I )  In other words. 1.C. tj 30- 1 -746,(3) 
1s rntendetl to be tllc ccji~l\ <lIciit of 1 I? ( I' 1 I sanctrorls, and is thus rnapplrcable because 
the clairns acscrtcil h i  I Z C ' L ~ I  I c i?8ior  ci~ld 111s counsel (10 fall within the reqursrtcs of 
I.R.C.P. I I .  In ortler to I?c cirtlcti ~riidcr I.li.C.1'. I l(a)(l). a party must pro\*c that 
the elltire course of Irtrgatrctl? ilc ioil\rdcreii :lrld all of plaintiflws claims must be fri\rolous 
7 ' l ~  Dcfcnt1:int.i '31 c not cntrtled to Ices under this section and cannot prc,\ic that all 
of liccd l aylor's cla1nl.i \iclc I I J \ O ~ ~ L I C .  \tl?1cI1 is a I-equired tinding to invoke tkcs r~nder 
tllrs scct~on. I n  fact. tile rccorci cont,i~ni. no c\:idcnce that Iiccd I'avlor's Motion to 
Amcrld was not grountictl r r i  i ,~ct. rllocirfic,~trorl or rcver-sal of existing law. 'I'hc facts ancl 
law clteti anti assertctl 131 liceti 1 .I? lor rrl illrs case \+,er.c extensive. Thcr-c rs rlo cvrcicncc 
that Iiccd ' l a > l o r ' ~  c l : r ~ n ~ ~  \sere n\kcrtv~l rrl victlatron o f  I.K.C.1'. I I(a)(l). Moreover. 
Rcect 'I aylor nc\,es asscrtcil t ie~l \  , i t r \  c cl,irrns untrl Ile rnovcd to t-lmcrld hrs cornplarnt or1 
October 15. 2008. 111nl;rng 1 ( '  i\ 7 0 -  1 -730(?)  only applicable if the Court fburld Rcctl 
MOI ION I 0  I I lS~\1  I 0 1 4  111 I I \ I )  \ \  IS. 
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'1 :~vlor to be shnrclloltler 
Absent a Lind~t~g Ikat Reed Tdylo~ \.'is a sl~ttrehztldcr. attorney tees shoulti not bc 
a\zl'irtfcd rcgardlcs5 of the crrcurnstdnccs. Nc\ crtheless, Jtectl 1';iyIor suf^trnrtted 
substarltral law) on hrs rrght to brrng d e r ~ \ ~ a t r \ c  clarms, he 111acie dei-i\;ttr\ c derxands, arld 
Ile fiolds a bcnelicral rrlterest in the shares of AIA lnsurarlce, Inc. and ;is n credrtor ol'tlzc 
rnsolvent AJiZ Servrces C'orporatlon. I l ~ e  foregoing were all argtrments of' tifirst 
rtnpression and all grounticd In facts a~ltl a\\) 
3. ,4ssuming The Court Findc That 1.C. 5 30-1-746 Pq~plies 'l'c, 'l'hc 
Ilef'endants' IZcyuest For Fees, 'l'hc C'ourt Shoutif 1)cn;c 'li'hc 
Ilefcndants' Itec)ucst For Fees. 
Attortley f'cc awdrds unclcr 1.C'. 3 30-1-740 are discretronary hfnlzllot v itlo,-<, 
I iee~i Taylor pro\ rctcd a cierrvatrtc dcnland letter- prior to filr~lg s~rrt: he 15 ;i 
securcd crcdrtor- of all revenues and ctc)cl< 111 AIA 1nsur:inc.c. lrlc., \vatch~rlg the lrttle 
remainrng assets he scludndcr.cd in the rnsol~cnt AJA Scr\ices Corl?oratron (nladc 
irlsolvent at Icnst in part by the Defenctarlts ant1 others n.lisapproprr;-ttlot~ of cot-poratc 
assets). and he ha5 asscrtcii argumerlts rn good faith that were grourltlcd rn fact. 
nlotirficatrorl or ~ c \ c r s a l  of.cxrst~ng law "vlorcover. no one 1s brrngrrlg the ~arrai l tccj  a n d  
\*alrd cl;lrms or1 behall' of' the corporatrc)i~s. \rl-lich merely r l l  tlstratcs \tlhy ticrrvatrvc 
proceedii~gs arc :il-tproprratc. Intiecci. c\*erl r f '  Itlnho la\\) \vas clear that crcdltc)rs o f  all 
r nsolvcnt coqoratrorl arid plctfgccs coulti cxpr cssly not bring tierr\ at r\Ic clarms. Reed 
'laylor's case \vould be the ultimate rcasorl for- tllc Idallo Suprcnle Co~rrt to llolci 
other wrsc. See, lieed 'I'aj lor's C'omplairlt. 1'1 o p o ~ d  Anlencicd C'ornplarrlt iirld I<esl~orlse 
In O ~ ~ ~ ~ C I S I ~ I O ~ I  to Motron to I lr \n~r\s  'Ik~us, thc C'oul-t shoultf not award fees uncles I C' $ 
30- 1 -746, ucgarrtless of r!s appl tc:ib~!ltp. 
4, Ever1 If The Coiirt Awards Any Fees Under I.C. 5 30-1-746, 'The 
Only :2pplicat1lc li'ecc; Would Ilave Bccn Incurred After Plaintiff 
I+'iied liis Rlotion To Anrend To A9sert 'I'he Derivative Claims Otr 
Octol>el 15,2008, And f)rrly For 'The ,4pplicable Fees Incurred. 
I?ecd 'laylor derr~atrvc clar~ns \+)ere first :tsse~-tetl rn 111s Motton to Arnentl and 
S~pplcment  CSo;;:pla;nt fled 07; !?ct<>bcr 15, 2305. Morcoi'ei-. ilic CcfJnJanis ha\ c fa~!cd 
to segregate tile total trr-rle expencteti or1 thc cicrivatrve clarms and should only be awarded 
fees i i ~ r  the trme spccrfically rtcnlr/cd pertaining to cferivatr\*c clarms. Any trrnc mrxetf III  
~ ~ t h  other dcfcnscs or Issues should be reduced accordrngly. rrlcJudrrlg, wrthout lrmrtatron 
thc fbllo\\rng ohjcctt"ons((\;' AFfitia\ r t  of' Mrchael S 13rs\cll. 1:x C) 5 Ilours rn Iten) 
102 (not properly segregateti or I-ccaulrcd), .S hours In Iten) I06 (not pr-operl y segregated): 
1.2 hours In Iten? 114 (not rcyurrcd or necessary): 3 4 llnuts rrs ltern I I0 (not properly 
segregated as to s~~ccessf'ul and unsuccessful cicfenses): .3 hours I r l  Item 122 (not I-equrred 
or  successful): and I . W  Iloiirs IJI Itel11 13 1  lot required or successful). 
The total nurnbcr of hours tllat rel'er-cnce dcrivati\~c action deferlso rs 12.2 hours 
(which ~ncludes those objected to above and otller erltrlcs not objected to). 'Ttlus. the 
Court shoulci Irrnit any aivard to a m;rxrnlum of 12.2 hours. sublcct also to li~rtller 
I-cductror~s based upon the objections above and othcrs asserted rn thrs Motton. No other 
time or k e s  Mere ;~llocatcd to dcr-rvatr\e clarrlls and tllel-efore they slloulci bc ctenrcd 
I). 'I'hc Ilcfcntlants Are Kot 1i:ntitled 'To An A\.rard Of  Attorneys' Fecs And 
Costs I'lursuant '1'0 I.C. 6 48-608. 
l'lle Ilcfcniiarlts have I-etlucstecl f'eec untier- 1 C'. $ 48-608. I lo~ ie \ l c r~  thcrr rdecltrcst 
slloulct be dcnrecl or. r f '  the Court finds fces iir-c approl31-rate. any award <llc\ul<i be 
M 0 1  ION 1 0  111s $ 2 1  I OW 111-1:I~NT)AN I S'  
J~IQIJI-s I -  I A 1 - 1  o r u w J J s .  FIYS AM) (-os I s - 14 4,L'(, K1 C 0003.0 
1 .  Uced 'ftayltrr?, C.13.A. Claims \C'erc Not  H r o ~ t ~ l l t  I-or Spurious Or 
I-larassn~en t Purposes. 
"'l'hc coirrt i n  ~ t s  drscrctron 111;p award attorr~eq's kc.\ t o  :i I ) I ~ L ; I I ~ I I I I _ L :  c ic ic~ida~~t  rf 
a * 
tt finds that thc piamt~tt'i: actton rs spunoils or brousht for i?:iras\mcnl ptlllwses only. 
1.C. $ 48-CtOh(5). 
do~~ht l t i l  or low cpalrty .. If lack'? 1 3~s :  Ilictionarj. S c i  cri111 1 iiir~orl I I < I 9 0 ) .  p. 13 l 1 
"Ilara\jn~cnt" rs ciefir~ccj a \  ''/\vlor.ds, conduct, or+ actrorl ( u ~  lepc,lti~l c l r  j-tcrsiitent) that. 
bcrng tlrrcctcd at a rpccrtic person. annoys, alarlt~\. or L L I I I W \  ' . i t 1 ~ " i ~ t r ~ t r c i i  crnotronaI 
ficect 1 a)loi-'s cluinls ~rncicr the Conslrnicr Ijrotcct~on .Zct \ % C I C '  r~ot \ ~ ~ L I S ~ O U S  or 
I?rougllt fhr hurassnlcnt purpox"SJnfbrtunatcIy. tllc court elcctcti to rlisrl>ri\  thc claim 
wrthout berrlg able to scc thc ~ a % t  nu~nhcr  of  ctoculncrlt. t l ~ r l  cicr~lor:sti;ii~\ ~'17'1t has 
trartspirccl ~ahi lc  thc Ilcfer-tdants cngagcd in their purl,ortc~ii "rel~rcre~lt:itro~l" of' A1A 
Scrviccs ('orporat~orl. AJA Insnrancc. Jnc, and CropliS,?I I r l ~ r i r  ,ir~cc ;\gerlcy Inc -all tllc 
w h ~ l c  knoti~rng that nerther AIA corporation has heict a ill:l~chc\Iticr- rncct~ng to elect 
drrcctoi s In )car\ arid that subsftlrltral acts of corporate rnalf'c,i~,in~c~ 1 1 , i i  oCct~rretl 
3rgucci 111 oppositiorl fo thc I)cfcnd,mts.  lotior or^ to I > r i r l l i \ \ .  corrrts cto not 
alfi~rtl attor-ncys bla~ll<ct rnlrnunrty fi.orn clarrlls hr-o~rgllt b\  t i p ~ o ~ r r l g  lartres untier. the 
unfair tr:idc prdctrces acts 5r.c c g . C ' ~ C I J ? I ~ ? L I ~  ~ln?l)( 1 , I I I ~  i I i , q c , l  288 ('01111 60, 05- 
96. 0 5  A 2ci I . 20-2 1 (Corm 2008): B Z I I - I ? ~  Y P I  Of/IJlii c. of f ' r i h l l ~  { r i i i l l  c l i i l ~ ~  I / / ( l i e  irlziz' 
I>oI-I- I 1  P,  345 1' Supp 2tl 04 (1) C't i\/l;-~ss 2006) (,illeg;ltrcirl~ l-rb ,l ~ua~dr , t r l  for tlrsabled 
hl0 ' l  I03 ' I  0 l)lSl?l 1 014' lll-,f-l~Nl),4K 1's. 
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mtrrol cipii~~l\t l , i t " i i~ l i~  ;~i ld trust rllanager (Jcmonstratetl recklessne~c necess'ir? t o  
C ~ ~ . I ] ~ ~ I ~ I >  C!. !W u ? > ~ ~ c I  E I I ~ : I I I  !I:~cIc ~IC!); S l  I '~ l t i /  FLFO Afarine I ~ z s .  C'O t, l i / / ~ ~  & l : / / t ~ ,  
211? I 5: ( l i t  ( 11 ItlOl): ( ' ( ~ n ~ p o ~  L R r o o l ~ ~ h l ~ ~ k .  1 2 0  1". Supp. 2d 1371 (13.Ct. NI.M 
T"o00j i /2ttornc\ ' \  11111le'ld1ng conduct ~1ol:zted unf'arr practices act): rcc. rt luo f;ttt1.17iii? I 
111 ( i~t,/'u~irit ll-ic I'onnecticut Supr.crne C'oul-t upheld a judgrnent iiga~nst a 
1 lotvc\cl f c r r  the tluty of' an attorney to realously represent hrs client extcrlds. rt 
rlccc\inr 11 \ 1dI I1 illor t of the point at whrch the represcntatron constitutes fruud or1 
,i t l l i r l i  p , i~ t \  or t l ~ c  ass~stance III the perpetrdtlon of such a frdud. wllethcr hy 
, i i t i rn~at~\  c ~~~l~rcprcc lcn ta t r~ns  or k owlng nondtsclosures . . . I  I'Jllis court's rciirsal 
10 Ixrn-irt litrg'tlltcl to raise clallns 'igarnst opposrng cvtlnscl under the C'onnectrcut 
I 'nt,trr 1'1 ,ttic n ~ t ~ c u s  Act cannot be constructl, ac the defcndarlt suggcsts. ns 
.iff;trtiinti ili,~r~l\ct rnlmurlity to 'tttorncys fix tortrous acts they comnlrt ag'lrnst 
t l ~ ~ r i l  j ? . ~  1 ~ " "  13 lulC t cpr esenting clrcnts 
~'/lil,t71~1<!ll. Oi 4 2(1 I .  20-2 1 cifirig Mozzochl v. Beck. 204 Conn. 490, 529 A.2d 17 1 
( i O X ' 7 )  (otl~cl 1ntc111,il cltatrons omittecf, rncluding Rules of' Professron;ll C:onduct) 
I llc facts allcged by Rccd Taylor- and the law In support of hrs Consumer 
I'rotcction ( 'iiilrn \i et c not slwrious or brought for harassment purposes orll y. Irldced. 
liecd I , i> l ( l i  \\ o~ilti I1;ivo pr efcrred to wait and tile claims afier the lltigat ron was 
co~iclutlcii r r :  'ior ( 0 1  \ I1 .I Srl vli.c>.s Col;nol-trftor?, e f  n l  : but statute of lrrnrtat~ons issued 
r e i l ~ ~ ~ ~ , t i  1111~1 ? ( I  file L I ~  \ I , c I I  as the harm thc I ) U I . ~ C ) I I C ~  representation was rnlllctrllg upon 
A14 Scl-1 rcc\ ('oiporatrc~rl and AJA Insut.arlcc. lrlc. The Defendarlts request for Sccs 
2. I f  'I'he C'ourt ,t\va,-ds Air) Fees Under 1.C:. j j  48-6013, 7'11~ 
Defendallts Shotrltl Onl? IZc it\%arded Fees 'That Mere tictuallj 
Incurred 1)efcnditrg 'I'his C'lainr And Not All Fees Incorrect In 'C'his 
Action. 
Iteed 'la>lor.'s C'onsumcr I'rotccrron \zt clainl was one of 1ns11y clizrn~s The 
C'ourt disrn~ssetl the clal-tn based upon the p r r v ~ t ~ ,  of contract rule argunlcnt ;isscrted by 
the Defendants citrr~g a s~ng le  l i r~e  of e~1t11-j folrr~tl c;ises Althougl~ Iiccct '1 ,illor b c l ~ e \ ~ e s  
that thc contract rule slloulti have cscepfrorw or he :ihandoncd altclgci!?er hji t!~c Idaho 
Suprerne C:ourt. the IIeiendantr' argument \r:i\ slrnplc anci docs not \\*arrant an award of' 
vrrt~ially any -i'ees. '1 hus. even 1 1  the ('ourt awarcfs any kes. the arnount of such fees 
should be dramatically recluces andfor cllsallowctf bccausc: the argument asccrtect was \vell 
I<nom~n by the expcrrer~ccd clcferlsc courlsel and ci~d not rcyurre the extcnsrvc tirnc 
antf Rcply pcrtarnrng to the C'onsunlcr t'rotect~on Act I'lalm arc few rn rlumbcr compared 
to the trverall nurnher of pages asscrtrng othcr :irgutnents 
Reed I'aylor object5 to the followrng rtcrns (rncludrng. wrthout I~mrtatrorl) I I ~  
Ilefendants' recluest lor fees (Sce Ai'iido\~~t of' Mrchiicl S. I3rssell. 1:x 1') 2 5 houi s rn 
Itern 15 (11ot propcrl~l scgrcgated). 3.1 hours In ltcrn 15 (not clear whether properly 
scgrcgated): 1 .? hours rrl Item 22 (excessr\le bi13ed o n  total Ilours). 4.6 hours rn Item 24 
(not properly segregated and excc~srvc): 5.5 l~ours In Itern 20 (no t  p~operl! segrcgatctl 
ant1 excessi\ie): 4 6 hours tn ltcrn 32 (1101 properly seglegated arid cxccsctve). ? I hours rrl 
Itern 37 (not 171-opcr-ly segregated and  exccssr\lc): 3.9 hou~-s rn Ite~n 17 (not properly 
segregated and excessr\,c): and  1.6 hours In Itell1 30 (not proper.ly jegrcgatcti and 
cxcessi\ e). 
MO'I'ION 1'0 IIISAI I OM7 !)!:I I'NIIAN I'S' 
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Dcfcnctants connscl hiis 11"icd s o n ~ e  30.2 hours of' or 1; rckr cncrr~g ( ' itn\u~ncr 
13rc.tlcct~rj~~ ,?ct cli~l:r, tleknse ' l 'hi~ t i i t21 amount is excess]! e hit)] ecn cr. ~i tile i-ourt 
awards all) kes  for dclcncling t4cecI 'faylor-"s Cons~~rner  I)ro~ctctlor~ Act cI;iri~?i. tlie 
awt~rcled urntrrrnt shoulct 11ot cxccctl 30 2 hours, subject to thc ;)hot c. o ! ~ j i ' c t ~ ~ ~ ! ? ~  , i ? d  o(r!?er 
0 b j ~ ~ t i O n s  assclrtcct 111 tlxs itlot~on 
E. 
Corrtained f n Ttre Recctr 4, 
I t  1s a n  abuse ol'tliscrctior~ for :1 court to predicate an ,r \ i . : i~t l  01 , I \ tct l l ict!  \ '  ices on 
matters not cctntatncij 113 the recof(1 S ' I J L C ~ : S ~ I M  11 l f c ~ m r t ~ z n ,  I i 0  Irl,tho $07. 409). '77 1' 2t-1 
260 ( 1 989) 
1 h c  C'ourt bascct most of 11.; iat~onal fbr drslnrssal on 1 7 1 ; i t t ~ " i s  117;it M C I C  ti(>t 111 the 
record. I e . the alleged toll~ng :tgrcenlcnts, representation agrccit?cilti :i l l t i  ~r~rircial nolrcc 
of matters outs~dc the plcadtngs. urld takrng judrcral noticc nitl~ct~it pr011dir1g liccd 
'I'aylot an oppctrtunrty to be 1lc;ird ot subrurt additional evrdcrlic. "\c,rtilcr liceti I ;iyIord 
nor t11c I l e k ~ ~ t l a n t s  suhrnrttcti an! i~f'fid;i\~rts In oppositton o~ sirppoir 0 1  I)cii.nti,irltc' 
Motion to Ilrsnllss. vct the Court rel~cd upo~l factual evidence In r t \  O j ~ i r ~ r o ~  ;113tt Oldel-. 
Moreover , IZeed l aylor's act ton 13 ,is tjrsmrsscd wrthnut b a n g  c.cirl\ crteci to ,I sunlrllnry 
judgn~cllt 21s r-eclurretl. tlrereby nlakrng rnlproper the Court's t:rh~ng 01 iut11c1;il notice ;~nd  
I;rrst. tllc Court cons~dcreii tolling agr-eemerlts and repreicnr,ltrt,rl tlocirnlcrlt\ that 
\%crc not In the rccortl In 1111s xt ron Moreo\cr. these documerlts c c ~ c  nc\ el protlr~ced to 
Reed l'aylor I r l  t l l ~ \  clctrorl or ' l i l ikor 11 AlA SPI'VICCC C ' O P ~ O I ~ ~ ~ I O I ~  pi ( 1 1 .  (ic5171t~' liced 
M 0 1  ION ' I  0 I)ISAI I O W  1)I.J~IINJ>AN'l'S' 
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l aylor's tcclttc\t ; incf 111011oi~ t i )  L ( \ I ~ I ~ c I  111 the lorcgo~ng c'ise.' Affidnvrt o! Mrchael S. 
B~~scl l .  I'Y. rZ-13. 
Second. the ('our1 iilcii ;rllegetl j&ictc: rn rts Orcler ancl Oprnion that were not In the 
record, I c . tindrng tk'tr the, Ilcferiii.inti, h ~ t l   rot rolzlted any profess~o~ldl rules of conduct 
In TLZJ lor I 41A 31.r) I (  ( 5 t c ~ r / / o i r ; c i o r ?  cii ( 1 1  , {allen such a findtlltg 1s a thctual Issue anci 
sucl? 3 broad optnron ~2 no1 S L I P J I O I ~ C L J  bv ilic bets or arguments. Moreover. Reed 
'faylor u a r  riot al'forticti i l l c  oj~polttlrlil> to itlhrn11 any docurncnts rebuttrng any f~c tua l  
issues asserrctl rn thc ('otrl t.\ t )p1111o11 ,fnd Or(1e1 
I Iirrcl. thc C'our t took j ~ i ( i r i l ~ ~ l  11tttr~e o f  liiyli~j. i1 A111 S'CYI ices C o ~ ~ o r a t l o n ,  el a/. ,  
Case No C'V-2007-000020~. i l l  ioro I t  t h e  ('our-1 clecteci to takejudlclal notrcc ,is a b a s ~ s  
to tlcny or gti411t the i\/l:~tron t t r  I)iinrl\i rllcn Ilefi-llcfant\' Motion to Ilisrnrss should habe 
been ~on\~crteci to s\ilnrll.:1\ ~utigincnl , ~ r i r i  (111 partrci slrloulcl l i a ~ e  1,ecn provrtiecl tile 
approprrate tilxc to rcij~otld '111d \uhr~~r t  ,i lditrcin<ll cvrdcncc as provided under I.R.C.P. 
5 Scp c.2 . lfcllzt h i o t ~  I Iordti:\. I 1 S Itlcrlio 273. 7'36 13.2d 150 (Ct. App. 1990) 
~-c.hccrntz.g ticr7lrtl (Jul i 7 .  I O O O )  
'I'hus. the Court l l ic l \  1101 coriirtit~r ,in:, facts, docurncnts o r  Lase pleadrngs n o t  filed 
rn thrs actron f i r  detcrrnrnrng tllc ,\\\,i1(1 of ,iitorrley fees. rf any. 
- Afle~  11ic tfcfcntl,tnts' c11c111\ 1-1 ~ticil I I I C I I  i \pi  I I \;\ I I I I C ~ \ C S  pi i \  ilegrd rcpie\enta~ic>n cloc11mcnt5 arid 
tollrng ~ tg leement~  In npyoL~tlon 11) 1icc.J I , I ~ ' o I  \ 2lot1on to I>~s i jna l i t~  he dcfcnd,lnts 110111 wrvlng a5 
cnunwl In lit, /or I AIA ' t t  I I i t  c ('oii o ~ i i i i c  1 1  ( ; (:/ ('dse No ('V-2007-0000208 plaii1tlff moved to 
compel the rcprcicnlalloll t i t ic  r l~?icn~< 111 , I  '110111 11) 1 0  ( 0111pcI filed In Yi i l  / o r  v 41A 7~1-1 ~ C P S  ( 0 1 / 7 O l ~ i i f l O ~ ,  
iii I he ('ourt clcnlcd pl , t~nt~i l ' s  ~ n o t l o ~ )  to colill;i I iiclilctl plnlnt~tf'c Inotlon to d~scjudlify and drsrnrs~ect h ~ s  
~ ~ ~ t i o i ?  ,111 \i ltl~ont produciirg 111c ( i o c  rlllicnt\ 1-1 licctl I ' I \ ~ ~ o I  A ~ ~ i ~ r C I l n p l ~  Kcccf I'aylor respectf~rily 
,?\scits that 111c C'ouil ha4 C I I L Y I  '11 I C I ?  i r ( 1  c r ~ ~ ( l  '1~i l11~111\  5I10uld 1101 a a a r c i  ~tltotnev fccs to the I)efe~ldants 
l?aacd ~lpon docuirle11ts ,111ii f,iil. lli,tr I ~ L I C  I I C Y  I I I  ~ h c  ~ e c o ~ d  <tnd that ficcd I'dylor d ~ d  not have a n  
o p p o r t ~ ~ n ~ t \  to respond 
1;. Dismissal For Failure To Statc A Claim Does Not Constitute Evidence 
I t  rs enor to award attorney fees for purJtrtng an actlon frrvolously S I I T I ~ I ~  because 
,in aztrtm 1s tl~smissccl for failure to state n clalrn ulmn ~sihich relief c,in I x  graltted. 
J i  i : r?~~.r  r/? Slirrc., 1 17 Idaho 47, 50, 785 P.2~1 172 (C't. 12pp 10%0) In I .~ 'c~I . / I /?~~.I - ,  the 
l t i ,~l~o C'clurf of appeals ctrscusscct the test that rt llatl prc\rously actoptcct tzllen 11 held that 
We hnve llcltf that where. as hcrc, yuecttonc of' 1;1w ,ire rarscd. the rlorlpre\ a1 l rng 
13~311?'s positlon is 11ot ,lutorilaticall> fiivolorrs si~tlply hccausc thc court rs 
~rrtpers~tndcd Kathcr, the test is tvhcther the nonpr.etarl~r-tg p,~rt>'c posrrron is 
p l~~rnly  f:lllacrous and, therefore. not f'arrly debntiihle ilcrc. the mag~stratc farled 
to apply thrs test. I lc  sinlply held that the pctrtrorl was ti-rvolous because r t  was 
tirsmrs%ecl for f;,lrlurc to state a clarrn upor) whrch rclrcf couJcf be gr drlted 7'111s 
was err or 
'I ~ L I S .  thc C'ourt rnust rnakc independent fintirnp that Reed Taylor frrvolously 
krougllt 111s cldrrns ,lntl may  not rely on the fact that 111s clarms ~ c r e  drsrnrsscd for farlurc 
(2. I f  'l'he Court Awards Anv Fees, Then 'The Court Should Disallow Fees 
Incurred For Unsuccessful Defenses And Fees That Were Unnecessarily 
And U~~reasonablv Incurred. 
A court need not blindly accept the figures advanced by the attorney and rnay 
tiivIlo\v Sccs that were unnecessarily and ur~re:r:or~ably incurred Ci.crjf 12/~11 of IcJ~rhn, 
117~ S ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~ ~ I O ~ ~ C I ' ,  I08 Idaho 704. 706. 701 P.2d 324 (Ct. App. 1085) Altl~ough tllc 
t ~ n ~ c .  and labor actually expended by an attorney is to be consrticrctl. rt 1s also to be 
! 111. , r i ~ t ~ n ~ e r l t  i i  incorpn~ated by ~ e k r c n c e  into cach argument 111 t i l l<  kZntlon that I?crt,tin\ to f l~\olr)us  or 
i cl,ttcd contluct a5 a b m s  f o ~  fees 
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Inc., I34 Idall(, I / : ( ) ,  263, 999 1'..2tl 914 (('1. App 2000). An  attorney cannot spend hts cts 
her f ~ ~ n c  c~tra\~agantly 2nd cxpwf to be cctrz3pens:ttccl Ity the p:rrtj: w.ho loses and a eoui-t 
may tf~sallotv ikcs that wcse unneccssar~ly anti unreasonably ~ncurred or that were a 
procfuct ofatrorncy cllirrn~ng. ILJ 
7 ' 1 1 ~  court may ,~lso makc a rcduc.tlon for trr~lc ex~>c~lticti o n  unliuccess-fitl, 
reditrlcla~lt. or  othct-lvrse ncinco~npcnsahlc clairl?i, 
-'IN]one of'the atto~-nc!! Jkcs fix work 
devoted cxclrrc~\ C I )  to that unsuccessf~~l c l ; i ~ ~ n  c,rn he ,ru,rrdcd " 1)~11,zdrrnn v ncco 
('01y2, 1 10 fdallo 606, 608, 775 P 2d 8 1 S (('1 4pp 1939) I hesc arguments are also 
ascertetj '1s a bnsls to ~ I S Q I I O W  unnecesc;tr>. L I I I T C ~ S O I I ~ ~ ~ C '  ‘inti u~lwarrante<l fees pursuant 
to i . l i  C" 1) S4(~)(7)(,4) 311d (1,). 
1 he I>efc~ii~~tnti  ~~lvci,t~gtjted fdctu,il Issues. $poke L\ ~ t h  consultnnt$ nndior cxj?erts, 
y o k c  w ~ t h  ~ourlsel tronl rul,ltctl casci. tpent trrnc on factual 14suc.: riot d~scl-ted III the 
C'ornpla~nt. and. 111oit impoltar~tly. thc Defenctnnt\ cltetl cases ,irld ~ubmrttctl brlcting that 
\%"IS sifbstdntldlly s~n-i~lar 111 botll ~ ( I L I O I  I.' f i t r ~  I C F  J'rox~~lI, ~t (11 ;1r1((1 I(?\ 101' 1 C'lcmrnt.~ 
on<ui R ,\It h'liho/s, o r  01 I h e ~ e  I \  no rnct~c~lt~on lh,it the attor 11cys ~ e p ~ e s e n t ~ n g  the 
Ilelcnddnts 111 the torcpo~ng cases d ~ \ ~ ~ d e c - f  u p  Issues 01-engaged In ,my otlle~ cost s a v ~ n g  
benefit Kcither. ~t appeals the attorneys f i ~  tkc dcfenctants 111 both actrolls ut111/e(f 
substa~lt~,~llq tl c c~11lc br1cling \v~thout ,in\i cost \,1\ 111gs 
l'llc Court sl~oulil retlucc ;tnd/or d~\;lllo\\ tccs to the cvtcnt that tllcy arc 
I eduntiarlt. unnecessal y or u~lrc'i\onabl~ 111cu1 rccf In  ~~nr-tlcr~l,rr, n o  fecs should be w e n  
cons~daccf that were ~ncur~cci In lscuo un~cl,~ted to the Motlon to I)~srn~ss. ~ n c l u d ~ r ~ g .  
w~tllout Ilmlt,ttrorl. t1111c expend~ng rc\i1cwlrig ,lnv picatf~ngs ol papers filed 111 l i ~ ) ~ l o ~ -  I )  
.4IA Se~,\vc~s (htpoi (///or?, ilt nl , fecs f01 gullic11ts not asi,c~lcd, 1-cv1ctl I llg cmol Is. fees 
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fot rr~\~c~trgattng factual is\uec, or other ctcfel~\u\ otllcr 111:lrl fho\e drrcctly attr rhutable to 
thc blotior~ to I>rx~^r~rss, excessive trmc cxpcritied oil cet i,irn I>\UCS. ;-ll-t(i co r~ \  ersat rii~ls \vrth 
~ I I Y  expert\ rctarr~etl for the forcgotrig caw 
lieeci 'l'irylor specrticnlly objects to the ! i ) i l o u ~ l n ~  ilnclutfrng. wrtllout Ilmrtatron 
b:tscci upon tl-ic fitct that the 1)cfen~l;lnts' 111o\e(i ;111t1 I ~ C ' I C '  g ~ a r ~ f ~ ( i  ~cl cf rrndcr 1.R.C 1). 
12(b)(6)) fcc rtem number5 (SCY i'\fitia\rlt of Mtcli~ic.1 ,C. 13r\scll, I-u ( f bnsccl upon thc 
aht,\e ohjcct~ont \x;hrch tcsult rn fees 17e111g Irstcd :I$ unnai-ranted or cxce\~rvc:  
I 1 1  n c I ( I  I i ~ i l  o 1 ~ 1  c 1 c 1 ) :  3 1iiiu1\ in 
Itciu 1 (revic\x of' MciVicllol\ ('ornplitrnt) I I I\ol~l\ in Itcn? I trn~propcrly .;cgtegatcd 
and un\var-ranted tlrscu~.;iot~ nllh h4cNrcliols' cotrrl\cl) i S ho~rr\ 111 Itcm 5 (rmpropcrlv 
scg~cgatccl alict ~rrl\\~,trranted re\ic\n ol R~1cN1cl1ol.i ~ornpl,xlnll. 2 3  I~oirr.; in  Itcrii 6 
(itlenttf~c:~trori of doctrmcnts unwarrantetl anti not pioj?cll\ \eg~cgc.:rteti), i hour.; In Iten1 6 
(tclephonc contcrence rn rth wliat irttorricy), 0 I I O U I \  111 1tur1-1 (7 ( \ z ~ o t  1% o n  untlerlyrng 
la\v\irrt, s t a y  and matron\ unu~nrrantctf), .5 110~1r's 111 I ~ C I I I  0 ( U I I ~ X  at I ii~itcd); .5 hours In 
Itcl~i I I (M'OJ k o n  ch:tnye of venue unwar I anted ttnd riot 131 ope1 11 \egr cg~1te~i); .2 hour \ In 
Itcrll I4 (ur1\v~lrrar2tcd \vorl< on liulc 1 1 2nd not propcr I \  \cgrcgnteif) 7 5 hours rn ltcrn 18 
(excc\il\ c ancl unwar rantcd): 7.0 hour s In Item I9 (cxcc\,\t\ c iirlci univarr anted): .9 hours 
in Iteln 2 1 ( I ~ \ ' I C M ~  of 1\4~NichoIs' c t~l i t l l~  L I I ~ \ Z J ~ I  r:irltc(i ). X 110~1rs 111 ltcri? 2 1 (call4 to other 
attorney u~~~i t r rante t I ) :  .2 hours In ltcln 21 (un~\,atiantetl). ? hou~i,  In 1tc11-i 25 (~rnspccrfic 
and un\~~ar-tnntcd communrcatron wrth ~ r n k n o \ ~ r ~  , rtorncy) h hotrrb In 1te111 25 
(un\vnrr-anted call to calr le~),  . l hours (unwarranted ~ 1 1 1  1; I i~huric), 2 4 I~ours rn Itcrn 20  
(excesstlc and unwnrranteii). 2 hauls In Item ? I (trrni ; r r  i,rntctl r c\ rcn of cxpelt CV); .? 
I?our\ rn Itcrii 3 1 (unwarr ar~tctf call w~tl l  ur~kno\\ n ,ittc~r nc\ ) 5 h o ~ ~ r  .; rrl Item ? ?  
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(unwarl drlteif) 4 I~out i, In Item 16 (rcvretw of prim court decr.;lon \~r~\\~:ir~anted): 1 ''3 
!?ours In I I ~ I I I  10 ic,dl\ to carrrcr anti conitultnnt rssues unwarranted): .l hours in Itern 3 0  
(crzlls to conii~ltar~r\ tlnt~~arriintcci), 2  0 11oi11s 111 Itcm 39 (rcv~ew of 1~1otror1 In untlerly~ng 
case un!? ar r a~-~tctj,l. 3 hour? In Itern 70 ((rhicovcry tilne unwarrantetf): .T! hour4 111 Itctn 30 
(tclepho~lc to clcrk uli\varranted); 7 hour4 rn Item 43 (drscovcry unwttrrantctl), 1 I~ourc 
rn Itcnl 4.1 i r l ~ i c o \  ctxl unttar~anteti). 1 5 hours In ltern 45 (analysrs of tiocumcntr 
rrnwart,l~ltcd) 7 fiotir~i in IIIIIC 47 (untvarrantccl); .3  hour5 in Item 49 (un\\~:tt-rante<i); .? 
hour5 rrt Item i7 (~lrl\'l'alr;lllte(j), 3 0 110111\ 111 Itctn 54 (unwarra11tetj), hours rn Itcrn 40 
(unw'irrantcci). 4 2 Ilours 111 I t e r ~ ~  60 ( d ~ r c o v e ~ y  unwan-anted); 2 0 houri, rn Itctn 62  
(tecearuli r ~ g ~ l r d ~ i i g  claims again\t off rcer and clircctors ~rn\var  anted ""other\' i\ 
u n k n o \ \ t i  , i i-~ci tri~\\a~raritcd): 5 110~1s i n  Item 65 (call to Mch'rchol\' coun\cl 
iin~varr~inrcti1. 2 i-iou~s In Itnn 65 (d~sco\lery unwarruntccf). .6 hour4 In Item 06 
(unwarr antetf). ? 5 hours rn Itcr-t~ 68 (cxccss~vc); 1.7 hour? In ltcrn 09 (ciri,co\~cr y 
unwarr antctl). 2 9 hor~r 4 rn Itern 71 (dl affrng an answer w : ~  unmarrantetl): 3 I IOLJ IS  In 
Item 7 1  i;~ltirrn,ttr\e dcknscs unwar~antect): .2 hours In Itcrn 72 jtlr\cu\srons wrth 
Quarle\ ISr~rtl\ un\tarr;intct.l), 2.3 hours In Itcrn 72 (letter to clrentr rcgartlrng c l a ~ m s  r \  
un\nearr anted) 5 hour\ In Item 73 (unwarrantcd); 1.9 hours rn Item 75 (unwarranted); I 
hours rn ltcrn 7h  (~111\?f~i1~ar11e(l). .3 hour\ In ltcrn 70 ( a n s ~ f e r  unw:irranted), 5 l~otlr\ 111 
Iten1 70  (un\iarr;rntcri call re: cf~s(~u~llifrcatron and related issues to unknoixn attorr~ey): .X 
ht,urs it1 lterll 70 (,rriLi\!lcr u~lwarrantcd]; .5 Jlour.; In ltcln 78 (un\vdrrar?tccj) 4 Ilour5 rn 
1tcri-I 7 0  iun\i:~rl~inteti). .7 Ilour\ i n  Itern 00 (unwarranted): .? h o u ~ \  rn Iten1 (10 (call to 
attornc? unn;tr~antccI). Items 85-02 (exccs~~l lc  w o ~ k  on reply brief) 2 houis i n  Item 93 
(c;ill to trnl<rlo\?rl ; i ttor~~cy ur~uari:rnted), 3 hours in Iten] 91 (call to catrrer ~rn\x*arranted), 
.? hours In ltcfn 9'3 (c;tlic, to untcnou1n attonley iinwrtr-rirntcd), Iteau? 05-101 (excessrve 
work on hearrng prcpatal~on), 2 llouls In Iten? 00 (treatrse on corporate dttrdend and 
redemptton unwarrantctl). 3 lrours rn Item 100 Irc\i~e\\ of tiltng., frorrr attorney Bond 
urrwarranted); . l  hous\ 113 Iterll If12 (revlet\! elna~l to unknown attornc)' unuilrr anted); . I  
hours 111 Item 102 (ernall to unknown attorney unwarrantccl). 2 hours rrl ltcrn 105 
lcummu~~rcatlor~s wrth c;trrrer unwamantcd}. 5 hour5 rn Itcm 106 (vrolatron of  stay rn 
underlyrng actron un\*ar-lantcct), '3 hourc 111 lteln I06 (c\toppcl unwar-rcrntetl): 2 honrs In 
If ern 1 06 (estoppel untvar r antecf), .? hours rn Item 1 07 (worli on jutlrcral estoppel 
unwarranteti): .3 ~ O L I ~ \  111 Itc'l~l 108 (call \ \~it l~ McNrchol\ attorney unuarral~tcd): 7 ho~rr \  
r n  ltcrn 109 (nelvly filed document re\ic\v 111 ullderlyrng cd\c unwarranted), 1 2 hours rn 
Item 1 14 (unwar~anteti). 3 hour\ 111 Ltcln I I6 ( r c \ l~cnf  o  plcatlrng\ tn hilcNrcllol\ case 
unwast anted), 2 h o u ~ s  In Item 12 1 (rcrurrl call to unknomn 'rttorney  inw war ranted), ltcrnr 
101 - 12 1 (exceb\~\e \\,ark on nlotron to amend), ? Ilour,s rn ltern 122 (un&;irrantcd); antj 
I .X houls rn Itcm 111 (iin\varranted). Ihtrs tltc forcgorng sl~ould bc ~cduccd and 
d~sallowccl a \  rnay llc dppl~ciiblc to C ; I C ~  rtcm 
rrnally, the I>eil.ndant\ arc rcclucstlng fee\ lor 103 hotus of \\fork. 'Thrs arnount i.; 
excc>slve, rctitlndant. rcprexnts abandoned thcorres and \\)as unwarranted rn rnany 
Instances. 
lil. If 'l'he Court Awards Anv Fecs, 'l'he C'ourt Should Disallolt All Attorney 
Tra\~el Time. 
/Itttorncy fee4 recltre\tcd lor an attorney's t r a ~ c l  trnlc sllotrld bc cxcltrdcci \n/llcn the 
ca\e cot~ld h;i\c becn Irtrgatcd by local counsel. /<017('1 $ 0 1 7  1 / 'PIC,- ,  121 U'n A p p  320. 
346-47, P?tf 420 (2004) (aeccptrng the rule t11,it tra\~el t1111c 1s generally 1101 
cornpcns:-rblc. 17111 ajva~drng tee? for- travel trrnc a \  a sanction for a dlscove~y \lroIatlon). 
1995)(rcfusr~-rg to compe~~satc  out-of-town attorneys); In up / ~ ' / I I I ' L L I I . ,  I1x , I o 13 R. 726. 
72% (19S2). Iorzl i lcr 'o IIl'o\ v Rrkzn i)fstrrh?illn~q ( 'o .  125 111 App 3tl 267, 405  N.E.2d 
130, 145 (Ioti4).  Attorney travel trme shoulil also be d~scrllnwetl pursuant to 1.R.C.I'. 
5 4  c)(3)(1\) and (I,) 
, * I l ~ c  II>eicnclants clcctecl to retar~i counsel firm o~i ts~<Ic  I,e\xi'i~ton. Id;tho, cvhcn 
there arc r?urncrttus attorneys with~n the I,c>~rston. Id:iho, Mosco\+. Itlabo anti C'oeur 
d'i2lcnc. Itli-rho areas I'llerefi)rc, tlic l)eSend;~nts sf~ould 11ot be compcnsatcd fix 'ittort~ej 
travel trnx arltf \uch cxpcr?\es should be dtsallowcrl, ~nclucf~ng, wrthout l r m r t ; ~ t ~ o ~ ~ ,  thc 
f o l l o \ ~ ~ n g  rtcr?ls (Src Affidavtt 0-1. M~chael S Brsccll. Ex. C ) .  3 3 l~ours  111 Itcilt 100 ant1 
2 6 hours In ltenl 1 0 1  
I .  If 'The Court Awards An! beer, 'l'he Court S i io~~ ld  Or11v Uonritfer Fees 
'I'ttat IIave Actuall\ Been Charged 'l'o 'f'he Client. 
AII atto~llcy rs orlly cntrtlccl to recover the rearonable Sccs actually cl~ar gcd to a 
elrent, not the See\ the attorlley wishes he or .;he mtght h a w  char gect 5( 011 / cf/:cr ( 'o  1, 
JI ccjic\. 122 W n  2tl 141, 149-50, 859 P.2tl 12 10 ( 1  093). Attorney fees i-rot char get1 should 
also hc dr~cillowcd pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)(/\) and ( I  ) 
'I'hc IScScr~tlants have not rtcrn~ccti their -tees to ailv~sc the ('olrrt or- oJ,posrrlg 
coun.;cl w11rcl1 attorney fccs Ilavc been actually charged to the clrent 'I'he Dctcndants 
sllould not be alvardcd any Sccs f ; ) r  any trri~c not ;ictually chargctl. 
J .  I f  'I'he Court Ils-vards Anv Fees, 'l'he Court Should Not Ascard :Znv Fees 
lrlci~rred For Time Sperit Liti~atincr, 'I'he Amount Of 'The Fccs T o  B e  
Awarded. 
\A,hc~c a n  attorrlcy's I'cc.; ma) be a\vnr-dcd. tl~cq arc not  avarlal-tle fi)r Irnlc spent 
2.10 1 IOY I 0  1)ISAl I OMJ 111'1'1 NIIAN'I S' 
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/nc . 934 So ?d (11 5 (J-la Dirt ( ' t  \ pp  4"' Illst 2006) i\ttorney fees incurred algurng 
II'the ('ourt aw;trcis a114 lee\. tiic I)c.fcr~ct;intc; shoultl not be awarded any k e s  for 
time sl3enr argurng over how 1ni1cl1 kc'. tIlc\i \)1ctuld be awaltletl 
An it~vard of fees under 1 R (' I' 5 4 ( ~ - )  I \  a d~scretronary cletennination of the trial 
court. i?ut ]nust be drrccted by 111e factor\ >ct Iortll In the lulc. Kcill) v IJodges, 1 I0 Idaho 
872, X I  1 15.2tl 38 (Ct. App. 1 (I(, I )  If the tour? awards any attorney fees in an actron o~ 
Im\eti upon any of' the law crtcci 111 t i ~ c  ,jho\c secttons. the court ''W consider the 
follo\li,li~g factors rtl  deterr~lrnrng tllc ~ ~ r n c ~ u r ~ t  t i !  wch fkc\ 
( A )  T l ~ e  trnlc and labor I e y ~ ~ ~ r c t i  
(13) 7'he notelty and clrfficult\~ ii l  the i l ~ r e s t s m  
(C') 'The skrll tequisrte to pci folm thc Icgal service.; properly and the expcrlence 
and abrlrty of thc  attotnc? 111 t11c partrcular field ol law 
(1)) 'I he prevarlrng chargcs i o ~  111ic v,orl< 
(1:) iVhcthcr the fee I \  iixctl or conlrligcnt 
(I7) 'Ihc trlne Irmitatronr rinpowti hy the clrcnt or the crrcumytances of the casc. 
(G) 'l'he amount tnvol\ ctf ar?ti tlic, rc~tllts obta~ncci. 
(El) 7 he unclcsrrabllrty (>f the 
( I )  ' I l ~ c  nature antl lcngth of  litc j^trofc\\~onal r elatror~sl~rp wrth the clrent. 
( I )  A\va~d\  In srrriila~ cake\ 
(K) '1 he reasonable co<t 0 1  ,~iiton?,rteti legal rcseitrcl~ (Computer Assisted Legal 
licscarch), if'thc cotlrl 11nils 11 \\:I< ica\onably necessary in preparing a party's 
casc 
( I  ) i111v otI1e1 Pdctor wl1r~I1  ti?^> iotit t (!cernk apgroprratc in the par-trcular caw. ' 
I .It C'.I1. 53(e)(3 ) (emphasis :~tirietl) 
Iiecd 'Taylor ~ncorporatci h i  rclcrer~ce ,111 irppl~cable arguments asserted above as 
a basrc tc t  r.cctuce and/or disal lou L , ~ I  t i l t 11  lee> tintier 1.li  .C'.I'. 54(e)(3)(A)-(L), shoultl the 
Co~rrt  award any. I?ccd 'l'a\ lor \pcrilic,ill\ oh/ccts to tile Ilef'endants' L?ilurc to subrnit 
AUG KFC - 00052 
e v ~ t i c ~ ~ c c  to f~111y atlvise thc Court of the ~nf i~nnl i t~on reclurrecl by I.R.C:.lV4(c)(3}(A)- 
( I  1 Rccti I aylor asserts that any fces awarded should be rcci~tccd by the factor?, sct fi:rtt? 
112 1 I!, ( 1' 54(c)(3)(A)-(I,), rnclud~ng. w~lhout Iim~tatlor?, the following: 
1 ,  The Defer~dants Should Only Re Awarded Fees For Kec)rtircd 
Time. 
I j  ,Ittortley fees are awnrtlcd, a tour-t may only award Ices based upon the tlmc ancl 
I,th( 11 i ccj~rirect 1 1i.C.P. 54(e)!?)(iZ) (e~nplla.;~i: added). ?'kt:s, :! any fccc arc a\i ,ti rfctl. 
t l~cv  ilioriltf only be those rncurred exclusrvely for tllc Q l o t ~ o n  to  Phq~nisc, anti only tot 
i r  r \o lo t i~  cot~tluct or related rnapproprrate act (04 \n/ll~ch the rccord rs devorti). suhjcct to 
cit'ricr cthlc~tronr aiserted In this Mot~on Spccrfically. the following trme should be 
tlr-,,rlIo\,ic.ci or ~etiuccd accordrngly ( ~ n ~ l u d r n g ,  but not Irn~rtcd to) ( I )  preparatron ol 
I%,II\~+Lzc', ,  ~r l \~e\t~gation In factual rssucx; (2) rc-crcw of pleatlrngs and pal.tcr\ lilccl 111 
/ c i \  / o i  I 114 So-wr es Corporiiftof?, el (1) , (3) tclcphone conference.; wrth rn.;ul ancc 
~a r s l c ! \ .  ( 4 )  telephone confcrcnccs wrtll attonley\ rn cornpanton cases or uncicrlyrng 
c:t-,ci. (i) uavel trme ior attorneys; (6) f'ccs n o t  actually charged to the cl~ent:  (7) i-lcfcnsci, 
i t ]  I I W C ~  rIc\cr presented or rclred upor1 by the Ilcfcndant\ rn illerr Motton to I ~ I s I ~ ~ I . ; \  
( I  c . j t~(i lc .1~11 estoppel); (8) redundant or unnecessaly work: ( 0 )  iclcpIlone confcrcr~ce\ 
M 1111 con\ultant\ and expert wrtnessec (10) trmc spent argurng o\er  thc irrncwnt ol f'ec\ to 
I)c , I L I , ~ I ( I c ~ .  ( I  I) d~seovery IS<UCS: a r~d (12) other unwarranted. unprotluctr\e. 
tii?necc\s,lrh ant1 redundant tlmc. A11 of the spccif~c ohjcctlon\ \et forth rn tile \ectron\ 
ai-tcl\ c , I J  c al\o oblccted to under thts scctron. 
2. The Court 1)ismissed Reed Taylor'c Complaint Raced lipon 
Simple Arguments That \Verc Rot Novel Or Conrplcx. 
Iile niirrow cxccpirons relred upon by the C'ourt were $rrnplc atgunlent,\ 111'11 
courtsel fbs the I_)elkt~d:tnts, who are expi.1 renccci attorneys in protcssror~al r~eglrgcnce 
a11d/or acts or o ~ n r \ s ~ o t ~ \ ,  :t\fcrted wrth ]:t,llc ~!j!lc or effort. mc;rc c<imljic.x , < C , U ~ <  ;11ld 
rlefe~-tsex asserted by the I>efendantk shocrltf be iltjti-compcr~sable bec:tusc such arguments 
were not asscrted or M cre not rclred upon bv thc Court. 
3 .  'The Defen<iatltc, lia-\-e Not \let Their Burdo) To C'ornply With 
I.R.C.P. 54(c)(3) With Respect 'l'o Any Fees Songht And Awarded 
Fc-pr 'i'he Entire Action or  Any Of' 'l'he Ixgal r%rgumcnts Asserted 
For In&\ idual Claims. 
Whcrt the ;nfi)nnatlon rcclurrctf by I 11 C.P. 54(e)(?) crrten;~ has not been 
subm~tted by the party recluestlng f c a ~ .  211 amdrtl of' fees I \  improper l(>itl/nlc-/? 1, 
I,i.rtit~tirtl, 141 Idaho 425. 1 I I 1' 3d 1 10 (2005). ' I  hc Dcfcndants Sr-i~led to rtcl~ii/e and/or 
segregate thcrr fees suf-ijc~cnt for the ('ourt or Jiccci 'l'aylor to ascertain 111c true trine spent 
on specrfic clallncl, c .g ,  ctcr~vatr\~e larm\ rind Consumer Proteeiron Act clarm. 
Moreover, the IJefendnnts Iwve larled to fully aclv~se the Court ant1 Iiced l'aylor of the 
rnforrndtron rcyu~rcd by 1 K C' 1' 54(e)(?)(A)-(1 ) '1 he I>cfcndant\ ha\c  not met tlierr 
burtIc11 because these cIarrn\ arc ~mrclittccl to thc o t l ~ c ~  claims as(;c~?cd hy Jiectf '1 aylor 
and ]nay not be usccl a.; a vchrcle to be awarkicd all :rttorneys' fees inc~rrred In this action. 
4. 'The Cotrrt Shot~ld Redttec And/or  Disallot+ Applicable Fees 
U ~ ~ d e r  'l'he 1,egal 'I'heorics Asserted Above J'ursuant To 1.I;t.C.P. 
54(e)(3)(1,). 
I he C O L I I ~  \l~all al\o conirdcr "fn)ny other lac101 whrch the court d c c n ~ \  
apl,roprrate rn the j?artrculirr caic." 1.R (' I' 53(e)(3)(1 ). 
Iiced Taylor objccts to tlic i i \&i~r( i  of' fee.;. and to the cxtcnt that an?  Sees are 
awarcietf. recluesty that they be rectuced arltl/or clrsallowcd for a11 of the rcr-isons set forth 
above. \vhrcl~ arc Incot 1701 atcd 11crerr1 b! I cli'rcnce. 
I l l .  C'OIVCl~I!SION 
i he 1)cierldants' leqiiest Ibr itttorncy fccs sl10~11(1 he ( J ~ I I I C C ~  "iiil~clcrc'n licctl 
I :rylor is respectlirl of thc C'ourt's opinion, Reed 'l'aylor's ('orl~l-il:~~nt ,i ti c'itr5c.c. ol';ictiol~ 
asserted rn rhl\ actton are c o ~ ~ ~ p l c x  ;inti Ile bclie-,es they si-to~~ltl no1 ii:r\ c. / ~ c c t ~  tJ~\r~irssed 
bcc,tusc hc pled suflicrcnt facts whrch arc lcgal l~ suffic~cl~t to i~1j - i j7011 tllc L ~ ; I I I ~ ' ~  1'11u\, 
thc Court sl~o~rld deny the I~~fcr1~1ant'r" r c ~ ~ ~ r c s t  fix fees In tlic ~ i I ~ ~ s r ~ , i t i ~  c, 1 1  hc ( ' o ~ ~ r t  
ciccts t o  ;imartJ an!/ fees, 11 .;lloulil recfucc ancflor dirallo\i an! C I U  ,riii I O I  rhc re;ison\ set 
fbrth ahovc 
1)A'flSII t l r t \  20'" cfay of January, 2000. 
C'Ak4I3B1:Li . I?lSSi 1 1 'k till413Y 1'1 I C '  
Attorneys for I ' l a in i i l - i ' l i i~  t i  i , i ;  lor 
M O  I 10% ' I  0 IIISAI , I  O N  111-I I KI>AN'I S 
131'(>1Jl S'I I Oli  rZ I I OliNt Y5' I 1.1 S A N D  COS I S - 20  
I t f  I'Tt t '  131' C7J R 1 11''Jr t l ~ ; r t  o n  tllc 20"' day of' January, 2000, 1 caused to be served 
a true and coi-rcct ioy!/ ol thc iotugorng ilclc~~rnalt to the following: 
l fANl3 1>1.1,1\/ L liJ' Jtlrrtes 11. 1,aRuc 
-- -- - 11 S hI j4 l I a  Elatn & Burkc, 13A 
- - O\'I'RZIC;tl'l M ,311, P . 0  I3ox 1539 
-- - -  FAX 'I IZ 2VS\IISSIOh Boise, 113 83704 
- - X'MAII ( ptIf att,icI~incnt) 8$ 
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James D LaRue ISB #I750 
Loren C. fpscn IS13 #I  767 
ELAM % BUPXE, P.A. 
23 1 E. Front Street, Strite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Botse, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Fxsimtle: (208) 384-5344 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED T. TAYLOK, an individ~ta!; I 
Plaintiff, ( Care N o  CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an indlvldual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an md~vidual; PATWCK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RIGHAW;, A 
RILEY, an ind~vidual; HAWLEY TRO,QI,L 
ENNXS R* HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liabil~ry partnership; JANE DOES I-X; 
u h o w n  mtlividuds; 
Defendants. I 
MEMORAmUM IN RESPONSF TO 
REED J. TAYLOR'S h?fO?'ION TO 
DISALLOW DEFENDANTS' REQUEST 
FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
'Tll~s Memorandum is submitted in response to Reed J .  Taylor's Motion to Dlsaliow 
Defendants' Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs (ft~meiniifter eferred to ;is the "h?oriaa to 
Disallo.~~"). 
MEb2OIMNI3UM IN RESPONSE TO REED I TAYLOR'S MOTION TO DISALLOW 
DEFEmANTS' REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES iUVD COSTS - 1 
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An award of anorney's fees under ldaho Code 5 12-121 1s appropriate where an actlon 1s 
brou&t or pursued hvolously, unreasonably, wtthout foundation. Garchel v Butler, 104 ldaho 
876,664 P 2d 783 (Ct App 1983) Attorneys' fees should be awarded under 4 12-1 21 tsiherc the 
pos~tion advocated by the non-prevailtng parry 1s plalnly fallac~ous and, therefore. not Idlily 
debatable A~sucintes Norftlwsl,  Inc v Beets, 1 12 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 ( Ct.App. 1987), Guif 
Chpmrcal Emp/o-vees v Cfilliirms, 107 Idaho 890,693 P 2d 1092 (Ct.App. 1984). 
In opposltlon to defendant's application for attorney's fees, plalntlff makes the self-semlng 
assertlon that "he bclleves the evldence is ovenvhelm~ng supporting the c lams agalnst thc 
Defendants, whlch pose many Issues of first lmprcsslon, othcr issues of clear law supporting clalrn\ 
to protect secunty ~nterests, and clalms wh~ch wmant thereversal or expanston of the law In Idaho " 
Motlcln lo Disallow, p 2 Pla~ntiffcontends that the Court "dld not have the luxury of scelng all of 
the facts whtch supported the Complaint and the Proposed Amended Compla~nt, "whlch facts "the 
Court will have lntlmate knowledge of at the conclusion of the tnal ~n Taylor v. AIA Senilcex 
Corporation " R t s  argument 1s completely ~nverted. The plalntlff had an opportunity to make a 
record In support of his complaint by afidavl t or othenvlse, but fa] led to do so. It 1s fallacious to 
argue tha t  h ~ s  complarnt would be seen to have legal rnmt lfonly sallent facts were brought to the 
Court's attention, where the plaintiff hlmself falled to produce any such facts. Moreover, on a 
12&)(6) motlon to dismlss, the plaintiff 1s pven the advantage of assuming that all facts allcged in 
h ~ s  complarnt are true, as well as all impllcatlons that reasonably can be drawn from those 
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allegations The fault w~th  the plaintips cnn?platnt is that i t  failed to allegeany facts that could g v e  
I 
rise to a viable cause of action. 
1 
Where the law is well-settled and tfic7-e are no dlsputes of fact, an award of attorneys' fees 
under 4 12- 12 1 1s appropriate First State Bank of Eldot-ado L. R o w ,  142 ldaho 608, 130 P.3d I 146 
(2006); Andrewr v Idaho Foresf Induftrtes, fncr , 1 17 Idaho 195,786 P.2d 586 (1990). Established 
case law in this state holds that pnvlt), IS requlrcd In order to bring a professional malpractice action 
aga~nst a lawyer, except In the narrow clrcumstancc of an attomey preparing testamentary 
lnstruments Hurrtdeld tJ Illancock, 140 Idallo 114, VO P id  884 (2004); Bechr v Calluhun, 140 
ldaho 522, 96 P 3d 623 (2004). 
To make matters worse, plaintiff ftlas first-hand kno~~ledge and cxpcricnce regarding 
applicable ldaho law by virtue ofhis status as one of the plaintiffs in the case of Taylor v. Maile, 142 
Idaho 253, 127 P.3d 156 (2005). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court clearly rebuffed an attempt 
to bnng a professional malpractlce claim in the absence of an attomey-client relationship: 
The thtrd count of the complaint as~efls a professional malpractlce c lam 
agalnst Mr. Ma~le  and thls count IS precluded by the general rule espoused In 
Hamgfeld "that an attorney-client relatlonshlp ~11th t e plalntlff 1s a prerequlsitc for 
holdlng the attomey Ilable for negligence In perfom~mce of legal services." 
Contrary to plaintiffs protcstations (see p 4 of hfoliun to Disullow), this is not a case of first 
~mpression. Rather, ldaho law 1s well-settled regardlng tbe necessity of an attorney-client 
reIatlonshlp in order to bnng a claim for legal n~alpr~ictlce While there may not be Idaho case law 
regardlng thc litigation privilege, the princ~ple 1s so well-established in the jurisprudence of every 
state that has considered the issue, i t  is not farriy debatable that one can sue counsel for one's 
MEMOKAYDUM n\r RESPONSE TO REED J I i \YI  OR'S MOI.1ON TO DISALLOW 
DT'FF;hinAN J S'  REQUEST FOR ATTORNEYS' f:lzES A N D  COSTS - 3 
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opponent In pend~ng litigation for positions taken dunng the course of ltt~gation. If thls were not the 
case, then thc adversmal structure upon wh~ch our system ofjustice is based would break down. 
W e n  pta~ntiff s conduct as a whole In thrs case 1s cnnsidcred, one is Icfi wlth the ahldlng 
lmpresslon that destruction or warping of the adversmal system is exactly what plalntlff was trylng 
to achleve After fdil~ng In hts attempt to dtsquallfy his adversary's counsel, he attempted In another 
manner - by bnngng sutt against counsel tc! depnve his opponents of the ef'kcttvc asslstmce of 
counsel Not only the defendants In this case, but all defense counsel In the underlying case were 
coniLonted with lawsults, or threats of sutts, agalnst them. It should be apparent that pialntlff was 
attemptlrlg to game the system by fillng lawsults agalnst defense counsel as a I~trgatlon tact~c. 'The 
filtng of an actton for such improper purpose constitutes the essence of bnnging sult "frivolously, 
unreasonably or wlthout foundation" and deserves censure under 8 12- 12 1 .  
Plajnt I fi argues that defendants are not entl tled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs 
pursuant to ldaho Code Cj 12-1 23 (p. 4 ofMofiun ro Di.~uallow). However, defendants do not rely on 
6 12-1 23. Thev ceek fees and cost under 4 12-121 1)ef'endants do agree with plalntlff that the 
declslon to grant of deny an award of fees pursuant to $ 12-121 is committed to the sound dlscretlon 
of the Coufr Under the c~rcurnstance ofthis case, whlch are rather peculiar, the defendants urge that 
such discretion be exerctscd in favor of awarding fees. 
When onc drills down into the averments of the complaint and the proposed amended 
complaint. ~t becomes clear that the accusations against the defendants are that thcy did nothing more 
than what they were ethically obligated to do: they represented their cllents zealously wlthin the 
bounds of the law. Plaintiff waxes histrionic beginning at page 7 of his h40lion ro Disallow 
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DFFENDAN'J S '  K ~ Q I J ~ S ' I -  FOR ATTORNEYS' FEES AND cos'rs - 4 
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regarding defendmts' entry into a jolnt defense ageement, making appltcation for a prcltm~nary 
injunction, and otherwise defending their clients. Yet, raising available defenses and collaborating 
with counsel rgresenting parties similzly situated In a common defense are not only proper 
aclrv~ties of defense counsel, but are consistent wtth their ethical duty to represen: therr ~ l l e n t s  
zealously. Plaintiff s contention that defendants exceeded "any permiss~ble scope of representation" 
(Motion to DisuOow, p. 8) 1s simp1 y without foundation, unreasonable and frivolous. It is ridiculous 
to contend, as evidently Reed Taylor docs, that counsel for opposing parties must permit him to 
dictate the scope of their rqrescntatlon and their defense strategy. 
DEFENIIANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND 
COSTS PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE 6 30-1-746t21 AND (3) 
Idaho Code § 30-I-746(2) ant] (3) provtde that, upon termination of a shareholder's 
derivative action, the court may: 
(2) Order theplaintlff to pay any defendant's reasonable expenses, including 
counsel fees, Incurred In defending the proceeding ]fit finds that the proceeding was 
commenced or malntalnd wtthout reasonable cause or for an lmproper purpose: or 
(3) Order a party to pay an opposlng party's reasonable expenses, lncludlng 
counsel fees, incuncd becausc of the fillng of a pleading, motlon or other paper. ~f 
it finds that the pleading, motion or other paper was not well grounded in fact, after 
reasonable inqulry, or warranted by existing law or a good falth argument for the 
extension, modification or reversal of existing iaw and was ~nterposed for an 
lmproper purpose, such as to harass or cause unnecessary delay or needless lnerease 
In the cost of litigation 
l l e  Official Comment to tj 30- 1-746 notes that among the purposes of the statute are to deter 
strike suits and prevent proceedmgs which may be brought to harass the corporation or its officers. 
For example, in SIerieland v. Roberts, 314 Mont. 76, 64 P.3d 979 (1003), the Supreme Court of 
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Montana awarded attorney" fees and costs pursumt to MCA 4 35-1 -547. whrch 11; substmt~ally 
tdentlcaf to Idaho Code 5 30-1 -746, against the platntlff in a shareholder's denvatwe act~on 1shep.e 
~t found the actron wafi filed pnmaniy for the purpose o f  lnterfenng wtth the corporatzon's efforts 
to refinance It was held that the denvatlve clam in that case was "without reaonablc cause" and 
"for an improper purpose " lif at 81,64 P 3d at 982. 
In the present case, Reed Taylor's ctalms were simrlarly wlthout r~a~rtnahle cause anti 
asserted for an Emproper purpose We was not a shareholder at the time of the allcgcti acts and 
om~sslons of wh~ch he complained ?he  Idaho statutes clearly require that only a sharehoicier has 
stand~ng to bnng a shareholder dmvatlse action. Moreover, he did not seek to protect or benefit the 
corporatlon Rather, he sought to use the proposed denvat~ve actron to benefit (mi y hlmcei f. and to 
recover corporate assets to the detriment ofother shareholders and corporate creditors I n  effect, the 
founder and former CEO of AIA Semlces, who left the company when ~t began to run ~ n t o  financtal 
dlfficultles, sought to capture only for himself all remalnlng assets of the compmy ~n preference to 
other claimants A shareholder derivatlvc sult is surely an lmproper vehicle fur seeking to  prefer 
oneself over others having legttlmate stakes In the corporatlon. 
Idaho Code 4 30- I -746(2) and (3) approve award~ng attorney fees agalnst 3 part3 who uses 
a shareholder denvatrve proceeding or a pleadlng, motion or other paper rclat~ng to a denvatrve 
actlon for an Improper purpose Reed Taylor's motlon to amend h ~ s  compla~nt o add a shseholder 
derivative action was such a proceeding, pleadlng, motlon or other paper. Appllcatton of the statuie 
lndlcates that the defendants' reasonable costs, including reasonable attorney's fees should be 
assessed agalnst plaint~ff. 
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Platntrff Reed Taylor's attempt to allege a cause of action aganst the defendants in this 
action undcr the Itiaho tonsurner Protect~nn Act (the "ICPA") Title 48, Chapter 6, Idaho Code, was 
without ment for the reason that he falled lo allege that he purchased or leased goods or services 
%om any of the defendants, whtch is a necessaq predicate for anycla~m under Idaho Code $48-608. 
In order to prevent such abuses by over-aggrcsslx c plainttflfs, Idaho Code 3 48-608 provides in part 
that, "The court in its dlscretlon may award attomev's fees to a prevailing defendant if it finds that 
the plarnttff's actron 1s spunous or brou$t tor harasment purposes only." 
The tern1 "spunous" 1s an apt dcscnptlon of plaintifs effort to make a clam agalnst 
defendants undcr the ICPA. Before fillng such clam. plalntifland hls counsel were required to 
tleterm~ne In the exerclce ofreasonable judglner-tt that the claim was well-grounded in fact and law. 
A moment's reflection would have sufficed to reallze that no goods or services were purchased by 
plalntlff from defendants and. thcrcforc, no bass existed for bnnging sult under the ICPA. 
Reasonable attorney's fccs should be awarded to the defendants to compensate them for having to 
defend agalnst an unwarranted and unjustified iCPA claim. 
DEFENDANTS' LEGAL FEES ARE REASONABLE IN AMOUNT 
,WD WELL-DOCUMENTED 
Plaintiff quibbles over the form of both the Court's Opinion and Order on Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss and Plaintips Motion to Amend Complaint (hereinafter the "Opinion and 
Order") and the ~temized statement of the fees and costs incurred by defendants in this action. With 
respect to the Opinion and Order, plaintiff complains that, 'The Court based most of its rational[e] 
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for dism~ssal on matters that were not In the record, I e., the alleged tolling ageements, 
rcTresentatlon agreements and judicial notrce of maners outstde the pleadtngs " Motion fo Disallow, 
p 18 A fa~r  eadlng of the Uplnlon and Order, however, reveals that the Court squarely addressed 
the legal Issues ralsed on the face of plaint~ffs piead~ngs and ruled on those Issues as a maner of iaw 
More ~mportantly, the motton presently before the Court 1s not a motlon for reconsideration. The 
pornts raised by plarnt~ff are not relevant to the Issue of whether defendants are entltled to recover 
thelr fees and costs. 
The ~tcmized statement of fees and casts speaks for Itself I t  reveals that defendants seek 
recovery only of fees ~ncuned and b~lled In the defense of this actton; tlme entries relatlng to other 
matters have been excluded. Counsel for defendants subrnlt that the tlme expended was reasonable 
under the c~rcumstmces, which ~nvolved a clam for damages In a rather large amount, and that the 
resulis obtained were favorable. Each of the factors ltsted In I R C P 54(e)(3) were discussed In the 
Affidavtt in Support ofDefendantsl Costs and Attorneys' Fees Plalntlff's conjecture that no effort 
to coordinate wlth counsel for Mr. McN~chols In order to save costs I S  disproved by the number of 
tlme entnes (wh~ch time entnes are also mt1~1zCC1) which indlcate a substantla1 mount  of 
communication and common effort. The reasonableness of the fees requested 1s a matter whlch the 
t ~ m e  ntries clearly identlfy and wh~ch the Court 1s well-equ~pped to determine. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendants are the prevalllng partles. When all applicable standards are considered, ~t 
should be found that this actton was brought and pursued hvolously. unreasonably or wlthout 
foundatron The attempt to allege a shareholder's dmvat~ve cla~m in plarntrffs proposcd mended 
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complatnt was not well g o u n d d  rn fact or wasranted by exlsting law or a good faith argument for 
the extenston, modlficatlon or reversal ofexist~ng law and was interposed for an improper purpose, 
namely to harass AIA's lit~gatlon counsel and to depnve AIA of effective representation. ?"he 
allegat~ons that defendants violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act were spurious, smce no 
allegation was made that plaintiff purchased or leased any goods or sewices from defendants. The 
filing and pursutt of cla~rns found to fail as a maner of law and the pursult of an amended complaint 
that would not withstand another mot~on to d~srnlss 1s the essence ofldaho Code 5 12- 12 1 ; hvolous,  
unreasonable or w~thout  foundation. Cnder the circumstances, an award of reasonable attorney's 
fees and costs should be made In favor of defendants. Counsel who consclentlously discharge thetr 
ethical duty to 7ealously defend thetr cllents should ne~ther be subjected to harassment in the foml 
of lawsutts filed agarnst them by partles who are not thelr clients nor required to shoulder the costs 
and attomey fees ~ncursed in defending agalnst such lawsuits. 
DATED this day of February, 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A 
By: 
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JX THE DISTRICT GOliRT OF THE SECOND JUDJC14L DIST'X2JCT OF THE 
STATE 01: DmO. 1N AND FOR THE COUN'I?' OF NEZ PERCE 
Plaintif;": Case No. CV 08-0 1765 
GARY D. BUBI 'TT,  an indi~tdual, D. JOHN 
ASNBY, an mditidual; PATRICK V 
COLLINS, an ~ndividud;  RJCIIAm A. 
RILEY, 5111 1nrl1 t i d ~ a f ;  W:AIa,FE' TRO,XX,L 
E M I S  & HAWLEY LLP, an Iciaho limited 
llabtltty parbenhip; JANE DOES I-X, 
unhown ind~vrduds.  
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO AMEN3 DEFENDANTS' 
MEMORAmUM OX; COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES 
The Defendants in this case. as the prevailingparties, submitted their Memorandum o f  Costs 
and Attorneys' Fces c i r ~  J<muary 6,2008, together with an Affidavit and Briefin support thereof The 
statutofy a~thondes rdied on by De;eti&its for seekrng asi award ofanomeys' fees~vere Idaho Code 
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44 1 2- 12 1,30- 1 -746(2) and (31, and 48-608(5). Defendants did not seek recovery of attomeysyees 
pursuant to ldafio Code fj 12-1 20(3) because controlling Idaho law at that time held that actlons for 
legal malpractice constitute tort actions, rather than act~ons b a d  on a "'commercial trimsaction," 
within the meaning of 4 12- 12 1. Rzce v Lllster, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P2d. 56 1 ( 1  999); filter v. 
Welters, 1 19 ldahn 41 5,807 P.2d 633 ( 1  991). 
On Januahy 22, 2009, the fdaho Suprme Court ~ssued ~ t s  decision rn ('try clfMcCall v 
Bunton, Docket No. 34609,2009 Opinion No. 8 (Jmuary22,2009).' The Gtty of McCall decision, 
when i t  becomes final, will radically change Idaho law. It expressly overrules Fuller v Wolters, 
supra, and its progeny and holds that agorney's fees may be recovered by the prevailing party in a 
legal malpractice action under 4 12-120(3). Accordingly, Defendants now move to amend their 
Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees to seek an award of fees against PlainttRReed Taylor 
pursuant to Idaho Code $ 12-1 20(3). 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(5) prov~des, in relevant part, that a claim for attomey 
fees as costs In an action "shall be supported by an affidawt of the anorney stating the basis and 
method of computation of the attorney fees claimed." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(5) (emphasis added). The 
Idaho Supreme Court interprets Rule 54(e)(5) to require a party to specif). the specrfic code sectton 
pursuant to which t t  seeks an award of attomey fees: "[A] p a r z y m  speclfy, in its Idaho R. Ctv. P 
1 At the time of ttus wnttng, the declsron har not been reported and has not become fmal A copy of the 
dectston 1s attached hereto for the conventence of the Court 
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54fe)(5) fee request, the code section or conbact prokqsion pursuant to which i t  makes the fee 
request." Eighteen iWife Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 ldaho 71 6,72 1 ,  1 1 7 
P. ld 130 (2005) (mph;tsts added). 
Thus, a party must state in tts cost and fee memorandum the specific code section upon which 
i t  sceks an award of anomey fees.* In this case, the I-iawley Troxell Defendants cleded not to rely 
upon !$aha Code $ 12"; 2(3(3) in its cost and fee maorandurn, though it  was considered, Now, thc 
Wawley Troxell Defendants seek leave to amend their application for attorneys' fees to include Idaho 
Code $ 12- 120(3) as a statutory basis for recovery. 
THE DISTWCT COURT HAS DISCRETION TO ALLOW AN AMENDMENT TO A 
A trial court has discretion to allow amendments to cost bills to include attorney fees not 
previously requested Ada Coun@l-iigh.cvay Dist. v. Acarrequl, 105 Idaho 873,874-75,67 P.2d 1067 
(1983). In Acarregui, the defendants filed their memorandum of costs which did not include 
attorney fees They later moved to amend their memorandum of costs to include their attorney fees. 
The distnct court granted the motion and later awarded attorney fees to the defendants. The plaintiff 
argued on appeal that the amendment violated the time limitations imposed by Rule 54(d)(5) The 
Idaho Supreme Court held, however, that a &a1 court has discretion to enlarge the time penods 
imposed by Rule 54, and that amendments may be allowed unless such amendments would deprive 
the complarnrng party of some substantial nght. See Acarrequl, 105 Idaho at 874-75 (citat~ons 
omitted). 
2 Hawley Troxell's Answer in this case does include a claim for attorneys' fees pursuaot to Idaho Code Q 
12- 120(3) 
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In this case, the Distnct Court has discretion to allow the Ilawley 'I'roxell Defendants to 
amend therr memt~randum of costs and attorneys' fees to assen a claim for anomeys' fees under 
ldaho Code 5 12-1 20(3). The amendment should hc allowed udcss the amendment would deprive 
Plalnttff of some suhstant~al nght. Based on thc fact that Idaho C'odc $ 12-1 20(3) is specifically set 
out In the I fawlep Troxell Defendants' Answer, Plaintiff cannot demonstrate he wlll be prejudiced 
if the amendment is allowed. 
THE WAWLEY TRQXELL DEFENDANTSBE ENTITILED TO RECOVER 
After thc date of tiling of the Defendants' Xlcmormdun~ (11- Costs and AttorneysTecs, the 
Idaho f uprerne Court filed its opinion in Cityo~M~-Clr l l~  Buxton. Ilocket No. 34609,2009 Opinion 
No. 8 ( J a n u a ~  22,2009) which, in relevant part, holds that Idaho i'ilcic tj 12-1 20(3) applies to legal 
malpracttce actlons. That declsron ovemled k c  C'ouri's pnor cicci\~on in Fullet v. W'olters, 119 
Idaho 41 5, 807 P.2d 633 (1991), which held Idaho Codc 6 12 220(3) did not apply to legal 
malpractice actions 
The C'lp oj il.icC'hll decision, and ~ t s  overrul~ng of Fuller, 1s based largely on Blimka v. My 
IYeh Whole.f.raler, LLC, 143 Idaho 723,152 P.2d 594 ( ? O C i i ) ,  wIlerc thc Court held stated as follows: 
From time to time the Court has denied fees under I f 4 12-120(3) on the 
commercial transaction ground either because tire ~ la lm sourided in tort or because 
no contract was involved. The commerc~nl iranraciron ground in 1.C 5 12 120(3) 
neither prohibits a fee award for a commercial rrmsaction that involves .tortlous 
conduct (see Lerfunrch v Key BankNai '/Ass 'ri ,  13 t Idaho 362. 369, 109 P.3d 1 104, 
1 1 1 I (200511, nor does i t  require that there he a contract Any previous holdings to 
the contrary are overruled. 
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liiirnh~, 143 Idaho at 729-30. However, the Court's hoid~ng In BIimku has not been cons~stcntly 
sppli" 11n subsequent declsioris In Bybee v. Isaac, 145 Idaho 25 1, 178 P.3d 6 16 (2008) rch 'g 
d m i (  0, the C'ourt analyred a clam for attorney fees under tj 12- 12013) and heid as follows 
t ortious interference with contract and economic prospect~ve advantage are torts and 
not act~vns to tccover on a contract. See Northwest Bec-Corp v. IIome Living Sen] , 
I l f t  Idaho 835, 842, 41 P.3d 263, 270 (2002) (holding a party is not entitled to 
attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 4 12- 120(3) for tortious interference with contract 
cla~rn) Thus. we decline to award Bybee Air attorney fees pursuhqt to 1.C. $ 12- 
120(i) on its c la~ms [tortious interference with contract and prospectrve busincss 
adx~aniagc] agalnst Farm Air. 
Ileiip~te the apparent incons~stency in the Court's application of Idaho Code 3 12-120(3) in 
actlor15 ~t-r\ictl\~ing tort claims, tlre Ctry ofhfcChil declsion clarifies that Idaho Code 8 12-120(3) 
appl:es in legal malpraztrce actions. Accordingly, theNawley Troxeil Defendants have a valid h a s ~ s  
for seek~~lg  attorney f'ecs under Idaho Code tj I2 120(3). Such fees may be awarded if  i t  is 
crtahlici~eti that the commercial transaction "is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon 
whtch the party 1s atterrzpting to recover." Bl imh ,  I43 Idaho at 728 (citat~on and lnternal quotation 
orni t t  ed) 
THE CITY OFMcCALL DECISION WILL, AT THE EARLIEST, 
BECOME FINAL ON FEBRUARY 12,2009 
Pursuant to Idaho AppellateRule 38(b), opinions of theldaho Supremc Court do not become 
f h a l  until 2 I days aiier the last ofthe following events: (I ) the announcement of the opinion; (2) the 
announcement of thc oplnion on rehearing; or (3) the announcement of a modified opinion without 
a rchcanng 1 A.K 3803) 
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The Court filed the Ctty ofMcColl decisron on January 22, 2009. If the optnlon 1s not 
modified, and the parties in that case do not seeking rehcanng, the decision will not become final 
until February I ? ,  2009, wh~ch is the last day a party in that case may file a petition for reheanng. 
See I.A.R. 42(a).' 
Given the fact that the City c$McCalldecis~on marks a significant modification of Idaho law, 
the pasmeters of whxh have not been fully explored, Plaintiff Reed Taylor shouid be given a 
reasonable opportunrty to respond to the new issues ratsed by any amendment by Defendants of their 
Memorandum of Costs md Attorneys' Fees. 
I$ APPLICABLE TO THE CLAIMS ASSERTED BY PLANTIFF REED TAYLOR 
AGAINST THE HAWLEY TROXELL DEFENDANTS 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff asserted claims against the tfawley Troxell Defendants for ( I )  
aiding and abett~ng or assisting others In the commission of tortious acts; (2) convcrs~on dnd 
misappropnation; (3) violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and (4) professional 
negligence and/or breach of fiduciary duttes (legal malpract~cc).~ All claims appear to stem fiom the 
Hawley Troxell Defendants' representation of the AIA entities in the [Jnderlying 1-itlgation and 
events Ieading up to that litigation. The Hawiey Troxell Defendants' representation of the A& 
entities should properly bedeenied a commercial transaction as defined by ldaho Code fj 12-  120(3) 
3 There appears to be no mle preclud~ng a party from cltlng to an optnlon whtch 1s not final under the terms 
outltned by ldaho Appellate Rule 3K(b) Nevertbeleus, t t  seems appropnate to note the oplnlon 1s not final 
4 See Complalni for Damages. 
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because i t  is a transaction other than for personal or household purposes.' I t  1s the attorney-cl~ent 
relationship between the Hawley Troxcll Defendants and the A t 4  entities whlch is ~ n t e g a l  to 
Plaintiff's claims in thlc case Such commercial transactionis tied to all of Pla~ntifi's claims. tflcrcby 
maktng Idaho Code 5 12-1 20(3) appiicab1e to all causes of action 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that claims against an attorney fordamages resultrng from 
the manner of the attomey'c reprel;erltatton constiate an action far maIpract!ce, x,?thet!?er !abe!ed 
maipractice or othcnvise: 
An action against one's attorney for damages resulting form the manner in wh~ch  tho 
anorney represented the cllent const~tutes an action for malpractice withln the 
meaning of [the statute of llm~tations for malpractice], regardless of whcther 
predtcated upon contract or tort or whether for indemnification or for dlrcct 
damages .... Malpract~ce by any other name still const~tutes malpractice 
Grigg.~ v Nnsh, 1 16 Idaho 228,232,775 P.2d 120 ( 1  989) (citatton omitted). Since all of Plalntlff's 
claims appear to be based on, or related to, a theory of legal malpractice, and because atlorncy fccs 
may be awarded under Idaho Code -!j 12-1 20(3) in legal malpractice actions,' the Ifawicy Trotell  
Defendants have a valid basis for seeking application of Idaho Code f.j 12-1 20(3) to all of PIalntifTs 
claims. The fact that Defendants have claimed fees pursuant to statutes relating to shareholder 
derivative actions and Idaho Consumer Protection Act claims does not preclude them fiom also 
relyng on lj I 2-1 20(3); noth~ng in Rule 54(e)(5) requires a party to confine hirnself to a ~ i n g l e  
statutory contractual basis for recovery of fees. 
~ o m m e r c ~ a l  transactton tc defined to mean "all &ansacttonr except transacttor~s for personal or hi~i,scholci 
purposes " I C 9 12 120j3) 
6 See Clr). otJMc(h1l v Rwton, Docket No 34609 (Jan 22,2009) 
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In the Ctry ofMcCali case, tile cinrrns against the defendant lawyers alleged they had glvetl 
negigent or lmprtlper advtce to the Crly of M~Gal l  in connection with litigation ansing out of 
cortsrmctron of the clty's wastewatn treatment plant. The Iddio Supreme Court held that the 
interaction bemeen the attorneys and the c ~ t y  constituted a "commercial t~ansaction " within the 
purview of Idaho Code 8 12-120(3) Simtlarly, Reed Taylor allcged in the present case that the 
Hawley 'Proxell Defendants gave t m p r o p ~  of negjtgent advlce to the A M  entttles in c~lnncrction with 
l~ t iga t~on over the redemption of his stock. Under the criteria of the City ofMcCa// case, the 
relevant nexus of facts rnvolved 111 the present action constitutes a commercial transaction. '13e 
rdemption ofMr. Taylor's stock, Ole titlgaflon arising from that transaction, and Iherepresentatton 
provided by the Wawley Trowell lalyiers tn defending the actlons of the co~ora t lons  are all related 
to commerctal, rather than personal or houcehold, purposes 
I t  rs true that in the City o f , W ~  Cail case, the defendants were sued by their own ellent, and 
not by a third party, as In the present case However, this distinction is irrelevant. As was polnted 
out by thc Idaho Supreme Court in C'rtr) ofMcCal/, "The latter portion of the statute [ j j  12- 120(3)] 
is not lirnrteci to contract act~ons I t  'does not require that there be a contract between the parties 
before the statute as applied, the statue only requires that there be a commercial transaction.' " City 
ofMcCall, supra, p. 13. [Citations otnitred] 
The term "commerciai transaction" is broader and more inclusive than merely a contractual 
relat~onship. For example, in Huyett v Idaho Slate Unrversity, 140 Idaho 904, 104 P.3d 946 (2004), 
a former employee sued a university for breach of an alleged employment contract. I t  was 
d e t e m ~ n e d  no contract existed, and rheunrverstty was awarded attomev  fee^ nlirsltant to Idaho Code 
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4 12-1 20(3) because the g a v m e n  of the action was commercial, as opposetl to personal or 
household. Sim~larly, in the present case there was no contractual relatlonshlp bemeen Rced 'Taylor 
i 
i and the Defendants; to the conb.ary, the lack of such relationship led to the conclusion that the 
i 
Defendants had no duty to Mr Taylor Nonetheless, the lawsuit is essent~aliy commerc~at in nature. 
The Plaint~ffs theory was that the Defendants owed him a duty In the course of their representation 
of onc or more cof~toratlons, a comercial activity The Defendants' representation related to 
busincss martas, not personal or household matters. Idaho Code 5 12- 120(3) should control the 
recovcrab~lity of attomey's fee5 by the preva~llng parties 
Plaint~ff also alleged, tnrer alia, that Defendants intentiortally interfered wlth contract, 
converted assets, alded and abefi~ng wronghi activltles by corporate ~nsiders. and engaged in a clvll 
conspiracy to depnve Plaintiff of his alleged right to receive payment of the balance of a promissory 
note. The redemption of Plaintiff's stock and the promissory note representing the balance allegedly 
due are ctrmmercial transactions The allegatrons made by Reed Taylor against Defendants for 
actions which, according to h ~ m ,  ass~sted the corporation in breaching the note are, at the~r core, 
cornnercral rn nature 
The test for allowing the preva~llng party in a clvil action to recovery attorney's fees tn 
conncct~on wtth a commerc~al transaction is whether the allegcd commerc~al transaction comprises 
the gravamen of the lawsuit, 1 e, whether the comercial transaction is integral to the claim and 
constitutes the basis on whlch the party 1s anmpting to recover Dennetc r. Ktrenzlr, 130 Idaho 21, 
936 P 2d 2 I9 (Ct.App 1997). 
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Pnor cases holding that legal matpractice claims constihlte tort actions, rather than acttons 
based on a commercial trmsactron, Fuller v. Wolfers, 1 19 Idaho 4 15, 807 P.2d 633 ( I  991); Rrce v. 
Litster, 132 Idaho 897, 980 P2d. 561 (1999), have now been overmfed. The newly applicable 
pnnclple of law as mnound In City ofMclCall mmdates that Defendmts are entitled to recover 
hei r  reasonable attorneys' fees p u r s w t  to Idaho Code i j  12-120(3). 
It is the duty of counsel to advance only cla~ms and arguments which they believe are well- 
founded by the facts and applicable law, or a good faith a r v e n t  for the extens~on, modification or 
reversal of existing law. Counsel for the Wawley Troxell Defendants relied upon existing case law 
at the time their Mmorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees was filed. The City ofMcCall decision 
was issued subsequently and constitutes a startling change of Idaho law. Assuming that decision 
becomes final, I! will become the controll~ng precedent in this State. m s  Court has discretion to 
allow amendments to cost b11l.s to include attorney fees not previously requested. Where a sea 
change has occurred In conbolling law, it is appropriate to exercise such discret~on to allow 
amendment of the cost bill and to apply the new standard announced in Ctty ofMcCall. 
DATED this 5 day of February, 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
By: 
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AUG Kt  C' 00076 
I HEKkBY CERTIFY that on ihe A day of February, 2009,1 caused a true and correct 
ropy of the above and foregoing i n s t r u m e n t  to be served upon the foliowing in thc manner ~ n d i c a t e d  
below 
Michael S. Btssell U . S .  M a i l  
C A ~ ~ B E I  L BISSELL. & KDUJY, PL1.C -- Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard S t r e e t ,  Ste. 416 Federal Expreys 
S p o k a n e ,  W 4  3920! L Facsimile 2 ransmlsrlctn (509) 455-7 3 i i 
UKIEI: IN  SLJPPOKl OF MOTION FOR I.I:AVE 10 AMEND DEFENDANTS hlEMUKAN11UM OF 
C'OSTS ANI)  ATTORNEYS ' FEFS - 1 I 
(1 \7012\00l J\Readmg\"lot~onto D ~ s m ~ s s ' ~ ~ l t c a t ~ o n  for Allorneys' Fua and CostiM~lmradunl rr hllxtlon to Amind ,,er 01 wf i  
MICHAEI, S. BISSELL, ISB No. 5762 
CAh5PBkLL,, BISSELL & IClRBY PLLC 
7 South Holvartf Skeet, Surte 4 16 
Spokane, W A  99301 
Tcl. (5091 455-7100 
Fax: (SU9) 455-7 1 1  1 
PATTY O .  'rt"CEl<S 
C L E R K  OF THE OIST. COURT 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Reed J Taylor 
IN THE DJSTRJC'I' ('OURT C>F THE SFCONU JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF ?'HE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND !'OK THE COUNI'Y OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J.  TAYLOR, an intflvidual. 
Plaintiff. 
'i 
C X R Y  D. BABBITT, 'In ~ndlvlciual, D JOHN 
tZSJ1131', an rndlvlduitl, PA 1 KICK V 
COLLINS, at1 indlvidudl, KIClirlRD A 
RILEY, an ~ndlvldual, IiAWI FY '1 ROYFl 1 
kNNlS & HAWLEI  LLP. dn Idaho Itmlted 
ildbliity partnership, JIVL'E DOES I X. 
unknown individuals. 
Case No.: CVON-01765 
Defendants. 1 
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO AMEND MER'IOR'4NDUR.I OF COSl'S 
AND FEES 
Plaintiff does not object to Llefendartts' amendment of their Memorandrlm of 
('osts and Attorneys' J ees to assert the application of IC 12- 120(3) based upon Ciw of 
IMc*CLZII 1,. B~i\ton, 2009 Ida. LEXIS 10. However, contrary to Defendants' assertions, 
that decision does nut entitle them to fees under 1.C. 5 12-120(3) because: I)  this matter 
does not in.ro1ve a co~nmerclal trallsaction; 2) the decision should only be given 
prospective application, and 3 )  ever1 rf I C. 9 12-120(3) d ~ d  apply, i t  would only apply to 
PLAINTIF 1: S RESPONSE 1'0 DEFENIIAN 1 3  
MOTION FOR LEAVE. TO AMEND 
MEMORANDU124 OF COSTS AND FEES - I 
t!:c rr~~!prx?jce !aim, and Defendants hnve fa:!ed to al!~cate  the fees 3pp!:crible to that 
clam. 
I. ARGUMENT 
A. 
COMMEWGL4L TIt4NSACTION BETWEEN PLrlINTIFE AND 
I n  C i t y  of A4cC"nil v U l ~ ~ l o n ,  the court strnply held that a legal tnalpractlce act~on 
between a cllent (the City of Mct'all) and its attc1nlt.y (Ruxtun, ct al .) wa:, an aclroti to 
recover on 3 "commercial transaction" for purposes of I C 12-110(3) 'That IS clearly 
not the situation in rhe instant case. as there was no transaction at all. let alone one ot a 
citmmerc~ai nature, between Reed Taylor and the Defe~~dants Defendants. In apparent 
realizat~on of that fact, ~rnpl~c~t ly  argue that 11 1s wffic~ent under ;l'irt iri/ ~f there was a 
comn?erclai trar~sa~tion between the Dekndilnis and tlllrd part~cs (the AIA ent~tris. 
i7ropUSIZ and John Taylor) Such a pcis~t~on I S contrary to express Idaho law 
In order to trigger an aw~trd under 1.G. 5 12 120(3 j, "there nlt~sr be a conlnlereial 
transa~tlctn betweerg the parties " Gt eat Plnirts Tqztrp , I i~c  v ,\jort/rwe.s I P~pel~nc. C orjt , 
136 Idaho 466, 471, ?6 P 3d 2 15 (2001) femphas~s ddded) In CAcilr Plains. ;! gc~lcrai 
contractor (Great Plains. or '"GPPC") and its sr~bcon~ractors filed clailns again.! the 
project owner, Northwest Pipcl~rte Gorp. (Ni'VP). NWP prevailed, arxl tile trial courl 
awarded i t  fees under 9 12-120(3) Tlze Idaho Supreme Court reversed, statlng that 
[tllie only com~nerclal tlansartlon took place between the respective 
subcontractor and GPPC, and GPPC arltf NWP At no point were NWP 
and the subcontractors ~nvolved ~n a transaction . Presumably had 
there been a co~~lrnerclal t~ansact~on between the wbcontrnctors and NWP. 
the suhcor~tractors would hnve recovered from NWP fhr the extensive 
work they performed and matenals they prov~ded that benefited NWP. 
There was no transactloll betneen the subcontrG*ctors and N\VP 
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C'onse(quent!y. WViS .r.i !he prevail~ng p@.y canno? re1y on 1.C: 5 !2- 
120(3) for sn award of attomey fees 
Id, 136 Idaho at 472-473 il~ltental sttations omitted). -" (he commerct,tl transactrun tnn;t 
be an a ~ t u a l  basis of the complaint, that is, the lawsuit anii the cauqes of actlon must tx 
based on a colnmcrcial transaction" and not. as Defendartis arc arguing here, . s~rnpt) n 
sttu;rtrnn that can be thdractttritcd as a co~nmercial traniitctlon " Id. Indeed, '"to hojci 
othertvise woulrl be ta coniert the award of attorney's k c s  from an exceptional relnetly 
ju~tlfied only by stntutory authclr~ty to a matter of nght In v~rtuaily every lawsuit tiiletf 
[s~c]." I t l ,  yuctftrtg Riuttcr t 6 1 L)uIJonl ~(c. lniemc~ut~ & Co , 1 17 Idaho 7811. 784. 7C12 
P 2d 3-15, 3-19 (1 990) "I C 4 12. 120(3) cannot be ~ntoked  if  the transaction 1s between 
~tlwtiet: only ind~rectly relate0 ' O  Notr.sum v ScAnohl, 126 liiaho 559. 855 P 2d 1070 ( i ' t  
App 1'39-1). rev dc~n~eif ( 1 905) Iplaintlff not ent~tled tn fees agalnst s~gnntory on ;i 
prnnl~ssory note, when the underly~ng loan did not ~nvol\ie that signatory). An award trf  
fees under LC' 9 12 120(3) "IS not warranted ebery time :I commercial transdct~on 1.: 
remvtelj connected wlth rhc case " Hrnwer, 1 1  7 ldaho at 754 (purchaser of a@- 
chemical could not lecover attorneys' fees from the manufacturer, as the comniercial 
trnnsact~ctn was between the pirrchaser and the d~stnbutor) 
fiere. as In Grcrrf Plurns, I-luuranr and Brolter. there was no cornmerc~al 
transaction bctxveen the partles to the lawsult Rather, tile only co~nn~ercial tr;insact~un 
was bet\+een the Defendants and AIA Servlces and AJA Insurance Consecluently. I C $ 
12- 120(3) IS  ~nappl~cable 
I Keetl 'T'aylor's allesed ~ltird-party beneficiary rigtits have 1x1 applicatiort to n "cnrnmcrcial Iritnsaction'. 
because he did not engage in any  commercial transaction with the Il)efel~dants 
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B. EVEN IF THERE W-4s A CafBaMERCIAL 'I'RANSACTlCP! BETWEER 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANTS, MCCrfLL SWOU1,D CINLY BE 
APPLIED PKOSPECI'IVELY. 
The mandatory nat~lre of 1.C. 4 11-120 -'make\ it. in efyecr, an adjunct to the 
rrderlyng cornmerela1 agreement betwee11 the parties I t  establishes an entitlemc~~t." 
h41er.i 1. f*'cr?nnns, 114 lrlaho 85. 87. 753 P Id  7% (Ct App 1988) An a ~ a r d  under thc 
statute 1s "closel) ahln to other 'contractual or vested" sights contalned tn the agleement 
itr;elf'~' fii (quotatrons In original) rhus. ~t 15 d substantive statute. and Idaho courts 
hove decreed that 
[rt] dtfccts t f c c ~ s ~ o ~ ~ s  to l~tigdte cornmerc~dl cilsputes As we noted ln 
lir1.C.il.s I ir fer i i~r~,  lizc v Dzn~.r, 106 Icinho 288, 793. A118 P 2 d  SO, 85 
{Ct App 1984) 
Sect~on 17-120(2) produce5 a harsh result fnr the losing pdrty 
In Iltrgatlc~n crier a commeradl d~splllc Thts party qufferc not on l )  
the outcome of the dlspute and 111s o ~ + n  legal expense, but dlso is 
burdened wlth costs and attorney fces awdrded ti) the other sldc 
However. thls result 1s falr ~f the benefits dnd cmts of Ilt~gatton are 
ldenllfied In ddcdnce and the pdrtlei; can gultle their declsion(: 
dccordlrlgly l'he partles are abjureil by the stdtute to etaluate 
careiitlly the merits of their clalms or defenses In the commcrci~l 
illspute Whcn decldlng whether to Iltigate, each party must weigh 
the yotentla1 benetits of prevailing ~lgalnst the potentla1 costs of 
luslng There 1s a dlrect relat~onsl-i~p between a party's declsloll to 
Iltlgate a commercial dispute and thc benefits or costs whlch flm 
from that declslon 
Ici , 1 14 Idaho nt  87 Based on thc fnsego~ng, amendments to the statute arc appllecf 
prospectively Id The same rationale supports prospective application ot rclevrtlit court 
dectslons, and p3rticularl~ so when. a h  hue. :I decision "iadlcall) changes Idaho law." 
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! % ~ a p ~ ~ t i i ' <  :ipp%iiaiion iif a decision "has a sound basis in legdl policp and 
theon " fi;ner i Ilaisnn, 98 Idaho 606, 608, 570 P 2d 281 (1977) As stated In State v 
4lutil>j.  '38-4 P 2d 833, 849 (Wash. 19631, which is quoted in Jones: 
50 7 t  i i  that the doctnne ol: prospective overruling has attached In many 
'Ireas. in cunstltutrttnai law, contracts, torts, cnmlnal law. taxation, dnd in 
thc !icld of procedure, g w n g  the doctnne both sanctlon and acceptance 
tl~rougiiout our jurisprudence. Prctspectrve ovemllng ~mpafts that final 
degree uf res~l~ence. to the otherwtse r ipd concepts of stare dects~s, so 
necessary fct prevent the system froill becoming brittic It enables the law 
under >tare dec~sts to grow and change to meet the ever-changing needs of 
an eter c i~; tng~ng society md yet, at once, to presenJe the very society 
M 'i-11~11 gl\ei i t  shlipe 
Ir t  ilctcrl~iintng nhcihcr ;1 dec~sion is applled prnspect~vely. retroactively, or In some 
hyhrrti nl;lr-i~ier. itlai:o court5 conslder: I) the purpose of the decision. 2) reliance on the 
Put ,inot her \%;I\., 
" I h r  detenn~nat~on of whether a rule IS to be glven retroactive appllcatlon 
l i g~ncrally rnatic pursuant to a balancing process, wherein the galn to he 
dihtc\cd I D  (he zldmlmstrat~on of justice by accompllrhmetlt of the 
pulj'ose of the new rule (the first cl-tter~oi~) 1s balarlced aga1rts-i the adverse 
cffects on the atinllnistration of justlce resuitlng from the extent to whlch 
the courts hai~u 11115takenly but In good filth relrect on the preva~llng rule 
(tlie ie~orici inicnun) and from an appl~zat~on of the new rule Ibr the 
1turpu.o oi ~tco~tsltleitng deter~nlnations already finally made pursuant to 
t l~e then prc-1,,trlrng rule (the th~rd criterion)." 
I"/ . c j t ~ ~ i i t l , ~  Pr.ojiii L .I4~ftDc21~iei. 16 Cal 3d 156, 127 Cs1.Rptr 467, 545 P.2d 833, 848 
Applic~t~on of tile foregoing pnnclples supports prospect~bc appl~catlon of  
ill< c ;iii i - r r x  tilt. 'ptrrpocc" of Mi.Ci111, at least insofar as i t  appl~es to I C 8 12-1 20. 
,ipp,irs to be notking Inorc than to announce that the statute is now applicable to 
~l :~iIp~xtt lce i ~ c t ~ o ~ ~ > .  a ncn rule of' law wlllcfl a ylalnttffmust conslder before iii~ng such 
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hri aeiion. Tv use the \WI-45 ":' thc ~ v u r i  11) J~ztres, "no ~ ~ r ~ ~ ; l r ~ ~ o r i t ~ " t l i l "  of ihat purpose 
would he served by retroactive appllcat~on of the deciston, as i t  has no lnffuence a-fler the 
fact. Second, the substantive r~ature of the statute and the effect of the decision on 
conh-actual r~ghts weigh hcav11y the stde of reliance. As stated In Jones. 98 Idaho at 
In the context of contract nghts, the element of rel~ance 1s 
pafitcularly important, as the tianger of lmpalring contract nghts vla 
retroact~ve ch6wges in court tloldtngs IS especially acute. "We take the 
following ti-om 21 C.J.S. Courts $ 194, subsec b. p. 329, 
'An overruling d e c ~ s ~ o n  cannot operare rctruspect~vely so as to 
~~rlpdlr the obligations of ~ontrdcrs entered Into, ur lrljunously affect vested 
nghts acqutred, in relidnce on the o~enu led  dec~ston.' rile same authority. 
at page 327, points out that d court of Hnal rcview hds tllc power to ltrnlt 
the effect of 'in overrul~ng dec~s~on  so that 11  v v ~ l l  operdte p~ospect~vely 
only See to the same effect 14 Am Jur , Courts, 5 130. at page 345 " L ~ n n  
Cinrnty v Rozelle, 177 Or. 245. 102 P 2d 150. 165 ( 1  545) 
Thlrd, Plalntlff does not belleve ihat prospective applioat~on ol'itlcC'iril uiould adversely 
effect the ad~nlnistratton of justtce. 'Thus, iZ.fcCh11 sl~ould bc appl~ed prospcetively only. 
€'. EVEi'j IF FEES COULD RE AWARDED UNDER 1,C. 8 12-120(3), TfIDY 
COULD NOT BE AIIARDED IN THIS CASE BECAUSE DEFENDAETS' 
HAVE FAILED 'fO SEGREGATE TEfEIR FEES. 
Defendants;' clarm they are ent~tlect to nil of thelr lkes under $ 12-120(3) 
Iiowcver. if appltcable at all, 11 would only apply to the mdlpract~ce claim Fees are 
propcrlv denled ~f the clntmdnt falls to segregate fees betxlieen covered and uncmered 
claims A~aoks t Gtgray Rirnche,c, 128 Idaho 72. 79, 910 P 2d 744 (1 996) (tnal court 
properly denled fees when prevdtllng pdrty could not sep~lrate fees attributable to contract 
c l a ~ ~ n  from those attnbutable to conversion clam) ' 
' Althvugit BrooX, reiled 011 Ftci!er L Cl'oiirr~. 119 Iddhu 415. 807 P 2d 6 l 3  11991). wiuch was ovemleri 
by i14cCiilI. i t  did not do so for the propi~sir~on dl~cussed here111 
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Based an the foregoing, and Plaintiffs' previously sublnitted briefing. Defendants' 
motjoli fur an award of attorneys' fees under 1.C 5 I2 120(3) should be denied. 
DATED this  day of February, 2009. 
CAMPBELL, BISSELL & KIyBY 1'1 I ( .  
A, 1 
Attomeys for Plaintiff 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the &%ay of F&ruary, 2009, 1 caused to be 
served a true and correct copy of the fitregoing document to the foliowing: 
-- HANU DELIVERY James U. LaRue 
% US NAIL Elam 8r. Bu~ke ,  PA 
- OVERNIGHT lklAII P 0. Box 1539 
k FAX TRANSMISSION 
-- - 
Bo~se, ID 83704 
EMAIL (,pdf attachment) 
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R l  IC'1 fi2f-l S. UISSFI,l . 1SH No 5762 
C ilMPBl",f,l . BISSE1,I & KIRBY PI 1 C 
C o u t h  Flowdrd Stt-ect, Suite 4 i (1 
f yli>l\;nic. %'A 99201 
I el 15r16)j 455-7100 
f ;?x (509) 355-71 i i 
,4ttornciys for Plaintiff Rccd J I aylor 
IN TUL IIISTRLC'I ('WJKT 01; T H E  SECOND JIIIIIC'TAI, 1)ISTIZIC'T OF 7'Ilr 
S FATE Of' IDAHO. IN ANT) FOR T11L C'OIIN'I Y ClF N E L  PEKCF 
R 1.1 11 1 7'iZY I OR, an ~ncilv~duai, 
t ;AJ;i'r 1) BABBIT'I', an ~ndlvlduai. D JOl th' 
<lS1113'1, an ~nd~vlduai ,  I'A'l'fllCK V 
( f 11 1 INS, ail lndrv~dtral, IZICIIAIID A 
R I 1  .I-Y . .in ~ndrs~dual ,  HAW1,I-Y TR(7XFLL 
i*NNlS R HAW1 FY, 1-1 P. a n  Idaho lrrnrted 
I~~iblllty pi11 tnersh~p. JANE TIOES I X. 
tinknc>wll ~ncf~vlduals. 
Defendants 
- - -- - - - - --- 
- --- --- 
i'lalntifl'subt~lit~ this fieply to Tlefer~dants' Response I'o liccd I i ayiol 's Motloll 
1 o l ) ~ \ ~ i l i o ~ i i  1)efeiidants' Reyucsi for Attorneys Fees and Costs Pialntltf's ~ntent  1s to 
i i;tr i t \  ccrfain arglmenls. and not  to restate arguments alrearlq lnaile IJI his opcrllng brief. 
,$. I.C. 6 12-121 IS INAPPLICABLE BECAUSH NO CI,AIM, LET ALONE 
AI,1, OF 'THEM, WERE BROilCIiT OK PllRSUED I'KIIJOLOUSI,V, 
C;NREASONABI,Y OR WI'l'l'IOUT E'OUh'DA7'ION. 
It1 i' I O DIIFEn'L)AI\I'TS' RESI'ONSE 
I 0  I'i , l JN 1 IFF'S bIO1 ION 7'0 J>ISAI,I OW 
J i i S ANZI COSTS 1 
I)etet-rdar?ts' argun~cnt for tees uncier I.(' $ 12 12 I SCCIIIS to k;-~sed on  two 
arguments. I )  thc l~lalpractice clatrn had no b a s ~ s  because there u,ls no pnvity of 
contract. anti 2)  the Iltlgat~orr pni'llcge 1s kvcfl-estahlisl~ed ~ur~sprudence in other 
juni;dl~tlitns Dcfenddnts' arg~amer?ts Ignore Ihz: f'aolr and rhe law 
Frrst, ~t ix~ould he Improper to f i~cus rolelj  on the ~ n ~ ~ l p r a c t i ~ e  claim, as fecs may 
not be a~%larcletl ur~cicr I C'. 5 12-1 21 unless ihc cnrrul. matter M C I ~  broxlghf 01. pursued 
fnvoiously, urtieasonably or w12hout reasonable cause .%~i.ip ~i!~i?rlgell l~i?t Cbtabsts 
lirvbo l.l.'i..sr Cbrpui. (nc . 1 I C) Idaho 636. 630- 809 P 2cl 487. 401 ( 1  091) (tnal court 
I I I I ~ I  operly ~ncoketf il.idt rtatute because 'not  all of platntlffs' elarms were frivolous") 
Second, th2 C'ourt'i decrsion was based. In hrge part. on {he "litigation privilege." 
tvhlch has neler heen addl essed 112 Idaho Ijcfendanls' claln~ that the doctrine is "weii 
e~tabll.;l~ecl ' urlspruclonce begs the cluestion. which is. uilat 1s the scope. of'the pri\ ilege? 
i2galn. that yuest1o11 I ~ a s  rlcver beer] adcfressecl in Idaho. I c . rt I S  a matter of first 
Imprcsslcln Plalntitf provlded l l ~ e  Court wlth substantla1 author~ty supporttng the 
proposttlol~ thdt the p n \ ~ ~ l e g e  iit>cs not extctid to tllc t43-x of lnalfedsanic alleged h e ~ e  
The Court dcclded otheru~lse, hilt glben the extel~cive iegnl support for I'iaintiff s positlon 
~t cannot be ledsonably be argued that 111s clalnls were fnvolorrs or wcre brought wrthout 
reasonable Lausc Where a case ~nvolvcs a novel legal questlon or lssues of first 
Impressloil. fees sho~lld not he aivarcted under 1.C. 5 12 121 ('ampht 11 L Ktldew. 141 
iilaho 640, 1 1 5 1' 3d 73 1 (2005) .  
'I lrlrd. the C'ourt also bdsed 11s d e c ~ s ~ o n .  in part. on  a review of documents w h ~ c h  
f'ld~ntiff u ns neLet pennltted to exdrrlllle 111 othei xords. the Cctu1.t 'ind Deftndants were 
procccdrng unitel dlll;Z~er~t !hits thnn Plilllitlff Plalntil'fs d c l ~ o l ~ i  .should be jtrdged ba~ecl 
l i  f-l'l Y 1 ' 0  Ill* I-1-hr1litN TS ' I<CSJ'ONSE 
1 0  1'1,iZ11\;1 11-F'S M 0 1  ION ' 1 ' 0  13ISA1,L.OW 
FEFS AIUI) ( ' O S  I S 2 
solely 0 1 1  tlre allegations 111 the Con~plalnt, and nut or1 11l;itcrial nuts~tlc the record, let 
alone tiocuments Plalntlff was never permitted to revleu 
W .  EVEN IF DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO FEES UNDER I.G. $630- 
1-746 or 48-608(5), SlJGlI AN AM'AKI) WOULD BE IMPROPER 
BECALJSE THEY HA\% FAILED 7'0 SEGRI;(; 47 E; 'I'HETR FEES, 
Ilefcndants seem to argue that they are ent~tled to all ofthetr fccs under either l.C. 
4s 30 1-746 or 48-60X(5). There I S  no author~ty for st~cli 3 j>rciltostt~on g 30-1-746 
dppl~cs to ciel-ivat~be cla~ms, and $ 48-605 appl~ec to IC'fJ?I ~ l ~ r r ~ r r ~ s  If Ilefendants cannot 
allocate fees to the appropriate claims. they cantlot be ,~~ur t icc i  ally fees for defending 
agalnst those cl'i~rns ,See Broctfcr v Grgruy h'clnches, l ? h  iiial~o 73,  79. 91 0 P 2d 743 
(1996) (trial t o u ~ l  properly denled fees when plevarling p ~ ~ t >  could not separate fee5 
attrlbi~t~ible t o contr'ict clarrn fiom those attrtbutable to cc-tin c1.lo12 cl;l~m) 
Based on the loregoir~g. as well as Plaintiff‘. rrc\  hrtefing. Ilefendants 
Motion I-01 Fees and C'c)sts should be denled 
4% 
IIA7 E l l  this W -- day of February. 2009 
K1:t'l Y I 0  I)T",T.I;NI34N 1 S '  IGSPONSE 
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I HI-,IIEHY C-ER'I 1FY tllai on the 21)'" &day of February, 2009, 1 caused to be 
served a truc i i t ~ ~ i  correct copy of the ii~r-ccct~ng document to the followirlg: 
- s IIAr.4'11) i l F t l V E R Y  j m r s  D. L a h e  
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IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JIIDICML DIS'rRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR 'THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
IiEED 3 .  'J'AYLOR, an individual; I 
Pldntiff, I Case N o  CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an indiv~dual, D. JOHN 
ASNBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; MCNARD A. 
ItlLEY, an indsv~dual; HAWLEY T R O Z L L  
ENNIS & FIAWLEY LLP, m Idaho 11mited 
l~ab~lrtp partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unhlown individuals; 
DEFENDNI'S'  REPLY BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR LEAVE 'TO 
AMEND MEMORANDUM OF COSTS 
AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff Reed Taylor hm not objected to Defendants' amendment of their Memorandum of 
Costs and Artomeys' Fees to assert the application of Idaho Code Ij 12- 120(1) based upon Cir,. oJ 
McCail v B ~ r f o n ,  2009 WL 1913305 (Idaho 20091, but contends that case should be given only 
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96 Idaho 19 ,523  P.2d 1365 (1 974). We balarlce the first factor agalnst the other two 
ro deternine whether to iirnit the reeoactive appilcanon ofthe declslon .Jones v 
Ct:atson, 98 ldaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 ( 1  977). 
B I A  Investments, Inc I). City <$Boise, 14 1 Idaho 168, 1 73, 108 P.3d 3 15,  320 (2004) 
The factors to be considered wtleri determining whcther to apply a new dec~slon 
retrospect~vely were formulated by the 1). S. Supreme Court in Ltnkletter v. Walker. 381 U S .  61 8, 
85 S G1 173 1 ,  14 L Ed 2d 601 (1 965), and have been adopted by the Idaho Supreme r o u e  
In detennln~ng whether a dec~slon changng a rule of law prevlousiy established 
should be applted retroactively or prospeetlvely, we have held that we should 
evaluate " I )  the purpose of the dec~ston, 2) reliance on the pnor rule o f  law, and 3)  
the effect upon administration ofjustlee. .lanes v. Warson, 98 Idaho 606, 609, 570 
P.2d 284, 287 (1 977). 
Baker v ,Sl~nv~r.~, Inc , 1 17 ldaho 696, 696, 697. 791 P.2d 1275. 1276 (1 990) 
Initially, ~t IS helpful to consider what 1s mcant by the tern "retrospectlve" application A 
new decislnn or statute is not "rctrospectlve" merely because i t  draws on pre-existing facts. 
University of litoh tfolospitalv Y ~ n c e ,  104 Idaho 172, 175,657 P 2d 469,472 ( I  983 ). For example. 
a new decision may be applied to pending, but not final, cases. Sfcrre v Fetterfy, 12 1 Idaho 41 7 , 4  1 8- 
19,825 P 2d 1073, 1074-75 ( 1  g92). What about cases that are "In the pipeltne" in the sense they are 
pending on appeal? How should one determine whether to apply a new decision to cases pending 
at the tnal court level, including those at the post-trial motlon stagey There are a number of 
possibilities that muqt be considered: 
There arc no constltutlonal Ilmltabons upon a court's choice to give elther retroactive 
or prospective effect to a declslon alterlrlg a prlor rule of law 1,rnkl~tter v Walker, 
381 l J  S 61 8, 85  S Ct 1771, 14 L Ed 2ti 601 ( l965) ,  Great Northern Ra~lway To 
v Sunhursl0116 Rejinlng Co . 287 U S 358, 53 S Ct 145. 77 L Ed 360 (1932). 
The cholce 1s discretionary The range of available chotces lncludcs applying a new 
rule of law to all cases (“retroactivity"), apply~ng the rule only to future cases 
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('"rctspcct~c~ty"") ;appl)~ng the rule to hture cases and to the case decided (a fonn of 
"rnutitfieti prospectlvlty"), or applying the rule to future cases, to the case decided, 
and to strriilar cases pendrng on appeal when the new rule was announced (a broader 
fomm of "mntllfretl prospcctlvlty") SEE, e.g , r"hor~pson 9. Elugan, 96 ldaho 19, 523 
1;' 2d 1365 ( 1  974). lluwson v Olson, 94 Idaho 636,496 P 2d 97 (1 972) For ease of 
reference, we will call the broader form of mod~fied prospectrv~ty the "plpeltne 
a j ~ p i o a ~ l ~ . "  because ~t in~ludcs lmtlar eases in thc appellate sys tm "plpellnc" when 
the ncw rule of law was announced. 
In foopm our Supreme Court did not explicitly pass on the retroactivity quest~on 
Ilowevcr, the court appllcd ~ t s  holding on procedural due process to the facts of that 
i:isc Slnl~iariy, In iqrrlker-Schmidflanch v Blaine County, I01 Idaho420,614 P.2d 
960 (1980) a rc~t-tntng case pendlng when Goper  was declded - the Supreme 
('rturt re-ersed a detcmlnatlon by mning authontles, and remanded the case wlth an 
l~lstruct~on to the dlstnct court that the ;runing authont~es be directed to comply wlth 
I 'nupcr J hus, ~t plalirly appears that the Supreme Court has not explicitly rejected 
rctrclact~t.lty. and has, at Icast, adopted the "plpelme approach" - applying Cooper 
to the case decld~tf and to slmtlar cases pendlng when the role of Cooper was 
arnounced, as *ell as to fiiture cases. We need not address the posslb~liiy of 
"retrtiact~vrty" In t h ~ s  case The "pipeline approach" 1s sufficient to determine the 
~ntpact of C-uopcr uptln this appeal 
Guy v G'oun~j~ Cbmnrtssrt>ncr.~ ofNonnevrl2e County, 103 ldaho 626, 629-30, 651 1' 2d 560; 563- 
Nctr have tile prorlouncements of the Courts been unlfonn regarding retrospective application. 
In Rice v / < I <  r ,  I 0 7  Idaho 85, 87, 645 P.2d 319,321 (1982), the issue was whether to apply a new 
decision, McCbrrv v McTar fv .  451 1) S 210,101 S.Ct. 2728,69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1 981), regarding the 
dlvlslon ~~1'111illtary retlrerncnt pay tncident to a divorce. The ldaho Supreme Court had this to say: 
Respondent I,lnrencc Rlce further asserts that the holding of McCarty should be 
applled only prospectivuly and thus applied to and include only those actrons tned 
aflcr the date of the h4cl'arty declslon, I.e, June 26, 1981. The issue of 
rctroappll~atlorl of iul lntervenlng ruling is far from settlcd Compare Stare v 
Mpndlbies. 606 P 2tI 825 (Az App.1979), which states, "As a general rule, an 
ovcnul~ng decjston 1s gverl retroactive effect unless there are specla1 circumstances 
wanantlng the dcrrlal of retroactive applicat~ori or unless the overruling court has 
expressly indicated othcnvlse", wlth Reed v Reed, 124 Anz. 384, 604 P.2d 648 
(1979), where~n ~t I S  stated, "It 1s the general rule that unless exceptional 
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crrcumsaarices are shown, court dec~s~ons  will be given only prospcctlve 
appilcation." Both ihls Court, Hogers r1 Yellowstone Park C'o , 97 ldaho 1 4 ,  539 
I) 2d 566, (1 975), Thompson v Hagen, 96 Idaho 19,523 P 2d 1365 (1 974), and the 
Unrted States Supreme Court, Hunkerson v North Carolinu. 432 U S 233, 97 S Ct 
2339,53 L Ed 2d 306 (19771, Chevron Oil Cb v Hzrson, 404 U S 97,92 S Gt 349, 
30 L,.Ed 2d 296 (1971), I,inkIen~r v Wnlker, 181 ll S 618, 85 S Ct 173 1, 14 
L Ed 2d 601 (1965), hold that the issue ord~nanly 1s a matter of d~scretlon wlth the 
overrdlng court. Mle note that McCarty itself I S  no guldance on the lssue Here 
appellant ralsed the precise ~ssue  of federal preemphon before the dlstrlct court, and 
we hold therefore that the appellant, David Rice, has preserved the Issue on appeal 
to this C o ~ r t  Hence thc came, not ha-v?ng Scen finally decided, muli the rssifc beil~g 
preserved before thls Court, the application of Mcrarty to the Instant cause 1s n o t  
correctly denominated a9 a retroactive apphcation See Sheldon v Sheldon. 177 
CaI.Rptr 380,124 Cal.App.3d 371 (1981); Jucanzn v Jacanin, 177 Cal.Rptr 86, 124 
C'alApp3d67(1981) 
Based on the foregoing, i t  is probably incorrect to label appltcatlon of'the (3ty ofMcCall 
decision to the present ease as "retrospective." The present case can be said to be still "in the 
pipeline." There 1s no irnpedrment to applyng the rule enunciated In City oflCfcC;nll here 
Even if application of Idaho Code (i 12-1 20(3) as Interpreted by City ofMcCall to the case 
at bar could be characterirred as retrospective, whether to do so appears to be a matter withln the 
Court's discretion. as g u ~ d d  by the I,lnkletter factors: (1) the purpose of the new dec~sion; (2) 
rellance on the prior rule of law; and (3) the effect on the administration of justlce 
mL OF THE APPROPRIATE FACTORS IMLLITATE 1N FAVOR OF APPLYING 
CITY OF Itlc&$J,L v. BUXTON TO THE PRESENT CASE 
The first factor to consider is the purpose ofthe rule announced In Crty ofMcCall v Btcxton, 
'The ldaho Supreme Court noted there that prior decisions declining to apply Idaho Code $ 1  2-1 20f3) 
to legal malpractice cases "did not engage in any analysis of the wording of the statute. " C'io oj 
McCull v Buton ,  2009 W1 1983095 at * 1 l (Idaho 2009). The Court went on to note that the Iatter 
portlon of Idaho Code 4 12-  120(3) "is not limlted to contract actions It  'does not requlre that there 
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be a coritract between the part~es before the statute 1% appllcd, the statute only requires that there bc 
a commercial transaction' " Id, at * I  1.  It can thus be ~nfened that at least one saltent purpose of the 
dec~sion was to correct pnor misreadings of the statute and clarify that. 
The cornrr~erclal transaction ground tn I.G. 6 12- 120(3) nelther prohtb~ts a fee award 
for a commerc~al transaction that involves tortious conduct, nor does i t  require that 
there bc a contract Any previous holdings to the contrary are overruled. 
- * I o ma~ntatn the artrficial dtstinction between tort and contract causes of act~on for purposes 
of applying Idaho Code 4 12 120(3) would not be corisistent with the purpose of the Cio~  o f h f ~ ~ G n l i  
deasion. By expressly ovemlingFuIler v. Wolters, 1 19 ldaho 41 5,807 P 2d 633 (1991), the Idaho 
Supreme Court made ~t clear that an award of attorney's fees is not prohibited in a legal malpractlcc 
case. Applying the new rule in the present case would advance the purpose of the City ofMcC'u1l 
declslon 
The next factor to conslder is the extent to which the new decislon might adversely afTect 
those parties who hatc placed reliance on pnorlaw. It is clear that PlalntlffKeed 7'aylor dld not ~ e i y  
on the assumption that each party would be requlred to bear his or its own attorney's fees in the casc 
at bar. To the contrary, in h ~ s  Complaint and proposed Amended Complaint he asked that the Court 
award attorney's fees to him pursuant to ldaho law, lncludlng ldaho Code (j 12- 120 Havlng sought 
to Invoke 12 120, Plaintiff cannot be heard to say he relled on 11s ~nappllcability when d e c ~ d ~ n g  
whether to tmbark on litigatron Very little Indeed seems to have a prudentla1 OT caut~onary eikct  
on the Plalntlff s propensity to institute lltlgatlon 
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Fxriafly, ~t must be considered what the effect of applying 5 12-120(3) rntght be on the 
admtnlstrat~on of justrce ?Bere is no rnd~cat~on that cases would need to be reopened ~f the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision in City oj ,McC'(z'ilil were fo be appited here. "Even a dec~sion overruling 
a prior opinion of thls Court does not authon~x trial courts to re-open civil cases that have become 
tirial In order to apply the new rule of law announced tn that decision." BlfA Invesmzents, h c .  v. 
City uJEctue, !41 Id&o ! 58. f 73, 1 OS 1' 33d 3 f 5 .  720 (ZS04j. I hus, the aiimrntsh.aflve burden on 
the justlce system would be slight, ifnot nc~llcxistent 'Ihe defendants' application for fees and costs 
was pending at the time the f'lty oJMrT'illi dec~\ron came down. Even m the present case, there 
would heno need to revisit a matter already decidcd N o  ~nequltable or unfair result can be imagined 
simply from applyng the conect rule of law lo the pcndil~g fee application 
In short, none of thelainkletter factors suggcrt a valid reason for departing from the general 
prtnclple that a new dec~sron 1s to be appllcd to pending cases, or even retrospectively to cases 
already dec~ded but not yet barred by the applicabic ~tatutc of limitation 
TIIE HAWLEY TROXELL UEFE:NDmmARIF, ENTITLED TO W C O W R  
Xb4'k70LVES ONE ON MORE CORllililERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
There are two types of commerc~al transactlctn ~nvolved in the present case. Plaint~ff Reed 
Taylor's claims stem from the Hawley Troxell Dcfcntt:ints' representation of the AIA entities in the 
underlying I~tigatjon filed by Reed Tayio~ aga~nst hc 41A entities and the events leadlng up to that 
l~tlgation The Hawley Troxell Defendants' represcntatlon of the AlA entitlcs should properly be 
deemcd a cornmerela1 transactton as defined bj  Idaho Code 4 12-1 20(3) because it is a transaction 
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c~tltct tl~en for personal or household purposes ' It 1s the attosncy-client relationship betvvcen the 
Ifnwley ii'roxeli Defendants and the AIA entities whlch 1s tntepal to Plaint~fT's elalms En this case 
In the City ofMcCull case, the clalms against the dcfendmt lawyers alleged they had glven 
negltgent or Improper advice to the clty In connection wlth Iltlgatlon ans~ng  out of construction of 
t f ~ c  ~ t y ' s  wastewater treatment plant. 'The Idaho Supreme Court held that the interaction between 
the aitomeys md the et)f constttuted a "commercral transaction " w1t111n the purview ofIdaho Code 
4 12- 1 ZO(3) Similarly, Reed 'Taylor dleged In the present case that the Hawley Troxell Defendants 
gilvc lnlpropcr or negliger~t advlce to the AIA entitles In corinectlon with the redemptic~n o f h ~ s  stock 
anct t.ncu~ng Iitigai~an. U ~ ~ d e r  the cnteria of the Czty i$-McChli case, the relevant nexus of facts 
ln\*oIved in the present actlon constitutes a con~mercial transactlon. The redemption of Mr. l'aylor's 
stock, the lltigat~on ansing from that trmsactlon, and the representation provided by the Hawley 
Troxcll lawyers lrr deknding the actlons of the cor~>orat~ons are all related to cornmr~clal, rather than 
persor~al or household, purposes 
i t  1s true that in the City ofMcCall case, the defendants wcre sued by their own clrent, and 
not by a third party, as rn the present case However, Bils distinction is ~rrelevmt. As was polnted 
out by the Idaho Supreme Court in City of McCall, "The latter portion of the statute [ 9  12 120(3)] 
1s not l~rnlted to contract actlons. It 'does not require that there be a contract bctween the parties 
txforc the statute 1s applied; the statute only requlres that thcre be a commmcial transactlon. " CZQ 
cjfMc('nf1, supra, p. 13. [crtattons omitted) 
I Commercial irarisactlon IS defined to mean " d l  tran.;actions except transact~ons for personal or household 
pulp' $e\ " I C g 12-120(3) 
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The tenn "commernal transactlun" 1.9 broader and more lnclusrve than merely a conhactunl 
relahonshlp For example, In Jluyert v Jdaho Srate Utziversity, 140 Idaho 904, 104 P.3d 946 (2004), 
d fornler employee sued un~vers~ty for breach of an alleged employment contract I t  was 
deterrn~ned nu contract ex~sted, and the un~vers~ty was awarded attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
4 12-120(3) because the gravamen of thc actlor1 was commmcial, as opposed to pcrsonal or 
tst-rusehold 
Slm~larly, In the present casc these was no contractual reldtionsh~p between Reed 'I aylor and 
h e  Defendants, to the contrary, the lack of such relat~onshtp led to the conclus~on that the 
Defer~dants had no duty to Mr Taylor Nonetheless, the tawsult IS essentially eommerc~al in nature 
The Plat ntlff s theory was that the Defendants owed hlm a duty in the course of the~r  epresentation 
of one or more corporat~ons. a comrnerc~al actlvlty The Defendants' reprcsentat~on related to 
business matters, not personal or householcl matters. Idaho Code jj 12- 120(3) should control the 
recoverab~l~ty of attorney's fees by the preva~l ~ n g  part1 es 
Plaintiff also alleged, rnrer alta, that Defmdants ~ntcnt~onally inlerfered wtth contract, 
converted assets, a~ded and ahett~ng wrongful actlvltles by corporate insiders, and engaged In a civ~l 
conspiracy to depnve PIaint~ff of h ~ s  alleged nght to recelve payment of the balance of a prom~ssury 
note Theredempt~on of Plalntltfs stock and the promissory note representing the balance allegedly 
due 1s the second ~nstance of a comrnerc~al transact~on upon wh~ch the present case I S  pred~cated. 
The allegations made by Reed Taylor aga~nst Defendants for actions wh~ch, accordrng to hlm, 
asslsted the corporat~on rn breach~ng the note are, at t f ~ e ~ r  core, commercial In nature 
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The test for alln%~ng the prevatl~ng p&y In a ctv~l action to recover attctrnei'~, fcc5 1x1 
connect~on wlth a conlmerclal transaction 1s whether the alleged commerc~al transact~on compnxs 
thc gravamen of the lawsu~t; I e, twheher the commerc~al bansaction 1s ~ritegraI to Ute ~ l a ~ r n  and 
constitutes the on w h ~ h  the party 1s attempting to recover. Iron Eagie Ilc\rlc;tpnfrnt, i I ( ' v 
Quality D~slgn  Systems, l n c ,  138 Idaho 487,65 P 36 509 (2003), Rule Sales utrd Scr19iccs lnr , v 
U S Bank, N A 173 ldahn 669, 9Ql P 2d 857 (I999), rela 'g den 2000, B m o h ~  v G:grt:: H::?:tj:,_~, 
Inc . 128 Idaho 72.91 0 P 2d 744 (1 996); Llennctf v fienzlr, 130 Idaho 2 1,936 I' 2d 2 1 Y (C't App 
I997). 
A number of cases have held that an alleged arrangement for scrvtces of a profcrc~orldl ctr 
business nature cnnstllutes a commcrc~al transaction justlFytng an award of attorneys' tees t v  tho 
prcvalllng party Huyetl v Idaho State I/niversrty, 140 Ida110 904, 104 P 36 946 (2004) jdllegcrl 
agreement lo prov~de coachlng services); Pinnacle Engzneers, Inc v Heron Brorrii, I,/ C. 1 '3" l ~ t S ; ! i ~ c t  
756, 86 P 3d 470 (2004) (en~necnng  cen/lces); Purue11 v Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 437 1' 2d 374 
(1 997) (excavation ofdramage ditch); PrapevtyManagement West, lnc V I lunf .  1 Yh ldahti XY 7. X'S4 
P.26 130 (1 995) (property management services); Lawrence v Jones, 124 Idaho 74b. 864 If 7tI 194 
(1 993) (alleged l o g ~ n g  contract);ffilf r Draper, 122 Idaho 61 2.836 P 2d 558 (Ct App 1 ~ 9 2 )  (hay 
haulage) It  does not matter whether an agreement to provlde such servlccs 1s f o ~ ~ n d  to e x ~ s t  by thc 
finder of fact. ~t is sufficient if thc existence of a comrnerclal transaction is allegcd i f z r ~  C > I ~  i. Irl<lhij 
Stale University, 140 Idaho 904, 104 P.3d 946 (2004); Clentenf v Franklzn Itr\~r~,~fnir r ? ,  Ijrorrp, LtcI , 
689 F.Supp 1575 (I3 Idaho 1988) See alsoErrrckron v Fbnn, 138 Idaho 430,64 P 3 d 95') (C't  i"\p 
2002); holdlng that Idaho Code 9 12-12013) artthonzes an award of attorneys' ices fur Iltigatlng 
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unjust ennchment or yzruntiin~ rnpt  urf ciar~ns if an alleged eornmerctal trarlsuction 1s the gavamen 
of the lawsuit The Hawley 'I roxs-11 Defendants shouId be entitled tcl recover their rcasnnable 
attorneys' fces In t h ~ s  actton pursuatlt to Idaho Code $ 12-I20(3) because the commercial 
transact~ons outlined above are intcbral to the c la~m and constitute the bases on which thc Plaintiff 
was attempting to recover 
'Ihe fact that Dek~~dart t i ,  have clalmed fees pursuant to statutes relating to shareholder 
derivative actions and Idaho ( r~ns~lmer Protection Act cla~ms does not preclude them fiom also 
relyng on Cj 12-120(3); nothlng in Rulc 54(e)(5) requ~res a party to confine himself to a single 
statutory basis for recovery of h s  ?Ilc Plaintiffs claims were intermixed in this case to the extent 
that ~t is ~mpract~cable to attanpt to jepnratc the amount of t ~ m e  devoted to each cause of action. 
W i l e  ~t may be posslble to segregate ttme with respect to major litigation funct~ons, such as 
defending a cauntercIdm as oppnsec( to prosecuting a complaint, i t  is unrealistic to impose a 
requiren~ent Oiat fees n~us t  be segregated to thc extent suggested by the Plarntlff T h ~ s  would literally 
require that separate time records be kept on each discrete legal theory advanced by the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiffs' c la~ms 111 this case are based upon a common nucleus o f  facts. Plaintiff Reed 
Taylor has been Imaginative In attempting to construct a vanety of legal theones whlch he then 
' "It ~c our concluslan that I nckson F unjust enrichment and quanhun mentit clams m the present case 
present the type of noncontractual ~ c ~ m r ~ - i e r t ~ a l  Irartsact~on contemplated by the Supreme Court in Great Pletns to 
whch Q 12 120(3) ~ ' 1 1 1  appiy " i d ,  at 438 04 P 2d at 966 However, the prectse holding of the Court was Iim~ted to 
cases where the quasi-contract theory 16 presented as a fallback posttion in the e ~ e n t  a contract claim falls The 
dects~ve factor 15 whether the allegicl transnction I S  commerc~al 111 nature 
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sought to adapt to the facts, like nckety scafYoldlng on an unstable bulldli-rg Defendmts prevailed 
irr ciefendirig then~selves against Plaintitrs inadequate legal theones M%cre the gravarnen of the 
Complaint relates to one or more common cornmerc~al tsansactlons, Defendants art: entitled to 
reamer thelr attorneys' fees, regardless of the how many legal theones the Pls~nt~ff-  mmages to 
dream up 
"When an award of attorney fees depends on the lnterpretatlon of a statute, the standard of 
revlew for statutory ~nterpretahon appl~es " <;anznlez v TTfiackt7r) 1009 W1, 129761 at *4 (Idaho 
20C19), crfing BECO Gonsr. Co., fnc , V .  ,I-U-B Engrnecrs, Inc., 145 Idaho 71 9, 7 16, 185 P3d 844, 
851 (2008) "'I7-re lntcrpretat~on of a statute is a question oflaw over which thls Court exerases free 
revlew." I d ,  al '4 
Ihe lnterpretat~oti of Idaho Code $ 12 120(3) as cnunc~ated by the ldaho Supreme Court In 
Ctry  of McCail v. Bz-cxfon, supra, should be spplted to the pre\eiil case, whether deemed to be 
prospect~ve or retrospective. Pursuant to Idaho Code 12- 120(3), CLS now understood, the I-fawley 
Troxell Defendants are entltled to recover then reasonable attorneys7 fees because the alleged 
cornmerc;~aI transactions between the Hawlcy Troxeil Defendants, the AlA entl tles and Reed Taylor 
const~tute the gravamen ofthe case. The fact that Ikfmdants l~ave clalmcd fees pursuant to statutes 
relat~ng to shareholder derivat~ve act~ons and ldaho Consumer Protectiorl Act clalms does not 
preclude them from also relyng on 5 12- 120(3) 
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IJA'T PI) thlr i*j day of Fclruay,  2009. 
E1,AM & BIJRKE, P A 
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LaRue, Of the Firm 
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below 
Michael S Blsself IJ S Mall 
CAMI%FIL BISSFLL Rt KJRBY, PLLC k-fanci Dellvery 
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XN THE DIST'IUCT COURT OF T JUDICIAI, 11ISTttlGT OF T13E 
STATE OF Xl)?ihl&b, IN RBI OUNTY OF NEZ PEPICE 
REED J.  cI'AUIIOK, an individual, 1 
) CASE NO. CVOX-01765 
Plaintiff, 1 
I OPINION AN11 OJIIIER ON 
‘v . ) IJl7FENIlAN'f S' M( I'I'JON 
) FOR AWARI3 01. A'I'J'ORNEY 'S 
GARY D UAJ3131'1"1, an individual; U .101 IN ) FtlES AND COS I S 
ASI-{BY, an indrvidual; PATRICK V 1 
COLl,INS, an individual; RICII-IARD A 1 
KII,EY, an individual: IIAWLEY TROXI'I 1 ) 
X:NNIS & IlA\Vl,EY. I_I,13 an Idaho 11rnr1cct 1 
liability partnership; JANE DOES 1-X, 
unknown individt~als. 
) 
1 
1 
Defendants. 1 
'This matter is before the Court on llcfendants' Motion for /l\\tita~ll ol Attorrlcy's Fees a13d 
Costs A hearing on the Motion was helc-i on February 26. 2009 Ptarntllf Reed 'Taylor was 
represented by attorney Mjchael S JJ~ssell ilefendants Babb~tt, Asllbv Collrns l i ~ l e ~ ,  arld the 
law firm of Ilawlcy I roxell Elmis & I f a i ~ l c ~  wcr e represer.lted bv atrc1111cy .James 11 1,aIiue 1 lie 
(:ourt, hav~ng read the mollon, affidav~ts ant1 br~efs of the parties, hav111g considered the I ecol d 
In the matter, having heard oral argunjenlGi ol cot~nsel and b a n g  f~11 ly ;liivised in the matte1 
hereby renders ~ t s  decis~on 
7 n i ~ l o ~  v Robbit, et  nl 1 
Order on Llefendant's R4otlon for I'ees it Costc 
Z3NOCEI)U'lZAL BACKCiROUPJD 
I T ~ t t l  t c i  t 1 . 1 ~  filing of tlie above-entitled action, Iqiaintiff Reed 'I'aylor filecl a Ia\vsuit 
agalcrst AIrZ Services Corporation, iZIA Insurance Inc. and val ious other tleklidants, asserti~.tg 
numetous clairni sounding in tort and contract. all of which stem from a con~plcx stock b r ~ y o ~ ~ t  
agreemci~l bctv,cen Reed 'I'aylor and the AiA c o ~ o r a t i o n s  that Reed 'I'aylor staltecl, turned ~ n t o  a 
p ~ f i t a b l c  buhit~ess and tlien lefi lo the rnanagement of his brotl~er, Job11 '1 aylor 'L'he l lckndant 
atlo~ncys 112 t11c above-entitled actton represent AIA Services and AIA Insurarlce 111 tlre 
ul~tierlylng act ion 
' l 'h~\  ~-iI,ittcr began on A ~ ~ g u s t  18. 2008, with the f i l~ng of I'la~ntiff s ('ornpla~nt narnll-tg as 
1)eScndants t l l i  IJOISC law firm oSlIa\iirley I'roxell Enllis & I3awley I21,I' and the ~ndivldual 
atturneys tv1t11 the firm. Ilefendants Gary 13abbit and 13. John Ashby, attorneys t ~ l t h  the 
IIe-lcntl:tnt law iirrn, represent AIiZ Services Colporation and AJA Insurance Inc In the 
undc~lqing 1;i\\\uit filed 13y fjlalntlif Reed 'l'aylor.] It is the representatlon of the AIA 
corlx>~atioi~s h! the IJefendants that form the basis of I'la~nt~ff's clalms in the above-entitled 
;rctron 
On Sep tmber  I 0, 2008, the Defendants filed a Motion to 1)ismiss and Memorandum i l l  
S ~ ~ p p o r t  O n  O ~ t o b e r  2, 2008, 131a~nt~fffi1ed his brief in opposition to the ]notion to c l ~ s ~ n ~ s s  A 
hc ;~ t~ t lg  o11 t l ~ c  mot~on  was scheduled and heard on October 16, 2008 Ilowe\*er. one day priol to 
the I I ~ ; I J I I I ~  P1~1111t11f filed a Motlon and Memorandum to Amend Complaint 1 he ('o~irt h e a ~ d  
oral arguli~c~it. of counsel on 11cfendants7 motion to d~srniss as scheduled and subsequently, fol 
reasolls of'j~1tlicia1 economy. 111lorn1ed the parties no ruling \vould be entered unt11 a hea~ing on 
1'1a111,tiif~~ motion to amend the complaint could be heard On N o ~ ~ c ~ n b c r  6, 2008, the 
I J i i l - i o ~ ~  I 4 l A  ,\'( r 19 i r  e.5, er (11 , Ne/ J'erce Cotlnty Case No  CV2007 00208 
?;rl+li,r I: l+rhhr/, c J /  ,!I 2 
Olc!cl 1111 1 )c tenc!; i r~~s A41ition for I'ces K: Costs 
heard oral argumerlts on Jlecember 4,2008. On December 23, 2008, the Court cllleled its 
Opinion and Order denying Plaintifrs Motion to Amend C'omplarnl and granttr.tg Defendants' 
h4otion to Dismiss. 
On January 6, 2009, Ilefendants filed a Memorand~lm of Costs and Attorneys' fecs, 
Afiidav~t in Support and Brief in Support. Ylair~tifffiled 111s Motion to IlrsaIloti~ Ilefendants' 
Request for Attorneys' l e e s  and Costs at) January 20, 20C)i) Before the matter was schccluled for 
hearing. Defe~~dants  filed a Motion for Leave to Amend hlTernorandum of Fees and Costs and 
supporting briefing. On February 19,2009. Plaintiff filed a response brief to flel-'endar~ts' motion 
to amend, stating he had no objection to Defendants' rnotlon to arnend the nlemorandum of fees 
and costs. On February 26, 2009. the Court heard oral argriments or1 Ilefendants' request for 
fees and costs and. there being $10 objection from Plaintifi: t13c Court 1wi1l lnal~c its analysjs based 
on a grant of Delendants' mot~on for leave to amend 
STANIIARUS UPON A M<QUESrI' FOR COS'I'S ANJ) Xill:ES 
'I'he statutory language determines mhether an award of attorneys' fecs is mandatory or 
diserctlonary When an award is discretionary, a court J I ~ U S ~  perceive the issuc as ntle of 
discretion. act within the boundaries of its discletion and consistent with the legal standards 
app11cable to the specific cholccs available to it. and the court nlust reach ~ t s  dccis~on by an 
exercisc of reason P 0 Yerrrures Ir7c 11 12~uck.s l+b1n1/y  irrevocaftie 7'rucr. 134 Idaho 2'33, 159 
P.3d 870 (2007) A court's drscret~onary author~ty ~ncluiies the dlserct~on to award reasonable 
attorney fees to the p ~ e v a ~ l i r ~ g  party in a c~vi l  action ui1~en such an award IS pio\iided for by anv 
. - 
statute I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) 
1;7v/(ir v 11nbbtl. el n! 
Ortier on Ilefendant's Motion for Fees & Costs 
ANALYSIS 
1)Ialntilf liced 'I'aylor, tn the ~llslant matter. asselled lltc following causes of <icl~or-I 111 I l l \  
Complaint againct the I lckndani attorneys and law firm ( I )  aiding and abetting 11lc1r clie~lrs. 
AlA  corptirations. and others in the colnmission of tortious acts for the purpose of prcvcntir~g 
I'lai~itiff from obtalt l j~~g the legal remedy he sceks in 111s lawsuit against AIA and otlicrs, ( 2 )  
receiving payment for Icgaf ser\iiccs from AJA, I)ete~~ciants ~vil l  fully ~nlerfered \vi ti7 jx  opu t j  aiiri 
~nuncy that shoultl have bcen under the possess~ot~ o f  I'laintiff', (3) Ilefendants' C O I I C I L I I ' ~  111 
rcprcsenting AIA constitutes unfair and deceptive acts or prnctices under 1 C' 5 48-(~01. anti. (4) 
by assisting RIA 111 resisting Keed 'I'aylor's claims against AlA. 1)efendants corntllitted 
profksslonal negl~gcncc anct/ctr breached fidtlciary dut~cs  the Ilefenctants owct-1 to lieed 1 a) loi 
Ilefendants, who prel arled on tl~cir hilotion to I>lsrn~ss. I-IOI~: seek an award of atto] incys' Jcci mci 
ci~srs pursi~ant o 1 (' 6 12-130('3), 1 C. $ 12-121,l  (' 5 30-1 -746 and f C $ 48-6(18(5) 
(A] 1 C $ 1 2- 1 20(,3) AN13 ~~1'1~~~4N~~ MO'I ION FOR I'lZhS AN 1) COS'XS 
Itlal.to ('oiic tj 13- 120(1) reads 
In any c~v i l  a c t i o ~ ~  to recover on an open account, account stated, note, b111. 
negoti;~ble instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to tlle purchase or sale of 
goodi wares, merchandise, or services and 111 any cornmelc~al transact~on unlcs\ 
otkcr\ui~c prov~ded by law, the preva~llng party shall be allo~vcd r-r reasc~n;~hlc 
attorr-icyi\ fee to be set by the court. to be taxed and collectccl as costs 
I he term " c c t ~ ~ ~ m e ~ c ~ a l  transactlonu 1s defined to mean all transact~ons cxccpt 
t r ; ~ ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ t ~ o t l s  1 or personal or household purposes The term "pal ty" 1s definetl lo 
~ne i l l~  any person. partnership, corporat~on. as?oclativn, private o ~ g a n ~ / ; l t ~ o ~ l  the 
state of Idaho or polit~cal s u b d ~ v ~ s ~ o n  thereof. 
Tlefkndants asicrt 1 t'. Ij 12-1 20(3) is applicable to their request for attol-nc? fccs as tl~ey 
contend the inst:illt actioll was one to recover on a commercial transaction Ilcfenii;~llts (111 C L ~  tllc 
Court to thc recent riecisiorl of the Idaho S~tprcrl-ic C'our t ~n ( i i ) .  of hf~-( '~- t l l  v 13i!aton, 2009 WJJ 
1988105 (2009) ~vhcleili the Court held the co111111ct~i~i1 t i C ~ n s 6 i c ~ ~ c i l ~  portion of I.G. li; 12-120 is not 
Iimrteci to col?trad actions and, theri-fbrc. 1s irppli~dtllc I r ,  tor! :~clions; involving a commercial 
transaction. 
PlatntiB Reed 'I aylor's clairns aga111st the I l c l e ~ ~ i l t l l ~ ~ s  sr t ~nded In tort, not in contract. 
Nc.~er.tl~elcss. under the holding in lj?dxiul-~ rcasot~;tltlc: ,it t c v  ne! /?es are to be awarded to the 
i?reva11111g party In a c1v11 actron wllcll the I eccn cr J \ougi~t 1-i ; t i  hd5ed on a con~mercial 
transaction 'I'he question this Court 1r1ust atls\\ci 1s ~ h h c t b c ~  tllr tccctver? soug11t in the above- 
erlt~tletl matter was based on a commerc~itl t~, tns; i~tlon 111 hc //'I I- Srlvcr.woodI~.~futes, 127 Idaho 
624, 903 1'.2d 1321 (1 995). the Court adcilessetl the test 1111.: ('oitrl lntlst apply to the question 
bcforc ~t 
4 n  award of-attolney fcc5 I \  not v,atl~~r~tcif \  cri rtrnc n con1rnercia1 transaction is 
lemotely connected with ;i case Iiafhct the t c ~ t  i i  whether thc commercjal 
transaction comprises tlie glavamcn of the l,i\?silrt Attorney fees are not 
appropr~itte under I.C. 5 12-1 20('3) unlcss the cun~incrcial t ra~~saction is integral to 
the clalni and constitutes the bas15 iipoii \xihlch r l ~ c  p;irty 1s attempting to recover 
k J j 7 1 ? ~ (  P 1- / i c ~ w ~ I / .  120 I(l;lho 703. 770 XOO I"? 7 14 727 ( 1  095) 
klclly v Silver1.1:ood iistufes, I 27 Idaho at (13 I 
J-'la~nt~Sf?s Complaint in the Instant ~ n ~ i t l e ~  I S  rejllctc w1t11 stiiternents about the commercial 
tr;insactlon betwecn Reed 'Taylor and ;\lA colpor;tlron\ I io\'ilc-\ ci,  the commercial transaction 
betv\!een lieed '1-aylor and AIA is not ~ntegral to 1115 clalil~s ,ig:tinst the Ilcfendants, is not the 
gravamen of 111s claims against the l)cSe~~ci:i~tts. t ~ l i i l  doc\ ncir ioi~stltutc the basis of' his attempted 
recovery. 1'11~ gravamen of.I-'laintiff-s altclnpteri I c co~~c i  1s tile alleged acts and/or conduct of 
tlic Defcncjants in representing their colpolare clic111s i'llc conlmcrcial transaction. while the 
foundatloll of tlie u~~der lying suit, is ollly ~cmotei \  ~onlicctcti to t11e 1n';tant action PlairltiSPs 
C'omplalnt ;~sserted clr-tlms for legal nl;rlprciitice, bieacll of iicfiicla~y dutlcs, conve~sion of 
~ ~ s o p c i  ty, atding and abetting tortious acts. ;tnd unfair and duccptivc practices in violation of 
1tl;lho's C'onsurncr Protection Act '1 he colnmercial tmnsact~ctn between Reed 'Taylor :tncJ A IA 
I S  onlt. tenuctusly related to tlte 1'laintifl"s claims in the instant action and, as such. f f'. I j  12  
~ 1 3 1  I C-5-12- I 2 I AN11 llliT:F,EQAN'l'S ' MOCI'I(JN l'QI< I'EJLS AN1 1 C'CIS'I'S 
Icittlio ('ode 5 12 121 reads: 
11.1 any civil action. the judge may award reasonable artorncy's ikes to the 
previtrling party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal (?I- 
anxnd any statute which otherwise provldes for the award of attorncy's fees 'I he 
t c ~ m  "p;~r-ty' or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnershjp. 
eorj3oratio11, association. private organization, thc state of Jdaho or political 
subdivision thereof. 
Idci13o Cocfc 5 12 121 Inus1 be read in conjunction with 1.R.C 1). 54(e)(l). whlch leads 111 
icle\,:int 17drf "\A)ttorncy fees under section 12-1 2 1, Idaho C'ode may be awarded by the court 
o r ~ l >  \tl~cr.t rt finds. from the facts presented to i t .  that the caye was brought, pursued or defentfed. 
f~t \o lo\~s ly .  unreasonably or without foundation." Defendants contend that each claim asserted 
?y rlic I'latntiif~n the instant matter was frivolous, unreasonable and without Sc)uncfat~on 
I'laintiSSs first claim alleged the Defendants had aided and abetted their corporate clients 
,111ti others 1x1 the cominission of tortious acts for the purpose of preventing Iieed 'Taylo~ from 
~-ht :~i r~ing 2-r Icg,~l re~nedy to which he was entitled Pla~ntiSTs ('omplaint, wllic11 is Icngthy, 
i o ~ ~ t c r ~ ( f s  t l ~ clegal posture taken by the Ilefendal~ts in defending their clients in the t~i~clerlylng 
lSci~rlt1,ints contend that by dsserting a cld~rn urlder the Idaho Constjr~ier Ijrotection Act. I C 4 48-601 et scq 
i'1,rinllif cle,ir!y stlug111 recovery on the basis of a commercial trdnsaclron The Coun is not persuaded The Idaho 
i'orl<iii~icr l'ractice\ Act is applicable to goods and services purchased for personal and household prirposes 'is  ell 
to tx15incss tr~tnraclions See 1 G S, 48-601 
1 . \ ~ n  i f  the Cour-t w ~ l s  persuaded that the commercial transaction  as the gr'ivamen of Plaii~tiff s actlon dgairlst tllc 
i)cfc~ici,tnt\. an dwdrd of attorney fees may 11ot be warranted under I C 6 12 120(3) Defendants In the ~ lndc i ly~ng  
,:( tiorr of Tdylor v AIA et ul have pending before the Court a Motion for Summary Judgment wherein they seek to 
I , I \  L t l~c  eonimcrcia1 transdction between Reed Taylor drld AIA declared illegal and unerifor~eable Where '1 
I ( ~ I I J I I ~ C I L I I I ~  trnnrnctlon 1s found illegal. no pal-ty is permitted to claim the benefit of I C $ 12-120(3) lreer 1. 
hi, , ( ,  138 Idnho 3 12 56 P 3d 765 (2002) 
, r  ! ( > I  Ijc11 / ) I /  c f (21 6 
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show a defendant attorile> ass~rmecl a fic-fnc~;~r y tJr~ty to the plaintiff. IrJ at 259 111 the instant 
mattcl. I IO  \uch facts were altcgcri nor ;tr c l!?c~e a ~ y  fac!s ~n the record t!~:tt v:c?:i!d <;uppc:rt a 
firlditlg th;it Ijefendants asst~med any fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff. 11 is ins~~ff ic ier~t  tha
J " l ; z r ~ ~ t l f t  II;?s a personal helief'tl-tat he IS a~llctrnatrcally entitled to cet lain I erned~cs I>?! \itrtne o f  tlic 
tcrlns of the 1995 and 1996 Agreements betweell Reed 'I'aylor and AlA, one of those being rzn 
ntltonlat~c transfer of the majoi it) of stocks to I'l~iintiff and, that as the inajorit! stockl~nldcr 
Ilcfcnilitt~ts ohie h ~ n i  fiduciary duties I'he 1995 Stock Redemption Agreement :ind the 
mod~fic:ition entered into in 1996 are complex agreemcnts not subject to a s i i~~pl ts t tc  ;?nalysic 
1 ].re conlt_>lc.iity of'the issues is recogni~cd bv every paity in the underlying tax. iilcluding llle 
l-'lalnrlfi, as each has expressed to the Court thc iieed to reconstruct the 1995 aijtJ 1996 financial 
hedlth of  AIA Services and Alrl. Insurance rn order to analy/,ed the issue5 and roach :I 
tieter~nin:itton. While not an impocxihlc task 11 is a daunting and cornplcx one 
'I'he rcrnaining claim, brougllt by the Plaintiff were frivolous and u~~reasor~able .  having 
no found:~tion 111 law or fact I'l:a~ntiff's slaiins were based on his theory that, 113 defeilding their 
~ l ren t s  lather than concedirig cvcry issue to the Plaintiff, the Defendants cnteretl ~ n t o  a 
consprracy undertaken solely for the purpose of pre\ienting I'lainti ff from receiving that whic11 
i'la~ntiff bel~eve, he is entitled without need for judicial adjudicatjon If this Court. (11 any court. 
'idopted the I'laintiffs positiot~ i t  would uiiqucstio~lahly tutn the ad\iersai la1 sy~tcn? oil i t s  
It is the duty of' an attorney to ~calouslp  represent 111s client and to do so v,itl~oul concern that Ile 
may he tlrslikcd or beratcil by ~lrose who disagree w1t11 his legal strategjcs or p o \ ~ t i o r ~ \  a s Iong ;l\ 
t l~e  iepresentation i'alls w1t111n thc bouncfaries allowed by law 
In the instant matter, the Coui t is ftlll}~ pcrsuadcd that the acts of the J)eiendants i n  
r ~ p r f i c i ~ t i n g  their clients in tlle uncierlv~ng action ucre rc;rsoi~able and necessary and the C'oui t Ir 
7 t:y/o~* 1, / ~ ~ I / ) / J I I ,  @I ($1  8 
01tle1 on i)eSend;rnt's Motion Ibl 1:ees K: ( 'osts 
, . I he clalms brought hy the P1n1ntrl-t : i g ~ i ~ . - !  the Defendants were frivolous, unreasonabte and 
withot~i foundation in law or f i j ~ t  and. tlli-~eiore. an award of attor~ley fees under I.G. 5 12-12] is 
l'he Defendants seek an awatcf of ~iltorney fees ui.tder I.C. 5 30 1 -746(2) and (31, which 
On terrnination of'thc di-r I \ a t r i  c proceeding the court may: 
. * *  
(2) Order the plnlnt~if 10 paj  :my defkndant's reasonable expenses. Including 
counsel fees, incurrcil 111 ~Ietb~ldlng tile proceedirlg if it finds that tlie proceedil~g 
was commenced or tna~ntatned without reasonable cause or for an improper 
purpose; or 
(3) Order a  pa-^? to pay an opposiilg party's reasonable expenses. including 
counsel fees, incuirctl ~ C C I I I I W  of the filing of a pleading, motion or other paper, if 
i t  firlds that the pleiidli~g. I I I O ~ I O I I  or other paper was not well grounded in fact, 
after reasonable I I I ~ U I I ~ .  01 \\:ilr:lnted by existing law or a good faith argument for 
the extension. modificat~on or reversal of existing law and was interposed for an 
i~nproper purpose. c.ueI-2 21.; t o  I-ioritss or cause linnecessary delay or needless 
increase in the co\t of l~ttg,-lt~oi~ 
Plaintiffs proposed Arncndeci Complair~t sought to bring derivative claims against the 
ilcfendants on bellalf of AIA As s~ateil bj* the Court in rts Opinion and Order granting 
Ilefendants' motion to disnlis. Plal~-iiiii'< ~7roposcd derivative claims hiled as a clear matter of 
law as the Plaintiff was \.\iith~tlf \tiindli~g t o  b~ing  such claims. 
Standing to bring a deirv:it~vc n c ~ l o ~ ~  I S  11nlited by 1 C lj 30 1-741 to persons who were 
shareholders at the time of the cotnplaint of' act or omission. Plaintiff was not a stiarel~oltler 
when tlie Defendant law f i m ~  i zas  rctali~etl r o  represent AIA Services and AIA Insurance. nor has 
I31aintlff at any time to (fate bee11 cieteimincci to be a sllareholdei- by way of a lawful translet of 
shares or other means. While ihc l'laii~tiff believes adjudicatioll of the underlyillg stock 
T(JJJ/OI- v I l~~ /~ / ) i / ,  ei <I/ 9 
()rder on Ilefe~~ciant's Motion for Fees h ( : o\ ts  
redemption ngrcemcnt w ~ l l  result in him being jutlgct~ tlie majority c;hai-ekolder, t11:lt 
tlct-crin~natlitn has ycxt to be made PlaintifPs clai?)? I?x,ec! cn :I ~!er!;ra?it;c :rctl::~: \uas theref<>re, 
firtiolous, unreasorlable and ilot based in law or fact 
(131 1.C 6 48-608(5} AN11 I>I<FANDAN~-&$Q~~~NJj<~I<J~l~S AKJ) cO;S 1s 
l'la~ntiff attemptetl in h ~ s  proposed amended complaint to hrjilg a cause of actlor1 based 
on v~olations oi'fciaho's C'onsumer l'rrotection Act I'laintiff'~ allegations were n~crely a 
leitelatlon of h ~ s  clairn that. by Ilefendants representing their cllentr in a zc:ilot~l; manner rathei 
than ccjnceding the issues to I'laintiff. Defendiu~ts engaged in acts that Nrere deceptive. 
misleading arid fhlse 1 lndcr I>laintifP s theory, wfiei~evc~ a defendant? attorney clefends his 
client by taking a positton that ts contra] y to tile j?laii~tiff-s posit lor-^ the tiefendii~g atto-t ney has 
violated Jdaho's C'ons~imcr I'rotection Act 1 lie cla~rn asscrtcd by the I'la~ntifi lacked ally basis 
rn law or fact and as S L I C ~  mas frivolous and urlleason:~ble 
CONGl,US1ON 
'Fl~e Court finds the claims alleged by the I'laintilf'in his C'c>mplaint and his proposed 
Amended Coii~plaint were frivolous. ur~reasonable and without found:31ion 111 law or fact 
'IJ~erefore. pursuant to Idaho Code fj 12 121 ;md liule 54(e)(l) of'the Idi+ho Rules of Civil 
J%rocetiilre, the Court finds Defendants are entitled to a reasonable award of attorney fees and 
~ o s t  111 addition. the Court finds a reasonable award of :~ttorncy k c s  is also warranted rmder 
Ida110 (:ode f j 30-1 -746(?) arid (3) and Idaho Code 4 48 608jS) for the cost of ricfend~ng against 
the two claims in Pl;31ntiffs proposed Amenticti ( ' u I I I ~ ~ ; ~ I I ~ ~  111 dcter~i~i i~ing :t ~casontlble amorlnt 
to amlard in attorncy lees the C'ourt 11as considcrcd tllc degree to MJIIICII ~ L I C I I  01 I ' I i ~ i ~ ~ t i f f ~ ~  ~ I : I I I I I S  
Y;lylur 1, Rniihir, c/ a1 1 0 
Ortfer o n  Ifefe11clar1t's h,lotion for I:ees & Costs 
I S  cettlcd law 111 Idaho, a factor ztrgticd to thc ('orist by Ilckncfants in their mctt~oli I O J  , i t )  ;iw:ircl of 
attonley f'ccs 
'l'he C:ourt does not find Idaho Code 5 12 120(3) applicable to Defel~d:t~~t<\ '  rcclue\t i ( i~ '111 
2iw;lid (ti  ;ittorney fecs 
0fil)Eft 
Ir lc; heleby the finding of the Court that IYla~nt~ff's claims were frivoloirs unrc,tso~~abli: 
and withortt foundation in law or fact and that Iletendnnts are entitled to costs :I\ ; i  rn:ittcr of l ip l i t  
and :in award of reasonable attorney fees rn the fbllow~ng a ~ l ~ o u l ~ t s :  
Costs as a rnarter vf light: $ 58.00 
I)~scretionary Attorney f e e s  $ 20,000 00 
1 11c.1cby certify that a trrlc copy c ~ f  tlrc ic)rejroir~g 0 I " INON & ORDER was: 
- - +  hand delivereci via court h;isl<ci (31 
- 
4 / ~~~i l i l ed .  postagc prepaid, hy 1111. I I I I C ~ C I S ~ ~ ~ ~ C C ~  :it / _~wis ton ,  1dilJ10, this 3:ny ofApril 
-- 
"109. , t o :  
h4ichaeI S. f3isscll 
Campbell, 13isscll & Kirby, P1,1 C' 
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25 1 Ibst Front St 
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I a! lor vr  f3dbb1tt et a1 
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RECEIVED 
Attorneys fhr Defendants 
IN TI-IF DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J .  TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintif1 , I Case No. CV 08-01 765 
GARY D BA13BIrrT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an i~~cl~vidual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, :u3 ~ndividual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS 6: HAU1L2EY LLP, an Idaho limited 
l~ab~li ty  partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown ind~\~~duals;  
1 JUDGMENT 
Defendants. I 
Defendants' Motion for Costs and Attorneys' Fees came on for Ilearing before this Court 
on February 26. 2009. James D. LaRue of the firm Elarn & Burke P.A., appeared for 
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. Jolln Asllby, Patrick V Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley 
TrclxelI Ennis 8r )lawley 1,LP. Michael 3. Bissell of the law firm Campbell, Bissell & Kirby, 
PLLC, appeared for Plaintiff. This Court hav~ng reviewed the record in this matter, together with 
motlons, memoranda, briefs and afftdavits filed concerning the above referenced motion, as well 
as oral argument presented by counsel, and the Court thereafier having issued its Opinion and 
Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs dated April 3, 2009, and 
having considered all factors in I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3), and In the exercise of the discretion of this 
Court finds an award of attorneys' fees as set forth below appropriate, J u d p e n t  concerning this 
matter is now proper. 
Accordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby entered, under the standards of Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54 and Idaho Code Sections 12- 12 1,30 1 -746(2) and (3 j, 48-608(5), In favor of 
Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D John Ashby, Patrick V. Collins, Richard A. Riley and Hawley 
Troxell Ennis & Flawley LLP, against the Plaintiff in the amount of $20,058.00. 
Post-judgment interest on this amount at the current applicable statutoq rate shall 
commence to run fiom the date of this Judgment forward. 
3 DATED this L day of April, 2009. 
F s  F-,,"---: 8FrnEF d- u - 4  C . Y P ~ - -  
i 
JEFF M. BRUDIE 
District Judge 
JUDGMENT - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF S E R U  
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of Apnl. 2009.1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the manner 
lndtcated below: 
Michael S. Bissell - --J" 1; S. hla~l 
CAMPBELL BISSELI & KIRBY, PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 4 16 Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transmission (509) 455-71 1 1  
James L). LaRue 
Loren C. Ipsen 
EIAM & BURKE, P.A. 
251 East Front Street 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, ID 83701 
, 
/is U.S. Ma11 
I land Delivery 
Federal Express 
Facsimile Transn~jssjon (208) 384-5844 
CLERK Of) THE COURT 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
JUDGMENT - 3 
MICIII~ILL. 5 HISSIL 1 lSl3 Mil  576: 
ClthlPBEL,L. UISSELL & ICIRIIY I'LLC 
7 Sni~ t i~  i-ic>iv:tid S1-r-ect, S~ltre 416 
Sjmks~tlc, Wi7 90?0 I 
Tel ( '(191 'IS", 1 L o  
Fau (i00) A S c - 7  1 1 1 
!h: J ! 11- DIS'i IiiC I ['UUIi'J 01- 7 f-tt: SkCORID J1 IDICIAL DJSTIZICT OF 'i'fiE 
srtax or: IDAHO, IN i-\r.in FOR TIE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCF' 
GARY D FZ/\BBlT'T, a n  ~ t l i f ~ v ~ i f ~ l ~ ~ l ;  U. JOIIN 
ASIIT3\l', ;In ~nd~-vidc,il. PATRJCIC V 
CO1 1 INS r?n ~nciivtc!unl, RICE1ARD A 
RILL V, iiil rl l i l~  viciunl. IiA1,VLEY 'I'IIUXELL 
FNNIS & I liiWi.Fi', 1 I.P, an ldabo IimilecP 
11abljity l>arlricrch~p, J A P E  DOES I-X, 
unlikiown ~ndivldnals: 
I-"EAIIN'l'IFF lZEED J. TA'liLOTt'S 
MfP'1'16)N FOR I.IECONS1IDEIKAFIQdN 01; 
'THE OPlNIUN, 03tDIEM AND 
JUZ)C&Pt.IENT AWARDING ATTORNEYS 
FEES '1 8 DEFENDANTS 
Blc~cl l  8~ KKlv 1'1-1 C', hcrehy lnoves to leconqider the C'ourt's Opin io~~ 2 n d  Ortiet dated 
1,- o! tier to :i:%alii a pal ty attorney fms pursuant to I.C. 5 12 121,  the Court ~ntlst  
finti th,i: t-t., tr l t l rc iiiil('11 &bas prilsued firvolously Snn~ply ptit, lieed 'faylo] only needs 
to sllo~x; that one of hrs causes of actlon W:I\ not pursued f i . l \ i~ l~usly  to dcfcut a rcclucst 
l;)r tees. Reed 'Tay1or.s conversivn cause c)t aciloti ,ilorlc Isar s hii iii;iarcl ti!' k c s  ptirsuailt 
to J C 12-1 2 1 Issues of lirst imprescion nlscz bar an ai-cartf of attorney,' fccs as well 
The Court s a d  that Recd l'aylor hrortght hls clarnls agalnst the Dcfcnctants 
because they are "~ealously" reprcsenring tl~cir clients In actuality, Recd 'Taylor s11npIy 
brought lalid ciairns pertaining to his cccurltj intcrc41s and the l>eli.ndants' conduct that 
]lac; absolutely no cctrrclat~on to "'realorts" representation. Rced l'a>lor's C'on~pl:iint and 
proposed Amended Cornplaint containeci tlumcrous valid causes of actloll all of whlcli 
were not fi-ivolously pursued. 'Thc ~ntegnty of 'our legal system 1s at stake wllc11 
attorneys are pcrrnitted to convert assctc subject to sccurlty ~ntercsts and ald anti 3bct 
I others In unlawfully convcrtlng assets anti thc comnliss~on of' torts An award of 
:%ttorneys' k e s  is not only inappropriate. but s~lch an award acts as a pcllalty to anyone 
attempting to protect collateral granted to them. 'i'hc Court should vacate ~ t s  prlctr 
opinion, order and judgment. and deny the 1)cf'endants request for attulneys' lkcs " 
11. STAT'Fh4EN'I' OF FACTS 
On April 3, 2009, the Court granted the Ilefendants' request fhr ttttorncys' Ikes 
and costs. See Opinion and Order on I>cfcndants' Motion for . A ~ ~ a r r l  of Allorneq's 1;ees 
and Costs ("C3pinion and Order"). On Aprll 24, 2009. the Court cntercd judgment ln the 
amount of'$20,000 for attorneys' fccs and $58  for costs. Sec Judgrnent. 
I i'he iswe of whether the Ilefenddnts obta~ned the proper intoi-med consent of three separate anti distinc t 
clients is irrelevant to Reed Tnylor's cau$e\ of actlon Regardless. the\ could irot Ir'lve obt,linc(f slich 
corlsent knowing that the corporations were not holding annual shareholder meetings a n d  that the prescnt 
officers and directors were not propel ly elected 
In addlt~on. the Court erred In clismissing this action foi the same reasons thdt i t  I r a  n o  basis to ~ U , I I ~  
attorneys' fees to the Defendants Unfoi tunateiy. since Reed I a ~ l o r  has filed a Notice of Appeal, the Court 
n o  longer has j i i ~ ~ s d ~ c t ~ o n  over the older d l sm~ss~ng  1111s dction 
111 .  i,EC;AIA itLf'l'IlOKI'TY AND I~KGUICJEIVII' 
A r ~ i c t t r o t l  fijt rccot~sliksdilcli? r)f d t l j  I ~ I ~ L T ~ O C L ~ ~ C T ~  ( rdcrs of tfic trial cciiiri i I Ia> h i  
made at any t11ne wlthln 14 days alier the entry of final juttgmcnt. 1 R.C.1'. 1 1 (a)(2)(13) 
Iierc, thc Court [cr~terect linal judgnjcnt 013 April 34, 2009. 'Thus. Rcecl 'l'nt lor'\ 
Motion lor Reconcldcl-at1011 of the ('ourt's Opinion and Ordc~  IS  timely and shoultl he 
granted. 
it. "The Court Errcd In Abvarding Attorneys Fees to the Defendants 
A cottr-t may award attorneys Sees under 1 C. $ 12-1 21 "'onlv when ~t finds, ijoni 
the facts presented t o  ~ t .  that the case wa\ brought, pursucd, or defended frivolously. 
~~nreasonabl> or 1z.it11out fi~undailon " 1 K I' P 54(c)(l) ( C I ~ I ~ ~ I ; I S ~ S  added) An aili ,irti 
of' attorney fccs and costs rcquestecf against nonprovailing party undcr 1.C. $ 12- 12 1 
proper onlv \,*hen an action \xias t.1 t her brought, pursucd or defended ti-11 01 ousl j , 
unrcasonahl! or ivithot~t fiundrttion." IlosFosso.r v i)csFosscs, 122 Itfaho 634, 618. 530 
1'.2tl 1095 (19'12) (emphas~s :tddcrf). 'Tllc district court shoultl evaluate whethcr -@ 
claims brought .are f'ri\.*olous or without Ibundation' bcfire a\\larding attornel !be\ 
ullcler 1.C 6 12-1 2 1 .'" Pzlcke~r v k'cv\l~cr, 144 Idaho 16 1, 170, 158 P.3d 937 (2007) 
(qziotr~rg, lf117gl?c~nt L i24o1ztanc. Kctozrrc c7 A s ~ o c s  , 133 Idaho 420, 427 987 P.2tl 1 035 
( 1  099)) (emphasis adderl) Where a case ~n\olves  a novel legal qucstlon or issues ot iil.st 
~mpl-esslon, attorneys fees shoultl not bc awardoti utlt-ler 1 C. 9 12-1 21. C ' L Z I I ~ ~ ? / X / / /  I 
Ktlden , 1 4 1 Iciallo 640, 1 1 5 P.?ti 73 1 (2005) 
lfero. the Courl's amard of attorneys' fies to the Defendants was ~ ~ ~ ~ p r o p c r  f l ill1 
of  tile reasons set forth below 2nd on the bas).; of the legdl authority and argunlcnt. 
asselted in liecd 'I'aylor's licsponsc in Opposition to R4otion to l)isn~iss and Moilolj to 
l'I,Al% 1 lJ,l.,S A 4 0 1  ION 1-'Ol< I<l~C~OXSIl) I~I iA~~ION - 3 
i\\rt r l i i  ( O O l  ZO 
Disallo\h Attort~cls'  I"GCS and Costs (both o l ' w h ~ c l ~  are rt~corltor:ite(i by reference hc re~n)  
docs not conrt~tutc a basis for atvarding attorneys' f?c\ to t l ~ c  Ilefendants. I'\cr) oi1c of' 
Kecii 'J'aylor'q direct irnci iJcriilatiilc causes nl' ;actlc>ti 14 crc stjpportc(l by 1eg;tl ;tuthority 
and none wcrc p~rrsuccl fi-~tolously 
1. The Court Erred In itwarding Fees Because Reed l'aylor Asserted 
Several Valid and \% arranted Ciainls Against the Defendants. 
ftcrc. Recct Taylor has a va11d and perfcctcd \ccul-ity interest In all of h l A  
Ser\ices C'orporation and AIA Insurance. Inc.'s c o n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ i o n s  and related recei-tables. 
See Cotnplaint and I'roposed Amended C'omplaint 112 other ~ o r d s .  the 1)cfi.ndants' 
purport" clicnts are required to obtain I-leed 'l'aylo~ ' \  corlscnt bcfbrc any funds sub~ect  o 
the securit: rntercsts itrc used fitr ally purposes. I I I C I L I ~ ~ I I I , ~  Ii)r the paynle11 t of attorneys‘ 
f'ces to the ~)ef'cnciants.' 'The Def'e~~dants and tl~err purportetl cl~ents have never sought or 
rccc~vc(i tile r e q u ~ ~ e d  consent from Reed Taylor, anci ~inythrng short of recelvlng consent 
const~tutcs conversion and other torts. 
i .  It \+'as Eot Frivolous For Reed 'I'aylor To Assert Valid and 
Warranted Claims Against 'J he Ilcfendants For Conversion of 
Funds and Assets Subject to Jlis Security Interests. 
Whcn an unauthor~~ed ~ s p o s ~ t ~ o n  of cnllatcral occurs, a secured cred~tor has 
standing to bring clainls ag:linst th~rtl parties for con\crslon and other remedies. Sce r.g.. 
h'rrc~ . k c .  i2rt11ic of' Icicrho, ,V 11 I Ahst o I.thrc~~?riri\c~, 111~ . 104 Idaho 853. 856-57, 664 
P.2d 28 1 (Ct App 1983); In r p  Gaglc, 230 13 .R 1'73 ( 1000) (debtor's acts of'selling off' 
parts of a $30,000 truck const~tutecl convcr\lon arid a non-d~schargeable debt); 
Mtlle171711on I'r17n17cinf S(.r-~:rcc>c. 1, 1, C' 1. T l ~ o 1 ~  74 f',3d 57 (Kan Ct. App 2003) 
' l'topert\ ,tnd prucecds subject to secur~ly ~ n l c r ~ \ l c  may niic hi. d~\l,oscd of \ \ ~ ~ h o u l  consent of the secured 
pal-ty SCJ~IC' $ 2 8  9 315 
1'1,,4JN 1 1 1 ~ 1  .S MO'I ION l.,OJ-l l I J ~ C O ~ ~ S I I ~ I ~ l ~ A  I l (  )'4 - 4 
I I I  stttxc crrcunlstances, however. an unautl~ortteci sale or other drspos~tton of 
coll,ltcral may con5tltutc conversron as to the secured party. In most cases wtxxns 
ctc_i7tor-c~1fi.~ a~unauthorizetf  di<pos~tion of g ) l l a t e r a l d h c  secur~ttl. m g  
~ ~ I I ~ ~ \ c x - ( ~ I s ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ o I I  of the collateral. In these cases, the secured party may 
repoise<\ the collateral from the transferee or, In an appropriate caw, m;~tnta~n a  
i ~ c t ~ o t ~  ibr con\erslon. T D ~  s e ~ u s e c i ~ p a ~ y r n a ~  ciaiin both any p r ~ ~ c < d s  ncl tlie 
c ~ ~ ~ ~ j j z i ~ ~ ~ r  ill but. of course, may on1 y have one satisi'iiction. . . 
\\/here-a s c ~ l c c t  cc2lliit~ral IS* wlth respect to the secured party: a e o n ~ ~ e r s ~ c ~ r ~  off the 
cctll;~ter;ril thcre 15 a con\lcrslon on the part of the one who sells, as &ell as on the 
part of thc one who purchases, or to whom property is transferred, or a third 
party who exercises dominion over the collateral or its proceeds.. . 
Scc 70 (' J S. Secureti 'I'ransactions 4 157 (2008) (internal c~trztions omlttcri) (cmpkasls 
I l c~c ,  licctl 'l'aylor ,~sccrtc;tl clal~ns against Ilcfendants for conversion n11tf ait11ng 
and al,ettlng IJ I  the conkcrslon of' ;tsscts subject to liecd '1'aylor.b iallcf anti perfected 
1 
sewlr~ty lntclc\t\ Specifically, Reed 'Taylor assertctf that thc I)cfi.11Jrrnts \vCre bclng 
p a d  wlth fiii~ds iubject to h ~ s  ecurlty interests and accepting such pay~nellts knowlrlg 
that thc? nee silbject to Reed 'I'aylor's security ~nterests. In add~t lo l~ .  Iieed 1 aylor 
2tssel tcit th'it t l ~ c  1)eii.ndants were asslvtlng John 'Taylor ar~ct others In the conversion of 
a\sct\ \rtbjcct to Iteeci laylor's security interests. 'I'hc preliminarq ~lqunction against 
I Ihc C our1 cl-roncc'i~\ly found rhat Reed Taylor must have the Court tiererrnine th,it 11,s security i n ~ c ~ e s ~ s  
,Ire ballti h u j i ~ c  hc innv ,.tsseit ,my cjaims f-iowever. like a security intcre\t grnnteti in ,I \chicle oi othei 
plopcrt? il)c bii~tien IS on  tlie tlebtor lo pro\,e a defense to '1 .\ecurity intercat and the creditor IS entitled to 
all r ~ g l ~ ( \  .inti ~ I O ~ C L ~ \  r i ~ l t l n g  10 the S ~ C I I I I I Y  irjleresl until such tiine as the dchtor may  pielail o n  such 3 
ticfcnw I ihc ,i ~ c i l ~ ~ r t y  ~ntcrcst 11) a veh~clc. a debtor may not sell the \chicle or a n \  o f i t \  parts anti retain 
the funti< or util~tc' siich funds to pay atforl~eys' fees I he I)efenclants and 11jeii purpoitctl L I I C I I I ~  I I I I V C  
ncvc.1 ieclue~tccl (11 o1)rainctl liceti l avloi s pernltsslon to i ~ t ~ l l r e  any of the fund\ stibjcc~ lo Ills \ccurity 
inteicst. in A l i l  \ci\  ices Coipordlion nnd AlA lnsiirance Inc 's  comm1sslol)s 'IIIO ~ c l , ~ t c d  ~eccivnbles 
Again t l t i \  scciiri1.v ~ntercst 1s wparate dnd d1st111ct from the security Inrerest grdnced to I ) I I ~  t h ~ o i ~ p h  t e 
shdrc\ of .21.\ I ~ j \ u i . ~ n ~ c .  I ~ L  
KeccJ 'Taylor docs not proxide the Deknttar~ts w~ th  authortty to cornrnlt torts nor docs the 
preiiminary i~?juricrlon have any bearing on iieeri 'i',ijior's pcriucicd security interests in 
all cntnmisstons and relatccf revenues of' AIA Sertlces Corporation and lZ1A Insurance, 
Inc 
'I hus. Kced 'I a! lor's valid causes of'nctictn for convcrslon and a~ding  and abctting 
In convcrslon ktgalnst the Defendants werc not only xl:rl~ci and ~~ar ran ted .  but the causes of 
actlon alone prevent an award of fees pursuant to 1.C'. Q 12- 120. 
ii. Reed Taylor's Aiding and At-jetting C'iiuscs of Actions Against 
the Defendants Were Supported By ~juthorit? From Other 
.Jurisdictions. 
Thvsc xzlho aid, abet, wunscl or encourage a wrongdoer by looks, slgns, words, or 
gestul-cs arc ecjuillly I~ablc to the ~njurccl party S ( J ~  loil(i v Szrli'r~xzt? ('017rr I,I,C', 136 
ldaho 1 18, 19l 1' 3d 196 (2008) (cmpha\rs addctl). L ~ k c  nor-ma1 tortfeitsors, attorneys 
may bc I~ablc to others under varlous legal theoncs, lncludlng aiding and abettlng, 
conspiracy and other torts. I J L " ~ I " s I  L.. Jfcanvl, 50 A.11. 3d 959 (N.Y. 2008) (factual issues 
preclu(jcd suinmary judgment on convcrslon and aldlng and abettlng of fraud claim 
against lawyer). II? uc h W S ,  Inc , 2007 WI 26601 50 (11 Colo. 2007); 'li-rrzth v 
CFJ~zshlngton, 591 S E 2-1 382 (Ca. App 2003), Acjenn, fnt ('ol~rz, 162 F .  Supp.2d 351 
(E.D.Pa 2001), ('crcclola v Nelllz~~zts, 733 N.F.2tl 133 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); 111 IT 
C'ztufis, et i l l ,  O Z X  F. Supp. 180 (D. Mass. 1986) (valid cause of' actlon for aidlng and 
abettlng securities fraud based upon confl~cts of ~ntcrest). 
In 111 I-L. .115:55, J~zc., 2007 WI, 26691 50 (D. Colo. 2007). the kdei al district court 
reverseri the biink~-~lptcv ourt's orcler granting a n~otioll to disliiiss. iZ bankruptcy trustcc 
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lor t17c cstatc of' 'I corporate debtor sucd d law firm for tor tic)^^^ conduct I I I \ O I L ~ I I ~  ~ ~ 1 1 ~ 1 1 1  
iinanc~ai transacirons between the debtor anci corporate lnslders, incluci~ng 0 1 1 ~  i iciwal-t i  
1,ench and "ct~titics under his control," all referred to in the facts of the caw irb ' - 1  c,icl~ " 
" T I hc f;tcts rcxcal a series of various tra!~cact~onc wl~icl> arc: qulte cotnplex hut ulttm;!tcl\ 
11lvo1ve ].each obtaining primay liens on dcbtnr's asscti when debtor %,as ~nso l \ c~ l t  l11c 
court notcd that "of critical imporlance" to t11c tr~stec.s  claims was the 1:1ct that tllc la\\ 
fir111 acted as counsel fbr both clebtor and I,cdch duntig thc transactionc; \~.hlcll t11c cclult 
char;tctel-~rcd a \  "dual reprcsmtation" atte~td~int c ~ ~ t h  co~iflicts of' interc\t '111ci ilii~iic-ri 
loyalties bct\;lecn the debtor and Leach. 
r ,  I he d ~ s t r ~ c t  ourt reviewect, the alIegat~on\ of the trustee's coml,lalt~r rci,iti\e lo 
c l ; r ~ ~ n s  fi>r consp~racy and a ~ d ~ n g  ancl abctt~ng In the breach of' fiduc~ary ctut~cs' ,ind heit1 
that the coniplalnt stated claims. 'I'hc d~strict court stared: 
I find Trustee suffic~ently allegect the t 'ollo~v~ng claims (31 behall ~,t'fj~c 
- 
cornorat~on's cred~tors. ( 1  ) [attorney dcf'c~idantsl engaged 111 a C I \  ~ ! - c ~ t j s p r ~ q  
with Leach, Blue Ch~p: Akamal, and rne~nbcrs of Debtor's manag-cz1mfi to c~mg71t 
fiautlulent transfers that breached f iduc~ar~l  duties to unsecured c r c c i t o ~ s ~  31i1[?) 
---- 
httorney defendants] aided and a b e w  Debtor's officers 211rcJ _ c l ~ ~ c ~ t g ~ ; s - ~ r j  
b z c h ~ n g  their f iduc~aryAut les  to unsecured creditors. l'hus. 1 firxi t11c 
bankruptcy judge's determination that 'l 'r~~stec's allegation only supl-iortocl - ~ l a t n ~ \  
of'the debtor against a third party" was in crror. /I:ootnotc No.31 
/I;ootnnte No. 31. Strangely, another pol-t~on of the bankruptcy lucIgcls itplnloll 
5~1pports niy finding here 'I'he judge notcd: "1 1 )he basis for all 01' I 1 ~ .ustce ' \ /  
cl211ms IS that [Debtor] cornm~tted wrongful acts, I e , \lolation of titinc*~arv t lut~c\  
~t hati to ~ t s  creditors and shareholders or s e c u r ~ t ~ e s  li-aud, ancl t l~at  [Ilebtor] wa\  
e~ther  caused to comrn~t such violat~ons or was ass~stecf In co1-ti1nttt1119 sucl~ 
v~o la t~ons  by [the attorney ciefendantsJ " 
117 I . (>  44S.55, Ir~c . ,  2007 W L  26691 50 * (emphasis added). 
' I hc tf~<rr!cr court rloleti lhal "Colorcicfo qldte I C r u  tf~cldfcs lhnt when ~i corpoialron b c ~ o m e \  ~ i j \ c i i \ i . i i r  thi. 
co rpora~~on ' , s  crcdilors are owed a cornmon Idw dulv by Ihe directors anti officers o f  ~ h c  o i  l?or,rlici~ 2007 
14~1 2600150 at * 14 
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In ~Icic~nir, IPR L' ( b l ~ ~ i .  102 F  SLIP^ 2d 151  (E.D. Pa. 20t)l), a clnsclq-held 
corporatlon anci two sharehojdct\ weci a fi3rn1er m;ilor rly sharekoidcr ("'iviaiecki') and hlc 
law fin11 alleging. amung other clams,  breach of  l iduclar~ duty and aidlng ancf irhcttlng 
111 the tlreach of fiduciary i iut j j  'The la\+ f i l . ! ~ ~  I~IOICJ  to ~ I S ~ I I S S ,  whlch mcltjorl was 
tlenled by the court. Thc facts ~ n d ~ c a t c  hat Maleciil. as corporate dircctos and officer, 
cil\crtcd corl)orate funds to another busit2ess -'\z111cl1 hc owned and operated lor his oun 
j?cr\ctnrzl pecuniary gain." It?  adciition, Malecki uqcd corporate "f'acilities and personnel to 
further" his other business." 'I hc Iaw finn llatl irnclcrtaken to provide representation to 
hot11 Malecki. personally. and the corporatlon ;inti the klcts of thc case detail a number of  
personal and c o ~ o r a t e  transactions fol wlllch the law firm provided representation. The 
cnurt stated the law lirms' position on the applic;~blc liiw as fi~llaws: "1 l'lhc [attorney] 
I>cfi.ndants contend that . . . arl '~ttoi-ncy I S  not 11ablc for aidlng and abcttlng a corporate 
of'iiccr's breach of tiduclal-y duty merely by t l ~ e  pruvlsion of  advice to the corporation 
absent ciircct and knowing participation in the hrcach itsell': . . ." See A~Jcnil. lnc , 162 F. 
Supp.2d at 356. Thc court held: 
To establish a c l am of aidlng and abcttlng a breach of fiduciary duty. a pla~ntlf'f 
must show: ( 1  ) a breach of fiduciary duty owed to another; (2) knowledge of the 
brcach by the alder ctr abettor; and (7 )  substantial assistance or encouragement by 
the alder or abcttor In et'fectlng that breach. 'The court in Scl~uylklll Skyport Inn 
Iv. Rlch, 1996 \VIA 502280 (E.D.Pa 1996)] dlii not require the dlrect and knowlng 
participation that the Dcikndants contend 1s reyui~ed. Rather, the court allowed 
thc claim to procced based upon a s h o ~ ~ i n g  of' "substantial assistance 01- 
encouragement." Moreover, evcn ~f suc11 a heightened lnvolvelnent were 
recrulrcd, the Plalnt~ffs 5uffic1entIy allc,geci that the [attorney] Defendants were 
- 
Indeed knowing and 'jcttve ltdrtlclpants In Malecki's brcach. Accord~ngly, 
I2lalntlffs havu suff-iclently alIege(1 a cIa11n off aiding and abettlng a breach of' 
fiduciag_rluty against fig [attorney) Defenc-iants. 
-- 
i- The facts th'lt \ w e  before the C o u ~ t  In this ccisc uere a s t o n ~ i h ~ l ~ g l y  slnl~lar as John raylor and othcr 
tiefcndants have diverted millions of ciollars fiom AIA S e n  ices Corporation arid AIA lrlsulaijce. Inc to 
othcr corporat~on\ and thet7lsel~es to thc defrlment of Reed I ayIo1 
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Id('tqri, fnc , 162, F Supp.2d a t  357-358 (er~iphasis added). 
in /iifo/?u, rhc iawyer dcf'endants subjected thernscives ro cidrlns of ilah~iltj' i i ~ r  
consjxrxy ant1 altllng and abett~ng of'var~oul. torts by undertak~ng to represent more t11;ln 
t)ne c l~ent  and then cubstantlally assrstlng the cllent who owes fiduclitry ctutlei: tcr  t !~ t  
ot l~cr c11c11i IJI the hrcacl~tng of  those iictuclary duttes. Moreover. attorneys rn such a 
sltuatloil act outside the scope of the attorney-cller~t relatlonsh~p, ~vhleh such C ~ ~ ~ I I I I S  ilre 
not protected by thc I~tigat~on privilege 
I'hu?. Reed 'l aylor's aiding and abettlng c l a m s  agatnst the IJefcndai?ts M ~ ~ I C  110t 
! T J \ O ~ ~ ) L I S .  C'onsequcntlq. there is no basis to award the Dekndar~ts attorneys' fkes ln i111\ 
/ ;lctl011 
i i i .  Reed Taylor Asserted Causes of Actiotl Bascd tjpon Issues of 
First Impression. 
Whcrc a casc involves a novel legal question or lssues of first 1111presslon. 
attor-nc)\ k c s  shoulci nut be awarded unrler I.C. 5 12-12 1 .  C'an7pbc;il v KlitJc~u, 141 
I(la11a 640, 1 I5 1'3.icl 73 1 (2005). In (i1n117b~I1, the Idaho Suprcrne ('ourt ai'ii~niutl the 
trial cowt 's  denial of an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to 1.C 4 12- 12 1 : 
.thc - dlstrict court properly notetl that t h ~ s  case involved novel ~ssucs,  ~ncludlng a 
matter of first impression.. .Where a case involves a novel yllestion, attorney fees 
-- -
shoulci not he granted. 
-- - 
161 at 051 (clnpl~asis added). 
Ilcre. even if the Court \?/as not persuaded that Reed 1 aylor'\ ('olilplaint nllcgerl 
vnllct causcs of actlon, including c lams  against attorneys, Reed 'I aylor's isstles of fils1 
I I I I ~ ~ C S S I ~ I I  111elude a stock pledgee havlng standing to bring claims. a cretfltor of an 
licctl I , + ~ l o r  does not address other causes of action becaiisc he only need\ lo \hou I I M [  a [  Irdq one c,\u%c 
of nLlion \+CIS vnlid and not l'rivolous lo prevenl the Ilefentlanls from being awditletf drrolney' fees hinder 
1 ( 12-121 
~nsolvent cctrpol:xt~irrl Irllve st;~ntlrng to brrng clatms, 3rd \vhethe~. attorneys In'iy accept 
piy1ilcrit of ~ L L >  i i o i i ~  ~ b l b j i ~ t  it ,  s i ~ U l . i i : y  i f i i ~ ~ ~ ~ i ~ ,  aiii<ing otbcrs Acctirdingty, t h ~  
Court sho~ild not have aunrclcd :ztto~ncy\' fircct to the llefkndants as this act1011 jnvolved 
Issue\ o f  first lniprcu\lon S 
R.  
As prc\,~ously argueti by Rcctf 'l'aylor, a stock plcdgec has stand~ng to h ~ ~ n g  tl~rect 
c l a ~ m s  against th~t t i  p2"Z1e5 .\(v c g  . <(;zi\tc~fSo~? v (;z~5t1~)'.~0);1, 47 Wn. App 272. 278, 734 
P.2d 949, 057 (Wn App 1087), Iimplro 1,ifi. /MI ('(I OJ A ~ C I  I C C I  v k'uftfcrk C 'or77 , 468 
F.2d 310 (5th C'lr 1972): firtt hrc v Mt MztEfen, 79 F 523 ((it11 C'lr. 1897) "l'he picdgec 
may tile s u ~ t  In eyu~ty  to preserve the stock and to protect h ~ s  or her ~ntcrests, to thc  same 
extent% at I c a ~ t ~ ~ ~ s ~ h g p l g d ~ o r  I'hc pledgce is also interested in the prescrvario~~ of' the 
corporate pn~pcr ty  ant1 111 p1cvel1t1ng ~t fro111 passing out of' thc hand\ of the 
corporation. ." SCP 13A 1;letcIier Cyc. Corp. 5 5651 (2008) (cmphas~s atfded). A 
credrtol of an ~n\olvent corporat~on has stand~ng to b r ~ n g  tf~rect clams. ellen tbr c l a~ms  
~ n v o l v ~ n g  brcaclles of' fiduc~ary d u t ~ c s  In certa~n circumstances. Sec, ( j g ,  Rocr~-d ~f 
7kustr.c~ oJ 'li~nrn.~ri~r,v v l*bodri.lon, I m ,  296 F.3d I64 (3rd Clr. 2002), /Iscr~.c,o I,/,(' I '  
Arnerrci~r ,'lilln ('clrp, 382 13.R. 4")s D 'l'cx 2007) I.C. 5 30-1 -746 prov~des no 
I ~ m ~ t a t ~ o n s  that a stock pledgee (secured by the stock and conlrn~ss~ons) or crcd~tor of an 
~nsolvent corporat~on niay not pursuc cier~\lat~ve c la~ms.  See 1 C. tj 30-1 ct scy 9 
8 Althougl~ Idaho has not adopted the "litigation privilege" defense, the Court relics lipon i t  in part to 
dismiss liectl 'l';r>,lor's Conjpl:-rinl. I'liis isst~e. like others involving Reed Taylor's C:omplaint. arc all issiies 
of first impression i n  lti:iho, wljich bar an award of attorneys' fees to the 1)efendants. 
?~e(l  (ig, A13A Official C'omitjeni to Sectioirs 30- 1-740. which state states: "(i]n the c o ~ ~ t e x t  of s c c t i o ~ ~ s  30- 
1 -740  through 30-1-747. bi~s!icial o t ? i ! i c ~ e ~ ~ ~ ~ s ~ - ~ ~ c _ r r ; o n  having a direct eqonomic interest ~ I I  I ~ C  sl,aresii 
(enyhasis added). Kceti l 'avlor is the oilly party with a direct economic interest in all of the outstanding 
shares of' AliZ Insul.nncc. Inc. as thcy are plcdged as collateral to him fiw the payment of his $6 Mill;on 
Note. See ( 'o~npla~nt  and I+oposcd Amendeci Complaint. Reed 'l'rt~lor respectfully disagrees with thc 
Coui-t's deter~ninntion tljat he docs not have standing to ixing dcrivati\/e claims and helicves th:it hc does 
Ilei.e, the C'ourt ti)und that Jiecd 'Taylor was not  a sharel~olcler Sot PLIJ-~OWC',  of  ;I 
I ticnvarl\pc actron. e tcn  though Reed Taylor asserted i i t a i  hc ir1<is tile sojc ~ t l e t i ~ c c  oi :i i i  a I 
outstancling shares 111 AIA Itlsurancc artif the most s~gnlficant cl-etiitor of !)IC ~t?stll\cnt 
sujtport~ng hrs de r~ \~a l l \ c  actlons. such a finding does not c t ~ i ~ i l ~ t u t c  it f i r \ c t i c t \ i ~  .ictrit~i 
Morco\icr, the Idaho Suprcnlc Court has never faced thcsc arcni; of'first 11~1/71es'tltf11 'iii(i ;i\ 
such awarding fees was not appropriate under I.C. $ 12-1 2 1 
6'. 
Courts do not afthrtf :ltto~neys blanket immunity fro1-n c1:iln-r~ hrc>~ll_tllt h j  opjxfilng 
counsel under the unfair trade practices acts. See Q g . ('/?np/nirrl iAzln7hi>1. It?(  iri,ct~t 
(;~icrnllnn t J  Ifule [mi/ />ol r* !,LP. 445 F .  Supp. 2d 93 ( D . 0 .  M:rst ?OO(t) ( ,~I leg: t r l~t t~  171 a 
guardian for disabled ininor against law firm and trust 111;t11ngei t1cn~c~i-i'ttr;ited 
recklessricss necessary to establish claiin under unfair trade act). .5r I'irzii I i i r J  rirrti 
M~inr7c. lrzs ('o ti i:'//rs 84 l.lllz.s, 262 F.3d 53 ( I  st Cir. 2001): (irttll;lo\ i lit-cic)/c\iic:tiX. 120 
F. Supp. 2d 1271 (I).C't. N M. 2000) (attorney's niislead~ng concfr~c~ roiarct) t~nfiiii- 
practices act); rcc. cl/so Rztrnclp v I,inlzurlz, 38 S.W.3d 61 2. 610-20 
In C'hi[/2n~cin. the C'onnect~cut Supreme Court uphclti a lutlpnicrll c~g : i i~~ i t  a 
debtor's attorney undcr the liiil'air 'l'rade Practices Act: 
I4o\vc\er f i r  the duty of anzealously represei~t 11ji gllCnt c*te~di,-!t 
necessarily falls short ofthe point at wh~ch  thc r c p r c s c n t l \ ~ r ~  C O ~ ~ ' ; ~ I I U I ~ \ _ ~ ~ I ~ I ~ ~ ~  
a thrrd part) or the assistance in the perpetration of st& ~i-fi~utl.-i:i~ctl~gr 71.
af imat ive  misrepresentations or knowing nondisclosur~c [ ~ l y y c ~ ) t ~ t >  JC!LI>W! -- 
to pcnni t litigants to ra~se-ga~nst opposlng c o u r ~ ~ c ~ ~ i n d c i  t11c C't)!inecticiit 
have sti tntl~ng as a beneficla1 ownel as contemplated by Idaho Cocic I'o c I ~ . ~ I I  111-1 d11\ ~ o l i f t ~ . ~ c ~ n  .ill 01 the 
<11'1rex of AIA Inqurance. Inc 'Ire pledged to Reed 'I aylor. not the shares of 9112 \ e r c ~ c c <  ( c ~ r l l o ~ ~ ~ t ~ o ~ ~  ( t i l t '  
parent corporation (-ffAIA 1njur;tnce. Inc ) 
U n f ~ i ~ r  rr acle J ) I ~ I L ~ I C ~ \  Iyc~cii!fi~)t bg cttns&ugt1, as h e  cicfcndant s u g g g  as 
a f f o r d ~ n ~ ~ b l i i ~ t h c l  r~~~ir~untt l ;__tj)  attorgcy? for tortlous acts they c g l ~ ~ m t t  against 
wli!ie I cpt csel?tEx c l ~  CIJJ? 
( I  987) (other internal crt,itror?s i~irt~ttecf) (c t~~pl~; i i .~k  actdcd) 
Here. Reed 7 ayiitr < ~ \ \ ~ . r t e d  il C;LUSC of iiCtl011 agalnst the Defendants both directly 
and dcrivativelq. 'I l ~ u i .  L I C I I  I S  Itced I 'itlor'\ d~rect claim was rejccled because he 
lacked priv~ty of contlac~ . i t . ~ t l ~  thc ljcfen(i:int..i. Iris tlerivatrve claiin brought on bchalf of 
AIA Serv~ces Corpor;ttlon ,illti :21,A 1nsut;tncc. l r x  should not  have been cJismtssed and 
was certainly not I?ilrolo~i\ / h e  i;ict that t l ~ c  ('ourt rejected Keed '1'aylor"s ex tens i~e  
legal authorities pro\ itl~r-ig tlci ~ ~ a t i \ ~  st~~ticf~ng dt)cs not constitute a frivolous action. The 
I'iicts and law asserteci 13) liccd I n> l o r  (~nclutiing thc a h o ~ e  law) support a f ind~ng that his 
cause of action under I (' IS-hOP(5) was r;ot fj~vc>ic>us. 
D. The Court Errctl In hlakinr~~~ Factual Jindings In Its Opinion. 
1 .  ?'he C'tturt fr Barred From qlaking Factual Findings Against the 
Plaintiff' In :i ?lotion to 1)irmics I'ursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). 
On a motion 10 t f i i ~ n ~ \ \  for fllltlrc to state a claim, the Court looks only at the 
plcadrngs. and all ~n te rc i~cc i  '11 c liieth cd $13 f;t\/o~ of the non-moving party. Yozing v City 
clJ Kerclzzcm. 137 Idalto 102. 103, 44 1' 3tl 1 157 (2002). F-icre, the Court granted the 
Jlekndants' Motion to l ) i i ~ i ? i \ \  fix t i t i l~~ic 10 stiftc it claim. 'I'he Court ]nay not consider 
or inake any tjctual Iil~(iii~gi otlier t11;ili tlloie facts alleged by the Plaint~ff in the 
Complaint. For erainplc. t l ~ c  ('ourt statctl that  
... the Defendallts nctcd ~xcll wlth~ll tbg-ct)gal rules established by the Idaho State 
Bar. 
Sep Opinion aiid Ortlci. P J ~  i( 9 (cinphitsls c~(it-ietlj 11) the context of a disn~issal pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(0). the only way thc Court could l~avc  re;tchetl the foregolllg conclusion 
mould be i i ;  and o d y  ~ f ;  Reed Taylor had allegcu that the iicr'cridaiir.~ '-acteu within tile 
ethic;il rtile4 esiablislied b), thc Idaho State I3ar." I lothc~er.  Jteecf l a ~ l o r  ~tllegccl that the 
!>c!endant haci \i~c~latcrd numerous ethical rules, c. g., icp~c\eIllrng mcxc than onc clictit 
i z  hen ccrcl~ client I I ~ C  diverging lnteresls. all nf'whlch such tilcts nluct be taken as true fbr 
purpose\ of I)cfkndant$' Motion to 1)isniiss and any subseyucii~ motions fitr attomeyc' 
ti.c., 10 
'1 hus. thc ('ourt erred in making any factual lintilngc 111 its Opiiiion and Order that  
;ire not I>a{ed upon the facts alleged by Iiced 7'ayIor. t\hlch n~ust  be take11 as true fbr 
purpose\ of' the I>eSendai~ts' Motion to J)ismiss and ReecJ I :r!lorq5 Motion to I)isallot\ 
/"\torne~ \ I- ees. 
El. ?'he Judgment Should Be Amendcc-l. 
,A ludg111ent may he amended or vacated if ~t is voitl, rc\ersed, tflschaiged or for 
[inv ot11cr reason justifyi~ig relief. See 1.R.C.P 60(b)i4)-((1) 
1. 'I'he Court's Judgment Should Be Amencted, 
1 oi all of the reasons articulated abobe, the Court shoultf iacate ~ t s  award of 
:tttorncjs' fecs and anlend tile judgmei~t to only reflect an award o f ' S 5 8  fol costs 7'11~s. 
the new~utfglnent sliould be a total of $58 .  
10 I lie I>efcndanrs erroneously argued. anti the C:c>urt was persuaded. rh21r liecti ' I 'aylor '~ (:c\~~?plaint \v:is 
b a e d  solely upon acrions taken by rhe lawyers ro pt~~.portetily "zealotlsl>" tlcf2nd their purporred clients. 
which has n o  correlation wirh rhe legal basis rhar Reed 'l'aylor iileti tliis acrlon. 13y accepting rhe 
1)efendancs' arguments. the Court missed the rrtle basis for the C'o~nplaint. Keecl 'l'aylor alleged conversion 
anci aiding and abetting claims stemming dirccrly from securiry interests hclti by hi171 and rite 
misappropl-iation of AIA's assets to CropUSA anti others. 'l'he 1)efenctaftrs ~.eccipr of'arrorncys' fecs anti 
costs f iom rhe I>efendants knowing that Reed Taylor's perfecteci scct~rity inleresrs ~ O \ ~ C I -  such funds 
consrlrutes conversion. i.e.. All1 Services and AlA Insllrancc cannot spend a slnylc penny o f  f ~ ~ n d s  eriveti 
f'ro~n lieeti 'faylor's sec~~riry inreresrs i n  311 commissions and relateci I-eceivables to pay expenses. salar~cs 
or arrorneys wirhot~r his consent. This \48arranred claim alone preclt~des an awarci of attorneys' k e s  to the 
1)cfcndants. 
I'I AIN 1 I1'l"S 4 4 0  1 ION J'OR RI~CONSI1lI:lI~'I l'1ON - I . ?  
IIJO Rf < - 001 7 0  
2 .  I f  the Court Awi~rd,  .In) 17ecs Undrr I.(.. tj 48-6OX(S) and/or I.<". 
1.C # 30-1-745, the ('ourt's 'Judgment Should Still 1Je Amended, 
I 1 If tlie ( ' o ~ i l - 1  ;iuSanls any ice5 under i C. 4 - 6 8  I 1 ' 4 . 6 30-1 -746, I 
the jutlgment shoultl be iimended trt reflect only those tccil ~ncurred for such causes of 
actton had the Ilelclltlants itemlxetl sucll fees. IZegardless. sirlce the Ilekndants failed to 
~tcrnixc tl~clr fccs, the Court may not duartl fcci; to the I>efentjant\ Scoit Ft.t;?cr C'O ti 
IV. CONG'1,USION 
For thc seasons set ihrth abo\*c. the Court slioultl grant JZcetf I aylor's Motion for 
Rcconsldcratlon and decline to award any attorneys‘ fees to the 1)ctendants. In add~tlon. 
the Jucig~nent \llould be ;unentlcd 
DATl'il tills ?$ay of Ma). 2009 
Attorneys fix Plaintit't' 
1'1 AIN I l l  l..S h 4 0 1  ION l.OJ< ]<I C'ONS11)1;1<,4 1.10N - 
I i ] l ; R F R Y  CER'!'IFY that c r ~  the 
;I true unil correct copy of the tiit-egoing document to the iolion 111g 
I IAND rIE1,IVERY 
I ;  S, MAIL 
OVI3IINIGHT MAIL 
I X X  'TRANSIWISSIORj 
Ji?r/lAlI, (.pdf attachment) 
James D I ; I J < L I L '  
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R4ICIIACL S. BISSELL, I:Ji rtic :r ibZ 
GAMPBEIdL, BISSF;I,L & K I R H I '  JY J C 
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U-4 Tlli"ISTRIC'1' ( ' 0 1  'R1 !?I. i I iC  SECOND JUDlClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
S'TA'T'E Oi IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MEZ PERCE 
REED J.  t *"\LOR, an in~tiivrcJu;ii I 
GARY IJ. BABB17'7', an ~lid:~iduhf 13 10HP 
RSI3EY, 311 irrdividu~l, I\AT!IICII. ti 
COLLINS. an indiv~ciudl, RICi- i~l l lU R 
RILEY, an ~nii~vidu;il, I IAl4/! li"l 'ITROXET.1, 
E W I S  & IIAWLEY, LL,P, an  Idahn l~~nrted 
I~ttbllity partnership, JANE DOES I-);, 
unknown ~ntIividuals. 
Case No.: CV-08-01765 
PLAINl'IFP REED J. TAYLOR'S 
RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF THE OPINION 
AND ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS 
FEES TO DEIgENDAN7'S 
I'larntiff Reed 3 Tci> l o ~  t 'Rrabri 1';iylor7'). by and through hls attorneys, Campbell, 
B~sseli & K~rby, PLI,C, ,ct t !~n~itc  this I!ciponse in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for 
Reconside-ation. 
I ,  IN JYRODUCTION 
Where a case ~n\c;i\c.s n ~ o v t  l legal q~lestlon or Issues of first Impresston, 
attolneys fccs should not hc liv/,lr~iecd ~111dcl 1.C. C, 12-12] Cartlpbcll v Kildew, 14 1 
PLAIN i'It E 'S RESPOI\ISl' Ii'd i>i'l'OSiI'ION 
TO MOTION FOR Rl~l'OnlXI1)1*l<A i710nl 1 
Idaho 640. 1 15 1' 3d 711 (2005) (e111phasls added). 'I'h~s c,lse ~nvolvcs not jusl one, hut 
numcrc;tis I;sues first ..--me.,-.,y, t11 ,kt lLa .31t11 ,  In Idaho, e g., ( I )  ;chi.thcr :I stock pfedgec. 1:;;:; 
starld~ng to  assert direct o r  den\ati\ic claiins, (2) uhether a creclitor has stand~ng to ;~ssert 
d~rect  ctr t lcr~vat~vc clams, (3) ~vhether the Idaho Coniumcr I'rotccttt~n Act afthrtts 
blarlket liability to dn ,tttorney, (4) ~ihctther an attorney may I -cce i~c  payment froln funds 
subject to a creditor's secur~ty ~ntercsts. ( 5 )  wl~ether an attorney may a ~ d  a n d  abet :t 
dekndant 111 the cotnlnlsslvn o f  tort~ous acts, and (6) ~ h c t h e i  a party may file claiins 
against opposlng counsel fix any one or inore of the foregoing cla~ms. Moreover. thc 
Co~trt based i t s  dismissal in part on the "l~tigation privilege." mthich the Court ~ C C O ~ I I I Z C C ~  
as an issue of first lmpresslon In Idaho 
Even ~f the case did not 111vollvc issues of first inlprecsion. an awdrci of fees would 
iictt be warrantetl Ixxausc Rcetl 7';tylor was and is cntit let1 as niatter of' la\+ to protect h~ s 
security interests in the prtrperty and ful~ds b e ~ i ~ g  inlsappropriated by other5 with tlic 
assistance of the Defendants. 
11. LEGAL AUl'flOKITY AND ARGURf EN'J- 
A. Ilefendants' hlotion for Itecunsideration Is Moot. 
For the reasons set forth above and in Reed I'aylor's ;"\;lotion fbr fieconsideration 
of the Court's Opinion. Order and Judgment Awarding Fees to the Defendants, the C o ~ ~ r t  
erred in awarding fees and ~t should enter an order denying the awdrct of fees.' '1"Ile issues 
raised in 1)eSendants' Motion i\o~tl(f bc rendered moot I S  the C'ourt rccons~tierccf ~ t s  
decision in &\or of Reed Taylor 
I Reed 'I'aylor inco~pctrates by refcrencc Into this Response all of the facttlal anci legal arguments assertc(i i n  
his Motion for lieconsideralion of t l~c Court's Opinion, Order and Judgment Awal-ding 1-ces. Iiecti 'l 'ayl(~~..s 
k4otion to Ilisallow I>efindants' Jiecltlest f'or Attorneys' Fees and Costs, anti lieed 'I'aylor's liesponse in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motiol~ to 1)ismiss. 
I'I,AlN 1'IFI"S RESPONSE 1% OPPOSI'I'ION 
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Feei arc properl) cfcnicd ~t a party falls to segrcgatc fees betweeii eo\w-etf items 
( 1OtI6) (upholding trial coui~'.; denial of attorney fkes because the prcxailing part! could 
not wpatatc fees attr~butable to contract claim and those ~lttributablc to conxcrslon 
O n  February 19. ?009. liccd l aqlor ohjccted to I>cknd,tr\ts' rccluest fi)r fees for 
the f a ~ l u ~ e  to segregate fecs c~trng Brooks I>. Giguirt /<iuzc-hcs. Since that t i~ne ,  the 
Defendants h a ~ e  clone noth~ng t o  cure this defic~ency and have failecl to d o  so in their 
Motion f;,r liecons~dcratio~t 1-or this reason alone, I3efkntlants ;ire not entitled to any 
fecs pursuant to I.C. Cj 30-1 -746 or 1.C'. 5 48-608(5) 
C. Even If Deferrdants Miere Entitled to Fees, the Court M a v  Not Corlsider 
Any of the New Ekidence Presented by the ljefendants. 
New cvideiice inuy not be subm~ttecl in it ~riotron fbr reconslc1cr;rilon of' a 
judglilcnt. SQP Frrst Sct Wonk o/ Itlnho, 1V.A v l$'c.h.sfrr-, 1 19 Idaho 262, 805 P.2d 468 
(1 90 1). I t  is an abuse of discretion for a court to predicate an award of attorneys' 1kcs on 
inatters not contamed in the recoict. Scvet*.ron v ??ermnr~f?, 1 16 Idaho 497. 490, 777 13.2t1 
269 ( 1989). 
Ilcrc. Ilefeiitfantr itppcar to innhe new arguinents based upon alleged .'itact\" not 
contained in the record Recd 'Taylor ol7jccts to all tilctual arguments that are iiot 
supported by cites to exidcnce presently in the record. \?~hich inclucfes all of 1)efklidants' 
arguriierits Defeiendaients inaj* ilot subinit new evitfciicc in support of theii Motloll Sol 
lieconsideration and such "e\ iifcilce" may not bc considered by the Court. For example. 
PI iZlh 111 1;'s IZi~Sl'OhrSI IN OI'I'OSI I ION 
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llcfknt-lants go 1r1to great Icngth arpulng the nit~nbcrs of'pagcs reviewed, thc complexlty 
of r l i ~  u n d ~ ~ l ~ i r l g  action. ;znci oti~et aiicged '-facts' \vhich arc not in the recori1 and not 
ccir3talned tn any afiidavlt.. \ubnlittctl by counsc! for the ~lcf'endants.~ Thc only cv~ilencc 
that the I'ourt may cons1c1c.1 I <  fhc evrtiencc In the Af'fidac~ts previously subinltteci in 
support of the Ilefendants' 2lcmorandum of f:ces ancl ("ctst~. N o  other evidence may be 
argucd or submitted througi~ ,r picaitrng or mollon. Ail such evidence should be str~ckcn, 
excluded and dlsregardetl b! the C'o~lrt 
1). I f  The Court 1)oes Elect to Award Fees, I t  Should Consider All of the 
Elements Required Under I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
An award of fees i~rlticr 1 I? ( ' . I ) .  54(e) 1s a dlscretlonary determination of'the trial 
court. but must be directetf 13v Ihc fiictors set ibrth ~n the rule. K ~ l l ~ v  v. tllocfges. I 19 Idaho 
872. X I  I P.2d 48 (Ct. App 1001) if thc court a\v:trdc any attorney fees In an action or 
based upon any of' the I < i \ \  citcd in the above sect~uns. thc court "&I cons~der the 
following factors in detcr~nln~ng the amount ol'such fecs: 
(A) 'I-hc tlrne arld l,ti-tor r_cgmr9j. 
(13) 'The novelty anti cllfficulty of the guest~ons 
(C) The skill reyulutc to pel-lbnn the lcgal services properly and the experience 
,rncl ability of the i~ttornc! In the paltlcular field of law. 
(D) 'The prevailing chargc~ for l ~ k c  work. 
(I:) Whether the fcc 1s fixed ol contingent. 
(Ff Thc time limit,itlons I I I I ~ O V ~ ~  by the cllcnt or the circumstances of the case. 
(G) The amount i n ~ o l \  ed and the resultu obtained. 
(f-l) 7'he undesirablilt!, of' the case. 
( I )  'J'he nature ancl lcrigtll of the profcss~onal ielatronship with the client. 
(3) An ar-ds In sllnllai cases 
( K )  'lhe reasonable co\t of' :tutomated legal research (Computer Assisted Legal 
fiesearch), if the cour1 finds i t  was reasonably necessary in preparing it party's 
? Ilcfcndants arguments lack mc-I-11 l?ccause i.btaining a dismissal pursuant to 1.II.C.P. 12(b)(6) 1.eqilires no 
illvestigation irito factual iss~le.: or  in\cst~;~ation in factual m:~ttcrs involving Tqlor- 1,. .4/,4 .Y(.~-t.ic.i~s 
I'orpo~viiion, ('I irl., because all ;~ll(.getf licts must be taken as true fbr purposes of the motion [(I dismiss. 
'l'l~us, any investigation into thc tlndcrlying action or other factilsl issues was not required and not 
compcnsable. 
case. 
(L) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular (:me.'' 
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) (emphasis added). 
Wen the infomation requrled by 1.R.C.P 54(e)(3) criterin has no! been 
submiffed by the party requesting fees, an award of fees is impropar. Lettunich v. 
terr~mich, 141 Idaho 425, 1 1 1 P.3d 1 10 (2005). Defkndants have not submitted the 
reqiured infomatian md, therefore, on that basis aionc they shouId not be. awarded fees. 
rv. _~ONCLUSJON 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should deny the Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration, grant Reed l'nylor's Motion for Reconsideration and award ~J fees io 
the  Dehdmts. 
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M THE nlsmlcr COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICML DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an indjvidual; I 
v. M M O W D U M  IN oPPOSnION TO 
P L A m F ' S  MOTION FOR 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individuaf; D. REGONSlDERATlON 
ASNBY, an individual; PATWCK V. 
COLLINS, an indi\idual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an indiadual; HAWLEY mOXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY U P ,  an ldaho l imit4  
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, wkm 
individuals; 
Defendants. I 
On or about May 4,2009, Plaintiff filed his Motjoa for Rbconsldmtioa of the Opinion, 
Order and Judgment Awarding Attorneys Ftr;es to Defadants ("Ptaintiffs Mohon for 
MEMORANDUM lN OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR KECONSLDWTION - 1 
ELAM BURKE 
Reconstderatlon"). Defendants now file thts Memorandum In opposttlon to Plalntlffs Motion 
for Reconslderatlon 
"A d c c ~ s ~ o n  to grant or deny a motion for reconstderation generally rests In the sound 
discretion of'the tnal court " Spur Producrs Gorp v Sfoel Rives LLY, 143 Idaho 81 2, 8 15, 153 
P.3d 1 t 58,  cirlnpJordan v Becks, 135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908 (2001). A motlon for 
reeonslderat~on allows a party an opportunity to draw the tnal court's attention to errors of law or 
fact In t h g ~ n k a l  declslon Johnson v Lamhros. 143 Idaho 468,473, 147 P 3d 100 (Ct App 
2006) (emphasis added). A motton for rccons~deratlon does not requlre the presentation of 
additional facts, cspeclally where the rnoflon 1s based on the lnltlai cvldence presented to the tnal 
court See Id 
ANALYSIS 
I .  
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION SHOULD RE DENIED BECAUSE 
PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE, ERRORS OF LAW OR FACT 
RELATING TO THIS COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS 
As a preliminary matter, i t  is important to note that Plaintiff simply relies on the same 
legal arwments and analysis in support of his Motion for Reconsideration that he relied upon in 
opposition to Defendants' Motlon to Dtsmlss and In support of Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow 
Dcfkndants' Request for Attorneys' Fees and Costs ("Motion to Disallow"). As outlined above, 
the purpose of a motion for rcconslderatlon is to allow a party to bring an error in law or fact to 
the Court's attention; not to raise the same arguments previously decided by the Court. Based on 
that fact alone, Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration should be denied. 
MEMORANDUM IN CIPPOSITION TO P1,AIN'l'IE'F'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATlON - 2 
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A. This Court's Finding that Plaintiffs Claims Were Pursued Frivoiously, 
Unreasonably and Without Foundation is Appropriate and Supported by the 
Record. 
Plaintiff a r p e s  that no attorney fees can be awarded under Idaho Code 5 12-1 2 1 when the 
case involvcs novel icgal questions or tssues of first rmpresslon (PIalntlffs Motion for 
Reconslderatton, p. 3.) Plalntlff then asserts that h ~ s  conversion and aldtng and abettlng clatms 
werc valld c la~ms - based on his unsupported assertion ofhavlng a "valld and perfected secunty 
Interest" - and argues that secured creditors have stand~ng to pursue such cfalrns agatnst thtrd 
partles such as Defendants. (Id, pp 4-6 ) 
Platntlff s arguments, however, fall to address the fact that Plalnt~ff s purported secunty 
Interest 1s one of the many issues cunently bang  l~tlgated In the underlyng lawsult lnvolvlng the 
AIA ent~tles. Slnce there has been no determrnat~on of that ~ssue,  Plalntlff s claim 1s 
unsupported. 
In any event, this Court previously determined that no valid cause of action for 
converslon could be asserted against I>efendants because pnor to Defendants' rctentlon as 
counsel In the underlyng actlon, thls Court entered a prellmlnary tnjunctlon ordenng operational 
authonty of AIA to remaln at status quo. (Oplnlon and Order on Defendants' Mot~on to Dlsrniss 
and Plalntlffs Mot~on to Amend Complaint ("Oplnlon and Order on Motlon to I>lsrnlss"), p 14 ) 
Slncc AIA was authonzcd to retaln Defendants to defend against the clalms asscrted by Platnt~ff 
In the underlyng lawsult, there could be no "'wrongful dominion" necersary for P l a~n t~n ' t o  state 
a valld clalm for converslon See Tonx v Allred, 100 Idaho 905, 919,606 P 2d, 334 (1980) For 
that same reason, Plaintiff cannot assert a valid claim for aiding and abetting against Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO P1,AIN"IFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIL>tKATION - 3 
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Plaint~Ealso a r p e s  this case presents issues of first impression, and that an award of 
attorney fees IS therefore inappropriate under Idaho Code i 12- 12 1 .  (Plalnt~Ps Motlon for 
Reconstderatlon, pp 9-10.) However, Plaintiffs clams cannot truly be categonped as ''issues of 
first tmpresslon" because, as outl~ned tn this Court's Order and Optnton on Defendants' Motion 
to Dtsmiss, and thrs Court's Optnion and Order on Defendants' Motlon for Award of Attomey's 
Fees an8 Costs ("Order on Defendant's Motlon for Fees and Costs"), ldaho case law and the 
Idaho Gode clearly lnval~date ach and every clalrn asserted by PIalntiff ~n thls case Thus, 
Plaintiffs clams were pursued iiivolously, unreasonably and wlthout foundat~on, support~ng the 
lmpositlon of an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 5 12- 12 1. 
I?. This Court" Award of Anorney Fees Pursuant to I.C. 6 30-1-746 is  
Appropriate. 
Pfarntlflcont~nues to assert that a stock pledgee has standlng to pursue clal~ns directly 
agarnst thtrd parties. (Plaintiffs Mot~on for Reconslderat~on, p. 10.) Pla~nt~ff  argues that even 
though thls Court rejects hls arguments and citations to case law from otherjunsdlctions, such 
findings do not demonstrate his cla~rn was frivolous. (Id., p. 1 I .) However, Pla~ntiff ails to 
address the clear language of Idaho Code 5 30-1-741, which provides that onJ those who were 
shareholders at the t ~ m e  of the act or omiss~on have standing to commence a denvatrve action. 
As this Court prev~ously found, Pla~ntiff was not a shareholder when Defendants were retamed to 
represent the AIA ent~ttes, and Plalntlff has not been determined to he a shareholder by way of a 
lawful transfer of share$ or other means (Order on Defendant's Motlon for Fees and Costs, p. 
9.) Plalnttff's contrnued failure to acknowledge the clear and unambiguous language of ldaho 
Gode $ 30-1-741 supports thls Court's pnor findtng that Plalnttff's pursutt of denvattve claims 
Mf'MORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 7 0  PLAMTIFF'S MOTION FOR KEGONSIDE,RA'I'lON - 4 
EiAM BURKE ELAM BURKE 
was hvolous  and unre~onable .  Aceording?, h s  Court's award of attomcy fees pursuant to 
ldaho Code 30- 1 -746 is appropriate and supported by the record 
C. This Court's Award of Anorney Fees Pursuant to I.C. jj 48-608(5) is 
Appropriate. 
Piaint~ffaserts that a consumer protectton act claim may be validly acsertcd against an 
attorney. (Plalntlffs Motion for Reconsideration, p. I 1 .) Platnt~ff argues h ~ s  consumer 
protection act c l am was asserted both dlrectly and denvattvely, and that his denvdt~ve claim 
should not have been drsm~ssed' and, tn any event, was not frivolous (Id, p 12 
Plalntlff s argument rcgardrng thts Court's decislon to dlsrnlcs h1.s p u ~ o r l c d  denvatlve 
claim relates to t h ~ s  Court's denlal of Pfalntrffs Mot~on to Amend, which i c  not p'irt of 
I'la~ntlff's Motlon for Remns~deration. In any event. PlaintlAchas falied to present facts or 
argument In support of hls Motion for Recons~deratlon which cfcmonstrate tha: t h ~ s  Court's 
award of  attorney's fces pursuant to Idaho Code $ 48-608(5) was in enor I'lalnt 1f7 has failed to 
establtsh that he 1s a purchaser of goods or savlces such that he has standing t o  pursue a c l a ~ m  
under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act Plalntlff clearly has no contractual rclat~onsh~p with 
Defendants, wh~ch  1s a prerequisite for pursutng a va11d clatm based on the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act. See Haskin v Glass, 102 ldaho 785,640 P.2d 1 I86 (C't App 1982) 
Accordingly, this Court's award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Codc $ 48-608(5) 1s 
appropn ate 
I Platnttffs denvattve clatrn was not "dismissed " Rather, this Court denled Platntifl's Mohon to Amend to 
assert a denvattve clam 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO PLADJTEF'S MOTION FOR RFCOh'SII>FKATION - 5 
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0, Fsctuel Findings Relative to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss do Not Prevent 
Tbll; Court From Awarding ANorney Fees to Defendants. 
Whether facrual hnd~ngs may be made relative to a motion to d~smrss under Idaho Rule 
of CtVrl Procedure I2(b)(6) IS irrelevant for determ~ntng whether thls Court shouid reconsider its 
Order on Defendant's Motlon for Fees and Costs. Moreover, this Court's dcclsion on 
Uelendmt's Motion ta Dtsrnlss 1s the subject of Pla~ntiffs Notlee of Appeal, and arguments 
relattng to that dects~on are not appropnate tn  hls Motion for Reconsideration. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregalng, Defendants respecthliy request that thls Court deny Pla~nttffs 
Motlon for Kecons~derat~on. 
DATED this f l d a y  of May, 2009. 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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copy of the above and foregoing Instrument to be served upon thc following tn the manner 
indicated below. 
Michael S. R~sseii U S Ma11 
CAMPULL L BISSFI I & KIRBY, PI,LC Wand Del  very 
7 South Howard Strcct, Sultc 416 
-- Federal Express 
Spokane, Washingon 99201 < Facs~rn~le Transmtsslon 
(509) 455-7 1 1 1 
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ELAM B U R K E  
ELAM & B U R K E  
ATTOIiIu'FYS h T  LA'& 
JAMES D. LARUE 
2 5 1  E a s t  Front  S t ree t ,  Sut te  300 
Post Oflrce Box 1539 
Rorse, ldaho 8 9 0 1  
Telephone 105 349,5454 
F a x  205 3 8 4 . ~ 8 ~ ~  
May 1 1,2009 
Please deliver the following pages to: 
NAME: Honorable Jeff Brudie 
COMPANY: Nez Perce County Courthouse 
TEL,. #: (208) 750-2057 
FAX #: (208) 799-3058 
NAME: Michael S. Bissell 
COIIIPANY: CAMPBELL, BlSSELL & KIRBY, PLLC 
TEL. #: (509) 455-71 00 
FAX #: (509) 455-71 11 
FROM: Sandi / James D. LaRue 
File No.: 7082-001 311-fl EN 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES (including this page): 8 
FAXED MATEMAL DESCRIPTION OR COMMENTS: Attached please find a courtesy 
copy of Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Mot~on for Reconsideration filed 
on May 1 1,2009 
CONFIUENTLALIW NOTICE 
The tnformatlon In thts fdcstmtle ts confidentla1 and tntended only for the use of the addressee The dala 
mnsmttted IS attorney pnvtleged and may be exempt from dtsclosure Do not copy or dtstnbute ro anyitnc 
other (han the addressee Reltancc on th1.i da& by other than the tntended reoptent ts prohthtted Please 
notify us tmmedtately tf vou have recetved thts communtcatton tn error Upon nottficatton we wtll mange  
for return of the fax coptec to tlam Rr Burke Thank you for your asststance 
Onginal  documents w ~ l l  
I 1 Follow by regular mar! 
I 1 FoI!ow by Federal Express 
I x..XX I Not be sent 
If you have any problems receiving, please call Sandi at (208) 343-5454. 
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Plaint~ff: 1 
) OPINION AN11 O J i l > l ~ K  O N  
V .  ) 1 )I:I'l~NIlA3 J'S' 340'1'10N 
) f40K ItliC'0NSII)I~lIA 1'1ON 
G A R Y  11. BA13131?'rl', an indivltiual: 1). JOIIN ) ANJI I>l,AlN i JFf*'S MO'l'lON 
AS1 {BY, an indi~idual. I'A?'IIl('K V. ) FOR R13  ' ~ )NSI I~ I~KiZ 'T ION 
('OI,I,INS, an individual; IXICIIAKL) A 1 
I<II,l:Y, an individual; IlA\4TI_f:\r' TlXOXl'I ,I, ) 
f:NNlS & IIAMII,EY, 1,1,1) an Idaho limited ) 
liability partnership; JAN13 DOJ:S I-X, 1 
unknown ~ndividuals; 
1 
Defendants. ) 
'I his matter is beforc the Court fin !)s1;~.ndants' Motion for lieconsidelation oftlie Cotlrt's 
award of attornejis' k e s  and costs arid Plaintiff's h4ot1on for l iccons~derat~on f the same. A 
hearing on the Motions was held 011 h4ay 14, 2009. f'laintif'fiieed 'I'aylor was represented by 
attorney Michael S. 13issell. Ilclendants Babbitt, Ashby. Collins. Riley and the law f i r ~ n  of 
Ilawley Troxell Ennis & i-lawley were represented by attorney James 1). I,aRue. 'I he Court. 
11aving read the motion and briefs ofthe parties. having considered the record in the matter 
Toylor v lj~zhhil. 01 (11 
Ortier on h4otrons for Recoiisitlcratioti of1 c:cs & ('osts 
,4[-J(i. IiItc. - 1,0147 
having heard o1;il argun?cnts of counsel and hcing fully advised in thc matter, hereby renders 11s 
decision 
PROCEUUIbZI, BAGKGROUNII 
011 illpr~l 3. 20013. this Court entered I ~ S  Opinion and (Irder on 1)efendants' I'vlotion fol 
Award of Attorncyc' Fees and Costs. where111 the Court granted 1)efcntfants $20.000 00 in 
atrorneys' fees pursuaiit to 1.C'. 5 12-121. Rule 54(e)(1) of the Idaho liilles of Civil Procedure. 
I C fj 30-1-74(t(?_) and I ( 2 .  3 48-608(5) O n  April 21, 2909, Defcl?ddiit., filed a Motion for 
Itcconslderat~o~~ :rsklng the Court to reconsider the amount of attorrlcy fces granted and secklng a 
clarilicatlon of tllc factors set forth in liule 54(e)(3) ofthe Idaho lirlles of' Civil P~ocedu~e .  
On May 4. 2009, Plaintiff filed a Motlon for lieconsiderat~on contending the Court crrcd 
111 awardtng ~ittorneys' fees under 1.C. ji 12-121. asserting f'laint~fi-s clain~s were not f~ivolous 
and. even ~fattort~eys'  fees might otherwise be warranted under I C' 6 10-1-746(2) and l.G 6 48- 
h08(5), award can be granted as Defendants failed to iternl~e lecs specific to the related 
claims. 
STANDAImS UPON A REQUEST FOR COS'I'S AND FEES 
'I he statutory language determines whether an award of attorneys' fees is mandatory or 
d~sclctionary. When an award is discretionary. a court must perceive the issue as one of 
discretion, act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards 
;~pplicable to thc specific choices available to it. and the court must reach its decision by an 
exercise of reason. I' O Venrures lnc  v Lolicks 12arnily Irrevocuhle Ilkust. 144 Idaho 233. 159 
I' 3d 870 (2007). A court's discretionary authority includes the discretion to award reasonable 
attorney fees to the prevailing party in a civil action when such an :ward is providcd for bp an) 
statute. I.li.C.1'. 54(e)(l). 
ii7y/or- v /ichi~rl, c l  a /  
Order o n  Motiorls for ?ieconsitler.ation of Fees & Costs 
ANA I dY sis 
f31aintilf asserts the Court erred in awarriil~g diluiticys' fcfezs. !f the Ccurt is persuadctf by 
I'la~ntiff's argument, it \\'otxld render Ilefendants' hlotron for Reconsideratio11 moot. I'herehrc. 
the Cloust must first ntake a determination as to the ~ ~ l c r i t s  of Plaintiff-s motion 
A m I N ' l l S  A S S  I I I A h1O lLION E(U& J<ECoNSlJlfiI<A'I'1<jN 
-- 
Under 1.G. 5 12- 12 1 and 1 J< C: P. 54(e), attctrneys' fees may be awarded only where t h e ~  L. 
1s a prevailing party and a court finds the lausult ails brought, pursued or defended f r ~ v o l o u s l ~  
unreasonably and without foundation. 14aintif'fasserts his claims, in part if not in their cntlrety. 
\yere novel issues or issues of first impression and, tl~erefore. werc not brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreason;ibly or witl~out foundation. 'I'he Court agrees attorneys' fees are not to h i  
ax~arded under 1.C $ 12-1 2 1 unless all of the claims brought or pursued arc found to be 
frivolous, tlnreasonable or without foundat~on nor are attorneys' Sces appropriate undcr 1.C 5 1' 
121 if the issues are novel or issues of first impression. "A party is 11ot ent~tled to attorneys' fcci 
if the issue is one of first impression in Idaho." J,ixnc Nunch v ('rty ~ ( S Z A I I  Vulley. 145 ldaho 87. 
"3, 175 P.3d 776 (20071, citing SIi/Z Const , L L C v Iduhi) Stute LTnzvtvr.sity. 140 Idaho 8, 14. 
Attorney fees atc not apprcpribtc itnder l.C 5 12-1 21 and ! l i  C.1'. 54(e) unless all 
claims brought or all defenses assested ale frivolous and wlthout foundation 
Where there arc "multiple claims ar~d multiple defenses, ~t 1s not appropriate to 
segregate those claims and defenses to determine which werc or were not 
frivolously defended or pursued The total defense of plaintiff's proceedings must 
be ur~reasonable or fri\lolous." hlug~c Volley Rucllc~logy /-1.\.sctcrufe.s, I )  R 31 
Pvufessronui Buszness ,Cervrce~, Ir7c . 1 19 ldaho 5 5 8 ,  808 P 2d 1103 (1 990) 
Managemer~t Cutu1y.vi.r v Turbo Wesf Corptli*, 119 ldaho 626, 630, 809 P.2d 487 (1991) 
In the instant matter. Defendants sought attorneys' fees and costs ;ic the prevailing p:trti 
afier the Court granted Ilefendants' 1.K C' P 12[b)[6) motion to dismiss and denied P1;untifl-i 
icry/or I, Bnh1j11, el ci/ > 
Order o11 Motrorls for Rccor~rrtfer~tror~ of Fees B ('ostc 
JIU(J K f (  oo l jo  
motlon to itinend h ~ s  complaint. I n  h ~ s  Complaint, l'l;rt~ltlIf ,iIlcgc\ forrr causes of actton against 
Ilefendants. (1)  conversion. (2 )  tortlous interfe~ence. ('3) i r , i c t r l  'iiicj;ut Ciiiisir;;ctittc fraud, ;::lcf, (4) 
malpractice Plalntlfrs clainis against the Uefendi-lnts tvcrc r t o t  based on an attolncv-cllent 
relationship bct;veeli f'lair~tiff and I)cfcndants Rathcr l ' I~iint1fl~~ claims against the IJeScndants 
were based solely on 1)efendants' represei~tatior~ ol A l A  S c ~ v ~ c c s  C'orporation and AIA 
Insurance. Inc in a lacvsuit brought against the corporiitlollk h> the I'laintiff Reed 'I'ayloi 
Plalntlff theorlred that, by accepting money fiom 11s coryoratc. cl~cnli, for lcgal fee<. Defendants 
had unlawftilly converted to tlien~selves AIA fiinds lhilt ~ ~ g i ~ r f ~ ~ l l ~  bclong to Keeci 1 nylor and, 
that by defer~dlng its clients Uefendants had commlttcd nisilp~~ict~ce. aided and abetted their 
clients in conlm~ttitlg fraud arid artlcd and abetted thcir client\ 111 toltlously intcrlerrng with 
Plaintiffs contractual t-ights 
P1:%11it11'1'~0ntends an award of attorneys' fecs was ~ n ~ p l o p e r  as some. ~f not all, of his 
clailns were novel ~ s s u e s  or issues of'first imprcsslon fhc C'olrrt is not persuaded 'I'hree of the 
four claims asscr-tcd by the Plaintiff are colnmon law thcor~cs of recovely that have been 
addressed numelous timcs by Idaho's courts. Whllc I'lnn~t~fi-s cholcc of defendants is novel, in 
that he opted to bling his clalms for conversion. tortlous ~ntclfcrcnce and fraud against the 
attorneys representing thc corporations rather tha~; agalnsl thc corporations and thc corporate 
leadership. the claims certainly are not novel. Nor I \  I'lalntili-s c l a ~ m  for malpractice brought 
against attorneys with whom lie had no attorncy-cllcnt ~ e l a t l t ~ n s h ~ p  novel or a matter of filst 
1 impression. 'The only novel ~ s s u e  or one of first ~ n ~ p r c ~ s l o n  hefore the Court was the litigation 
privilege doctrine ralsed as a defense by the Defendant\ 
I In the unrelated case of Toylor v A4nrlc, 142 Idaho 253, 127 I' ?d  1 5 6  i ? O O > )  lieed rnylor brought an action 
against an attorney with whom he had no attorney client re1'1tioilrhip 1 llc Suprerne Court, in iuling oil the appeal, 
emphasii-ed that an  attorney-client relationship is required i i i  ,i 1eptil ii~nlpinctice claiin 
Taylor v Bobbit, ct cii 1 
Order on Motions for Iieconsideratior~ of Fees & Costs 
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In addliioll to the C'ourt finrjirig attorneys' fees appropriate under 1.C 9 12- 12 1 and 
I . ~ < . c  P. 54tej. the Colrrt f o ~ t ~ l d  Defendants request for attorneys' fees pllrsuant to 1.C 5 30- 1 - 
746 and 1.C. 5 48-608(5) valid relative to two of Plaintiffs claims. However. the Court need not 
address whether attorneys' fees \.iere properly requested under the two statutory provisions as the 
Court found all of I'laintiKs claims were brought and pursued frivolously. unreasonably and 
without Ivundation and. therefore, awarded attorneys' fees pursuant to 1.C. ji 12-121 
Based on the Coun's review and finding that attorneys' fees were appropriate under 1.C 
3 12-121 and I.iZ.C:.f>. 54(e), the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider. 'fhe Court 
conttnues to be of the opinion that each of Plaintifrs claims was so plainly fallacious as to be 
decmetf frivolous and that Plaintiff's claims were not supported by a good faith argument for 
modillcation of the law in 1daho.l 
Rule 54(e)(3) of the Idaho Kules of Civil Procedure reads: 
Amount of Attorney Fees. In the event the court grants attorney fees to a party or 
parties in a civil action it shall consider the following Factors in determining the 
amount of such fees: 
(A) 'The time and labor required. 
(B) 'I'he novelty and difficulty of the questions. 
(C) The skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law. 
(11) The prevailing charges for like work. 
(IJ) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
(f;) 'Ihe time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances of the 
case. 
(C i )  The amount involved and the results obtained. 
(I]) Thc undesirability of the case. 
(I) 'The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client. 
(J) Awards in similar cases. 
(K) The reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer Assisted 
1,egal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably necessary in preparing a 
party's case. 
(Ii) Any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the particular case. 
' Li171red lnvesrors Life Insurance Co v Severson, 143 Idaho 628, 634, 151 P 3d 824 (2007) 
1;?j'Ior v Nnbbrt. et a1 6 
Ortiei o n  R4otions for Reconsideration of Fees & Costs 
On h4otion for Reconsideration, Dcfciidants ask the Court 10 c!arify the factnrt: it 
considered in awarding attorneys' fees and asks the Court to reconsider the amount of the award 
I'he Court concedes 11 provided only a gencral statement rcgardlng its co~~siderations under Rule 
54(e)(3) in its April 3, 2009 Opinion and that an articulation of the factors considered is 
appropriate. 
'I'he Court did not find the questions presented by Ylalntiff s clalms particularly novel or 
difficult. As Ilefendants noted in their opposition brief to Plaintiff's motion to reconsider, the 
legal requircmcnts for each and every claim brought by Plaintiff are well established and the 
fatal flaws in each of Plaintiffs claims should l-tave been easily evidint to Plaintiff. The same is 
true in defending against each claim. 
Plaintiffs claims were based in statute and common law and \were. for the most part. 
claims with well established proof elements. As a result, defending agalnst the claims did not 
require extensrve time, labor or research as each claim contained a fat;il flaw that was easily 
discovered and presented to the Court. 'The Court does not disaglee with Ilefendants' argument 
that a malpractice claim presents a case within a case. Hotvever, in the instant case there was no 
attorney-client relatiolxhip between Plaintiff and I>efencfants. a fatal flaw easily ascertained 
without the need for a full understanding of the complexities of the underlying case as argued by 
Defendants' counsel. 
One of the many factors considered by the Court 111 decidlng the colnplexity of the instant 
matter along with the time and labor required was the brief elapse of time between the filing of 
the Complaint and the grant of Defendants' motion to dismiss. a mere six month time frame I n  
addition. counsel for the Defendants, whose fees were based on an liottrly rate in the instant 
R?y/or v Bubhrt, et a1 7 
Order on Motrons for Kzconsrderatron of 1:ees Rc Costs 
matter, are sk~lled ;itld experienced attorneys able to address issues tl~orc~ugiily. efficiently and 
effectively. Afict recollsidcration of the ibcrors the Court is to cons::!cr uncler ! N (' P 54(c?(?). 
the C:ciurt remains of the opinion that a reasonable amount of attctrncy,' fees for defending 
against tile clairr?\ brought by Plaintiff is $20,000.00. 
ORXIEN 
'I'hc Court has, as requested by the parties, clarified and al-tlculatcd the factors considered 
by the Court in deciding a reasonable amount of attorneys' fees to lx award to 1)efendants 
pursuant to 1 C. jj 12- 121 and 1.1X.C.P. 54(e)(l). 
I'llaintiff's Motion to Reconsider is hereby DE;NlI:I>. 
1)ckndants' Motion t o  Reconsitier is hcrehy I~I<NlI:I) 
Uateti this $ dz? oi Julie 2009 
/"*3 
7bylor- v liubl;r~. el cil 8 
Orilei or1 Motrons  firr Kecor~ridcratior~ of'l:ce.s X: Casts 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing OPINION & ORUER was: 
____ hand delivered via court basket, or 
SP 
I/;mailed, postage pl-cpajd, by the undersigned at Lewiston. Idaho, this !_ day of June 
2009, to: 
Michael S. Bissell 
Campbell. Bissell & Kirby. I'i,I,C 
7 South I loward St. Ste 4 10 
Spokane, WA 99201 
'faylor vs. JSabbitt, et al. 
Order on Motions for Jieconsideration of Fees & Costs 9 
: i i ~ i i s  
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7 South Howard Street, Suite 416 , ..&, * 5 L d  7 " 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Tel: (509) 455-71 00 
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Attomeys for AppeIlant Reed Taylor 
M THE DISTRICT C O ~ T  OF TIJE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 'TI-It.: 
STATE OF IDAFIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual, who is 
brjn@ng this action on behalf of himself and 
on behalf of the creditors and/or shareholders 
of AIA Services Corporation and AIA 
Insurance, Inc.; 
Appellant, 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; I). JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual: HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
unknown individuals; 
Case No.: CV-08-01765 
SECOND M E N D E D  NOTICE OF 
APPEAL 
Respondents. - I-.
- - 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, GARY D. B A B B I ~ ,  I) JOHN 
ASHBY, PATRICK V. COLLINS, RICIIARD A. RILEY, AND 
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS 6z HAWLEY LLP. AND THE PARTIES' 
ARORNEY JAMES D. LARUE, ELAM & BURKE, P.A., P.O. BOX 
1539, BOISE, TD 83704; AND 
TO: THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
AUG K1.C 00156 
N61)'TIGE IS HEREBY GIVEN '1'13A'T: 
I .  The above named Appellant Reed J .  Taylor appeals against the above- 
named Respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Order granting 
Defendants' Motion to I9isrniss and denying Iqaintifrs Motion to Amend Complaint 
entered In the above entltled action on the 23'"aay of December, 2008. Opinlon and 
Order o n  flcfendants' blotion for Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs entered in the 
above cntitlrd action on April 3, 2009. &Judment entered on April 24, 2009. & 
Opinion and Order on Ilefendants' %lotion for Reconsideration and Plaintiff's h4otion fbr 
Reconsideration entered on June 1:  2m the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie presiding 
2.  Appellant has a nght to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. and the 
Judgmentsi'Orders dcscrlbed in paragraph 1 above are appealable Orders under and 
pursuant to Rules 4 and 1 l(a)(l). I.A.R. 
3. A preliminarv statement of issues on appeal, which the Appellant intends 
to assert in this appeal arc as follo\vs (several of which are issues of first impression); 
provided. the following list of issues is not exhaustive and Respondents should expect 
others: 
a Dld plalntlff state causes of actlon agarnst attorneys for fraud, 
breaches of fiduciary dutles, conversion. excessive compensation. 
and/ol tortlous Interference and/or causes of actlons pcrtarnlng to 
aldlng and abettlng and/or conspllacy to asslst others In the 
commlssron of any of any of the foregoing causes of actton 
b. Does the Litigation Privilege exist in Idaho and, if so: does it bar 
claims against attorneys for fi-aud, constructive ilaud, breaches of 
fiduciary duties, conversion. excessive compensation. and tnrtious 
interference and/or causes of action pertaining to aiding and 
abetting and/or conspiracy to assist others in the colnrnission of 
any of the foregoing causes of action? 
SECOND AMENDED NOTlCE OF APPEAL - 2 
c. Does a plaintiff state a citusc of action against an attorney for 
conversron and other causcs of actton by alleging that the attorney 
accepted payment for attorncg's fees and costs from funds the 
attorney knew or should have known were funds in which the 
pla~ntiff held a valid and perficted securlty interest'! 
d.  Does a stock pledgee. \iil~o 1s also a secured creditor of the 
revenues and all of the ' t t o~k  of the coporallon. have standing to 
pursue dlreet causes o-f'act~ol~s against partres for cla~rns owned by 
the corporation? Does the m n e  plaintiff have standlng to pursue 
derr\iatrve causes of act1011 on behalf of the corporation'? 
e Does a cred~tor of an insol~ent corporat~on, who 1s also a secured 
credrtor of the revenues o f  the corporatlon, hate  standlng to assert 
d~rcct causes of action ;iynlnst parties for claims ouned by the 
corporatlon7 Does thc same plaintiff have standrng to pursue 
der~vatlve causes of acttons on behalf of the corporat~on? 
f: Are allegations that an attorney has exceeded hlsjher scope of 
representation sufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss for failure to 
state a claim based upon the 1 ]tigation Privilege? 
g Can an attorney represcnt corporate cllents wlth dlverglng Interests 
when the representallon was approved by ppersons with 
d~rectorlofficer conflicts of' ~nterest? 
Irl Iloes Idaho's Consumer I%rcttcct Act bar a person from asserting 
dlrect and derivative cla~rni\ against an attorney, when the plaintiff 
does not have privity of contlact with the attorney, for violations of 
Idaho's Consumer Protection Act? 
i .  In considering a motictil to dlsmiss under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), is i t  
permissible for the district court to take judiclal notice of an 
entirely different case rn toio and/or to conslder documents which 
are not in the record for that case? 
j. Can a stock pledgee of' all o f the  stock and revenues of a pledged 
corporation assert direct ancilor derivative causes of actions for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
k. Can a secured creditor. who 1s also the most slgn~ficant creditor of 
an insolvent corporation. ai\scrt direct andlor derlvatlve claims for 
malpractice against an attorney? 
I .  Can the district court jucigc. who is the same judge for two related 
actions, consider privilcgccl documents in granting a motion to 
SECOND AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
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d t c ~ ~ ~ t s s  under IRCI" 12(h)(6) w~thout requiring production of the 
da~ci~mcnts to the other party? 
ni I f  '1 party provides privileged documents to an expert and the 
cxpcrt provides testimony through an affidavit relying on the 
pn\ ~leged documents for the experts testimony, has the attorney- 
clrent privilege been waived and must the documents be produced 
I t ,  t i le opposing party upon a motion to compel? 
n I f  Idatlo adopts the Litigation Privilege defense for an attorney, can 
the <lefense be asserted to dismiss an action pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
12(b)(6) for actions taken by the attorney which the attorney 
'isierti were under the scope of representation, when such scope of 
reprewnt"ion was purportedly agreed to by representatives fi-om 
thc ccirporation client, when the attorney knows or should have 
know11 that: (1) the representatives of the corporation have 
cc,ntllits of interest; (2) the board of directors of the corporation 
cllcnt have conflicts of ~nterest; (3) the corporation has not held an 
:innual shareholder meeting in years; (4) the puvot-ted scope of 
rcprc'cntation was not in the: best interests of at least two 
cctrpitration clients with diverging interests; and 15) the scope of 
representation was not in the best interests of each of the attorney's 
three different clients. 
o I30ci an attorney owe a non-client any fiduciary dutles, specla1 
dutic\ andlor third-party beneficiary obligations when the attorney 
Lno \ t i  or should have known (~ncluding, wlthout Iimltatlon): (1) 
that all of the shares and revenues of the corporation client the 
attorney is purportedly representing are pledged as collateral to the 
12on-ellent and another client is in default of the obligations which 
trigger remedies pertaining to such security ~nterests: (2) the non- 
c l~cnt  has voted the shares appointing himself as the sole officer 
and dtrector of the corporation client, and the corporation cllent is 
hang  wrongfiilly managed by persons breaching fiduciary duties 
:il~d riot safeguarding assets; (3) the assets and funds are 
insuf'liclent to pay the secured credltor who voted the shares of the 
corporation pledged to him as collateral; (4) that ln~lllons of dollars 
In msiets and funds have been unlawfully transferred from the 
corporation client by the very individuals directing the litigation: 
arid (5) the parent corporation of the pledged corporation is also 
'itclng represented by the attorney and the same non-cllent is owed 
lr~lllions of dollars by the parent corporation client who is highly 
~nsolvent? 
p Does a plaintiff have a constitutional right (whether under the 
I'nlteci States Constitution or the State of Idaho's Constitution) to 
SECOND AMEh'DI.l> \CYl ICE OF APPEAL - 4 
obtain dctcumenis, prosecute causes of action and/or pursue causes 
of actlon to protect ancilor recover %sets which are subject to a 
security in terest and/or pursue causes of actions action against 
attomeys relating to any o m  or nmre the foregoing:) 
(1. Did the district court err in awarding attorneys' fees to Defendants. 
pursuant to 1.C. Q 12-121. 1.C'. 8 30-1-746 and L.C. 4 48-608(5), 
when plaintiff%$ clainls urtdcr each of the foregoing statutes 
involved novel claims and/or issues of first impression. and 
plaintiff asserted claims relating to security interests held by him 
for propcrlq~ received by Defendants" 
r. Can a district court award a defkndant attorneys' fees pttrsuant to 
I.C. 3 30-1 -746 when it found that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
bring derivative act~ons as a stock pledgee and secured creditor of 
an insolvent co~ora t ion  under I.C. 4 30-1-746, which does not 
expressly prohibit a stock pletlgec or secured creditor of an 
insolvent corporation from pursurng derivative claims? 
s. Can a district court award atlcrrnc?~' fees to a defendant pursuant 
to 1.C. $ 12- 12 1 after plaintif'f's complaint was dismissed pursuant 
to Rule 12(b)(6) based In part upon the district court adopting the 
"Il,it~gat~on Privilege" as a first ~mpression defense? 
t. Can a distrlct court find that a plaintiff pursued an action 
frivolously when the pIaintifY 1s a secured creditor who pursues 
claims against attorneys who have received payment for services 
from funds subject to valid and perfected security interests and/or 
the proceeds of such valid and perfected security interests? 
u. Can a district court make findings offacts that attorney defendants 
did not violate any rules of professional conduct in an action 
dismissed pursuant to Rule I2(b)(6) when the facts alleged in 
plaintiffs complaint state that the attorneys violated rules of 
professional conduct? 
4. 'There has not been an Order sealing all or any portion of this record. 
5. A reporter's transcript is not reclucsted 
6. Appellant requests the ibllo\\ing documents be included in the clerk's 
record. in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, I.A.R.: 
a. This Second AmenddNotice of Appeal; 
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h. ilIi_r?ntifrs Notice of App& 
d. Defendants' Motion to Ilismiss: 
e. I'laintil'f's Response in Opposition to hilotion to Disrn~si. 
f. Defendants' Kepty in Support of h4otion to Dismiss: 
g. Plaintii'fs Motion to Arnenti and Supplement Comp1:trrit ilnclud~ng 
the attached proposed F~rs t  Amended Complain!); 
h .  Ilefendants' Response In Opposition to Plaintiff's r\/lotlor-r to 
Amend Complarnt: 
I. Opinion and Order on i>ekndants7 Motion to 1)1\111i\i. and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint; 
j. Ilekndants' Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' 1 . ~ ~ 5 .  
k.  Ilef'endants' Brief in Support of' Costs and Attorney 's i-ce\ 
1. Affidavit of James 1,ttRue In Support of Memorandun1 C'osts and 
Attorneys' Fees; 
m. Plaintiff' Reed J. 'I aylor's Motion to 1)isaltow Defenddnt\' Rcclucst 
for Attorneys' Fees and Costs: 
n. Affidavit of Michael S Blssell In Support of Plalntlff Rccd J 
'I'aylor's Motion to ISisallow I)efendants7 Request for 4tta>rne>l's 
Fees and Costs: 
o. Defer~dants' Motion for 1,eave to Amend I1efknri:ints. 
Memorancium of'Costs and Attorneys' Fees; 
p. Defendants' Brief' in Support of Motion for Leave ro hlncnti 
Defendants' h4emorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees 
q. Plaintiffs Reply to Ilefendants' Response to Plaintiff-s "cotion to 
Disallow Fees and Costs; 
r. Defendants' Memorandum in Response to Reed Taylor's M o t i o ~ ~  
to Disallow Request for Attorney's Fees and Costs: 
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e. Servlce has been made upon all parties reyu~red to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this 4th day ofJune, 2009. 
CAMlzBt._LL. BISSE1,L &: ~31ig\' PLLC 
£3 y: - 
Michael S. Brssell 
Attorneys for Appellant Reed Taylor 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 4th day of June, 2009, 1 i j u b e d  to he served a 
truc and concct ropy of Appellant's Sccorld Amended Notice of  Appeal ti? the following: 
-- -- MAN11 DELIVERY James D. L,aKue 
U.S. MA11 A- Elam & Burke, PA 
-- OVERNlCiHT MAIL P 0. Box 1539 
- FAX 'TRANSMISSION Bolse, ID 83704 
EMAIL (.pcif attachment) 
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4u(; KEC 00164 
James D. LaRue ISB #I780 
Loren 6. lpsen ISB $1 767 
ELAM & BBUKE. P.A. 
75 1 E. Front S'ueet, Suite 3 00 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Iddm 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-00 13 
Attorneys for Defendmts 
IN THE DISTRICT GOLrRT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, R\t' A h 3  FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV 08-01 765 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOKN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLL1bTS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
EhiWIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability ppartnership; JANE DOES I-X, 
uzknown individuals; 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND 
DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDU!M OF 
COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
Defendants. 
COMES NOW Defendants Gary D. Babbitt, D. John Ashby; Patrick 1'. Collins, Richard 
A. Riley and Hawiey Tromeii Ennis & Hawley LLP, by and through undersigned counsel, and 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(5) moves for leave to amend their Met-norandurn 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AiMF,ND DEFEhDANTS' MEMORANDM OF COSTS ,Y&iI) 
ATTORNEYS ' FEES - 1 
G :7i)S2rOf)l_??Plmd1ng~~Moflon to Dtsmtss'Appilczt~on for Attorneys' F e s  and Costs\ h4otron t Amend Cosr Bil! vn-02 i ipd 
of Casts and Attomeq s' Fees filed in tbls actron to assert a claim ibr recovery of reasonable 
attorneys' fees in the amount of 643,912.50 from PIairatrERecd Taylor pursuant to Id&o Code 
f; 12-1 2O(l)). 
DATED this 3 day of Febmary, 2009. 
ELAM C3: BURKE, P.A. 
--7 
/- ,4 C By: ..-/Cw /-r&$d 
@&es D. LaRue, Of the ~ i r m  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 day of February, 2009,I caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instmment to be served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael S. Bissell U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRI~Y, PLLC Hmd Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Ste. 416 - Federal Express 
Spokane, WA 99201 Facsimile Transxnission (509) 455-71 1 l 
J&D. LaRue 
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO AMEND DEFENDPLhTTS' MEMOR?,?IDUhf OF COSTS AND 
rlTTORNEYS" FEES - 2 
G:~?O82i0013~~leadings?Molion t  1)ismiss'Application for Attorneys' Fees and Cogs\ Motion ti, Amend Cmt Bill ~ r r - l j 2 . ~ ~ d  
Loren C. Ipsen ISB # 1767 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
FacsimiIe: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-001 3 
Attorneys for Defendmts 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individua1; I 
Plaintiff, I Case No. CV 08-01 765 
v, DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERGTION 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN 
ASHBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; R I C H N  A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TROXELL 
ENNIS & WAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknow 
individuals; 
Defendants. I 
Defendants, by and through their attorneys of record, Elam & Burke, P.A., and pursuant 
to Rule 1 l(a)(Z)(B) of the ldaho Rules of Civil ~rocedure, moves this Court to reconsider its 
Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Award of Aborney's Fees and Costs, entered on 
April 3, 2009, to clarify that all the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDEMTION - I 
EVilcl AND BURKE 
were considered by this Court in determining the cost and attorney fee award. Defendants also 
request- that this Court reconsider the mount  of attorney fees awmded. 
This motion is made and based on the file and records in this matter, along with 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, filed concurrently 
herewith 
ORAL ARGUMENT IS REQUESTED. 
DATED this day of April, 2009. 
ELAN & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defmdants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 
_dL day of September, 2008, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument to be served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
Michael S. BisseIl U.S. Mail 
CAMPBELL BISSELL & KIRBY. PLLC Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 4 16 Federal Express 
Spokane, Washington 99201 J Facsimile Transmission 
(509) 455-71 11 
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James D. LaRue ISB #I780 
Loren C.  Ipsen ISB ##I 767 
ELAM & BURKE, P.A. 
25 1 E. Front Street, Suite 300 
P.O. Box 1539 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 343-5454 
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844 
E & B File No. 7082-001 3 
ELAfdl AND B'dRKE. 
Attorneys far Defendants 
1N THE DISTRICT COURT OF M E  SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
REED J. TAYLOR, an individual; I 
Plaintiff, Case No. CV 08-0 t 765 
v. MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
GARY D. BABBITT, an individual; D. JOHN RECONSIDERATION 
ASWBY, an individual; PATRICK V. 
COLLINS, an individual; RICHARD A. 
RILEY, an individual; HAWLEY TKOXELL 
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, an Idaho limited 
liability partnership; JANE DOES I-X, unknow 
individuals; 
Defendants. I 
INTRODUCTION 
On April 3,  2009, this Court entered its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for 
Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs ("Opinion and Order"). Defendants now file this 
Memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration. Defendants request that this Court 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSLDERATION - 1 
E~~~ AND BURKE 
reconsider its Opinion and Order to clarify whether the factors set forth in Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 54(e)(3) were considered by this Court in detemining the cost and attorney fee award. 
Defendants also request that this Court rcconsidcr the mount  of attomey fees awarded. 
COVEWING STANDAWS 
""A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound 
discretion of the triaf court." Spur Products Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho 8 12, 8 15, 153 
P.3d 1 158, citing Jordan v. Beeh,  135 Idaho 586, 592,21 P.3d 908 (2001). A motion for 
reconsideration allows a party an opportunity to draw the kial court's attention to errors of law or 
fact in the initial decision. Johnson v. Lambrus, 143 Idaho 468, 473, I47 P.3d 100 (Ct.App. 
2006). A rnotion for reconsideration does not require the presentation of additional facts, 
especially where the motion is based on the initial evidence presented to the trial court. See id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. 
THE RECORD MUST REFLECT THAT THE FACTORS SET OUT IN IDAHO RULE 
OF CNLL PROCEDURE 54(e)(3) WERE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE 
AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES TO BE AWARDED 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) outlines the factors a trial court must consider 
when determining the amount of attorney fees to award to a prevailing party. While the trial 
court need not make specific findings demonstrating how it employed any of the factors set forth 
in Rule 54(e)(3), i t  must consider the stated factors in determining the amount of the fees. 
Perkins 1). U.S. Tranqformer West, 132 Idaho 427,430, 974 P.2d 73 (1999). Moreover, the trial 
court must demonstrate in the record that it considered each of the factors outlined in RuIe 
54(e)(3). 
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Thc distnct court must, at a minimum, provide a record wh~ch 
establishes that the court considered these factors. They include 
such iterns as the time and labor required, the skill requisite to 
perform the legal service properly, the mount  involved, and the 
results obtained, as well as "any other factor which the court deems 
appropriate" in this case. 
Building Concepts, Lrd. v. Pkcker-ing, 1 1 4 Idaho 640,645, 759 P.2d 93 1 (Ct.App. 1 988). When a 
decision awarding attorney fees contains insufficient: infomation to determine what standard the 
trial court applied or whether it  applied the Rulc 54(e)(3) factors, the award may be vacated arid 
remanded for further consideration. Pet-kins, 132 Idaho at 430-3 1. 
In this case, Defendants outlined and addressed each of the Rule 54(e)(3) fztors  in 
support of their request for an award of attorney fees. (See Afidavit in Support of Defendants' 
Costs and Attorneys' Fees.) However, the Opinion and Order does not appear to specifically 
state that this Court considered all Rule 54(e)(3) factors in detemining the amount of attorney 
fees to award Defendants. To protect this Court's Opinion and Order of April 3,2009, and to 
clarifL the record on appeal, Defendants request that this Court modify its Opinion and Order to 
reflect that all Rule 54(e)(3) factors were in fact considered by this Court. 
If. 
THIS COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER THE AMOUNT OF ATTORNEY FEES 
A W A m E D  TO DEFENDANTS 
A malpractice action is a case-within-a-case, requiring the parties to analyze the facts in 
the underlying action as well as the allegations in the malpractice action. Efam & Burke was at a 
disadvantage at the outset of this case because it lacked a working knowledge of the facts and 
issues in the underlying Iawsuit -most of which were the basis for the claims asserted by 
Plaintiff in this action. Accordingly, it was necessary for Elam & Burke to become familiar with 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
ELAM AhD B U R K E  
the crrcumstanccs relating to the underlying Iaxvsuit invoIving the AM entities to Eully 
understand and evaluate Plaintiffs claims in this case. As this Court is aware, the filings in the 
AIA entities lawsuit are substantial to say the least. 
Plaintiffs Complaint in this action was fled on A u p s t  18,2008. Plaintiffs Complaint 
covered virtually all of the allegations at issue in the PLIA entities lawsuit, consisted of twenty-six 
(26) pages, asserted four (4) causcs of action, and sought damages of $10,500,000 against 
Defendants. PIaintiff also filed his Motion to Amend Complaint on or about October 15, 2008. 
Plaintiffs Proposed Amended Complaint included a significant number of new aIlegations, 
consisted of forty-five (45) pages, asserted seven (7) causes of action, and continued to seek 
damages of $10,500,000. 
In addition, the proceedings in the AIA entities lawsuit were specifically applicable to the 
issues raised in this action. Specifically, Plaintiff fi led a motion to disqualifl Hawley Troxell 
Ennis & Hawley LLP as attorneys in the AZA entities action which was appreciably similar to the 
allegations asserted by Plaintiff in this case. This required Elarn & Burke to devote additional 
time and effort to perform a detailed analysis of Plaintiff's substantial briefing and arguments 
asserted in the underlying action. 
Moreover, Plaintiff initiated a companion case against the law firm of Clements, Brown 
& MeNichols, P.A., and Michael E. McNichoIs individually, which involved allegations and 
issues similar to those asserted by Plaintiff in this case. This required Elam & Burke to analyze 
not only the aljegations in this case and the AIA entities iawsuit, as well as the allegations and 
claims asserted in the companion case to verify the allegations and arguments raised by Plaintiff 
in each of the lawsuits were consistent. 
DEFENDMT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
In addition la the substmtial number of issues raised in Plaintiffs Complaint and related 
issues raised in the underl14ng and campmion cases, Plaintiff attempted to raise even more issues 
rn opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. Defendants were required to conduct additional 
research and andysis to address Plaintiffs a r m e n t s .  While the briefing filed with this Court 
relative to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was substantial, it was necessasy to address the rnany 
issues raised by Plaintiff and to demonstrate that PlaintiFs allegations against Defendants were 
Erivolous, unreasonable and without foundation in law or fact. 
This Court issued its Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and 
Plaintiffs Motion to Amend Complaint on December 23, 2008, dismissing at1 claims asserted by 
Plaintiff- including his substantial damage claim of $10,500,000 - and denying Plaintiffs 
Motion to Amend Complaint. On January 6,2009, Defendants filed their Memorandm of Costs 
and Attorneys' Fees, seeking an award of attorney fees in the amount of $43,912.50. (See 
Defendant's Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys' Fees.) On April 3,2009, this Court 
determined all claims asserted in Plaintiffs Complaint and alleged in his proposed Amended 
Complaint were hvolous, unreasonable and without foundation in law or fact, and found that 
Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code tj 12-121 .' (See 
Opinion and Order.) However, this Court awarded less than half of the attorneys' fees requested 
by Defendants. (See Id.) The Opinion and Order does not state why the attorney's fees requested 
by Defendants were reduced. (See Id,) 
 h his Court also determined Defendants were entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code $8 30-1-746(2) 
and (3)' and 48-608(5). (See Opinion and Order.) 
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Based on the foregoing, Defendantrs request that this Court re-evaluate Defendants-lings 
in suppati of an award of casts and attorneys' fees, and reconsider its award of attorney fees. 
Buildrng Concepts, Lrd, stipra, 1 14 fdaho at 645.  
CONCLUSlON 
Defendants respectfulIy request that this Court &rant their Motion for Reconsideration and 
cMFy that all factors set out in Rule 54(e)(3) w m  considered. Defendants also request that t h s  
Court reconsider the amount of attorney fees awarded. 
DATED this cZ I day of Aprif, 2009. 
E L M  & BURKE, P.A. 
By: 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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EL4M AND B U R K E  
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the day of April, 2009,1 caused a true and correct 
copy of the above and foregoing instmment to be sewed upon the following in the m m e r  
indicated below: 
Michael S. BisselI U.S. Mail 
GAEXPBELL BISSELL & Hand Delivery 
7 South Howard Street, Suite 41 6 
- Federal Express 
Spokane, Washington 9920 1 Facsimile Transmission 
(509) 455-71 1 I 
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